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ABSTRACT
Throughout American history there has been an increase in the involve-
ment of the federal government in the regulation of social behavior.
Increasingly regulation has taken the form of prohibition: Thou Shalt
Not Do; no discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters by 1985.
The environmental area is rife with examples of prohibitive policy.
The thesis studies the formation and implementation of one of these --
the extremely prohibitive Endangered Species Act -- through case
studies and measures of program output.
Critics argue that prohibitive policy is bad because it does not
allow for a balancing of the costs and benefits of alternative actions.
They assume that implementation decisions are made solely on technical
criteria, that outside parties are excluded from decision-making, and
that agency discretion is limited.
The thesis argues, however, that these are bad assumptions.
Prohibitive policy is not implemented prohibitively. Resource scarcity
and huge amounts of technical uncertainty force administrators to exercise
discretion. The political context in which implementation takes place
provides an opportunity for other interests to enter into decisions.
Indeed, the thesis outlines a set of nonstatutory forces that shape
implementation at least as much as the original statute. These include
resource limitations, conflicting organizational goals, bureaucratic
and scientific conservatism, internal advocates, constituent support
groups, and legislative and judicial pressures.
If prohibitive policy is not implemented prohibitively, why use it?
The thesis argues that there are observable impacts of a prohibitive
prescription that are useful to interest groups, agencies, and
politicians. For example, prohibitive policies have a definite
impact on the initial balance of power in a political negotiation.
The analysis further identifies two substantive criteria for deter-
mining whether to advocate the use of prohibitive mandates in the
future -- in cases of extreme risk, and where the goal is to define
or protect a social ethic.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence E. Susskind
Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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PREFACE
This thesis tells several stories. On the surface, it examines
prohibitive policy -- a kind of policy that prohibits a set of actions
without allowing for a balancing of the costs and benefits of alternatives.
But it also describes what happens during the implementation of a bill,
how bureaucracies behave, and how professionalism and expertise influence
the actions of administrative agencies. In addition, it deals with the
process of policy formation and the development of regulatory policy.
The thesis is also very much concerned with the endangered species
issue. I started out -- and remain -- fairly well persuaded by the
preservationists' argument. The statistics on declining diversity and
changing world land use patterns are dramatic, promoting a sense of
urgency about determining the values that should be assigned to plant
and animal populations, and the institutions that should be established
to manage them.
Nevertheless, while I find the argument persuasive, I cannot defend
it absolutely on the basis of the rational economic paradigm. I was
relieved, therefore, to find that my hypothesis was true: There is in
fact enormous amounts of uncertainty and latitude involved in these
seemingly-technical decisions. Choice and judgment is pervasive.
Supposedly the two things that are certain in life are death and taxes.
Yet we all know people who don't pay taxes, and we have some latitude
over when, how, and where we will die. Indeed, many cultures eliminate
death by defining it away: Physical death is not death, but a step into
eternal life. Discretion is prevalent in most facets of life, probably
more so than we generally realize. Even in seemingly-irreconcilable
vi
conflicts between preservation and development, compromise between social
objectives is usually possible if the incentives are large enough to
force the parties into negotiation, and if the conflicts are approached
creatively and early in the planning process.
The endangered species problem has both technical and institutional
dimensions. The institutional question is the toughest: Who can manage
animal populations that -- God help them -- do not respect political
boundaries? In the United States, we have only rudimentary land use planning.
State-level critical areas programs are in an infant stage. National-
scale land use management (and ecosystem preservation) is almost nonexistent.
Yet the American institutional question is minor compared with that
at the international level. Not only are there few international manage-
ment institutions that work, but the issue of social conflicts is much
more real. It is a lot easier to deny an agency a development project
under conditions of affluence, than to deprive a poacher of his ability
to feed his family: The ecological issue begs the social question.
Until some of the problems of human society are solved, it is unlikely
that much headway will be made in preserving ecological diversity.
I am not optimistic. Yet if this analysis encourages several readers to
think creatively about the problem, then it will have served a useful purpose.
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CHAPTER 1 -- INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of the United States, there has been an
increase in federal government intervention in the resolution of social
problems. From an originally-limited role in everyday life, governmental
oversight has proliferated dramatically into areas once thought to be
solely the domain of the individual and private organizations. Today,
there are regulations that specify the minimum size lot on which an
individual can build a house, the labelling on cigarette packages, the
safety equipment on automobiles, and the shape of toilet seats in the
workplace. From defense to education to food to health care, there has
been a growth in the types of problems for which government intervention
has been deemed appropriate.
Further, the kind of intervention thought to be appropriate has in-
creasingly taken the form of what Charles Schultze has called "command-
,1
and-control techniques of government bureaucracy," that is, policy that
prescribes behavior by prohibiting actions beyond a certain standard.
Prohibitive policy is prescriptive in an absolutist, boundary-setting
direction: Thou shalt not do; given a set of circumstances, discussion
may occur only up to a line, beyond which is forbidden area. Prohibitive
policies do not let the regulatees make legal choices about their behavior.
Governmental prohibition has been considered appropriate in some
instances for a long time: Murder was generally prohibited, as was the
refusal to pay taxes. However, the class of problems for which prohi-
bitive policy is considered an appropriate solution has grown dramati-
cally in recent years. The 1970s have in particular seen prohibitory
intervention expand enormously.
1
2Three kinds of prohibitive policy have appeared; The first is the
-most obvious, since it explicitly prohibits certain actions: Thou shalt
not commit murder; habitat that is critical to an endangered species
cannot be adversely modified. The second kind is prohibitive in a comple-
mentary sense, in that it prohibits some actions by mandating others:
All workplace stairs must be a certain width; species are to be considered
endangered only on the basis of biological criteria. The third form pro-
hibits a set of actions past a boundary such as a standard: Power plants
cannot emit sulfur dioxide at concentrations greater than x parts per
million. By outlawing a set of behavior, prohibitive policies appear to
disallow any balancing of the benefits of the policy against the costs of
compliance. While this analysis focuses on a case of the first kind of
prohibitive policy, conclusions drawn out of the study are thought to be
generalizable to the other two forms as well.
The environmental area is rife with examples of prohibitive policy.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 established a
national goal "that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters
be eliminated by 1985" and a national policy "that the discharge of toxic
pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited."2 It mandated the use of "best
practicable control technology" by all nonpublic sources by July 1, 1977
and the use of "best available technology" by July 1, 1983. It further
prescribed a secondary level of wastewater treatment by July 1, 1977 for
all publicly-owned treatment works. The Act did not set up a framework
whereby such factors such as cost effectiveness and the characteristics
of the specific watershed could be explicitly examined and balanced with
the benefits from the prescribed levels of treatment. As a legislative
statement, the Act was couched in absolutist, prohibitive terms.
3The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments were similarly prohibitive:5 Ninety
percent reduction of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons from auto emissions
were required to be achieved by 1975; ninety percent reduction of nitro-
gen oxides by 1976. The 1964 Wilderness Act is similarly constraining,
limiting allowed activities in wilderness areas:6 "There shall be no
commercial enterprise and no permanent road ... no temporary road, no use
of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motor boats, no landing of
aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no structure or
installation within any such area."
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 builds upon this absolutist frame-
work, resulting in a legislative statement that is extremely prohibitive:7
A procedure is established whereby species of plants and animals are
determined to be endangered or threatened with extinction based solely on
biological considerations. Habitat is delineated which is considered to
be critical to the survival of endangered or threatened species. Indi-
viduals are prohibited from importing or exporting listed species, taking
listed species within the United States, its territorial seas or the high
seas, and possessing, selling, delivering, carrying, transporting, or
shipping listed species in interstate or foreign commerce. "Taking" is
defined extremely broadly as activities that harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or collect endangered or threatened
species. Further, all federal agencies are required to take "such action
necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them
do not jeopardize the continued existence" of listed species and do not
destroy critical habitat. As a final club, the Act allows any person to
commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin anyone else (person,
group, or government agency) alleged to be in violation of the Act.
4It also provides for suits to compel the Department of the Interior to
carry out provisions of the Act.
As a legislative prescription, the Endangered Species Act'(ESA) is
extremely stringent: If species are biologically endangered, they must be
listed. If they are listed, no one can harm them and agencies must act
to protect them. If any individual or organization misbehaves, he can be
sued. At legislative face value, there is no room for negotiation or
discussion aimed at balancing other social goals with endangered species'
objectives, or for the consideration of the costs incurred by mandating
preservation of the habitat of a species.
Policy analysts and economists have viewed the expansion of prohi-
bitive policy with some concern. They generally concede that there are
instances where market failure requires governmental intervention. Inter-
vention is often assigned to problems where externalities are significant,
transactions costs, uncertainty or information costs are high, or where
a collective good is involved.8 The need for government protection of
fundamental rights -- the set of which has expanded over time -- is also
conceded. These critics argue, however, that given the need for inter-
vention, the type of intervention that is the current norm -- regulation
by prohibition -- is inefficient. They argue that society's attempt at
influencing behavior would be better served by the carrot of market
incentives and the stick of taxes, rather than the club of prohibition.
Prohibitive policy has at its root the assumption that a meaningful
standard can be defined. The choice of this discrete point suggests that
the cost or benefit function is discontinuous, or at least that it can
tell us something about a threshold at which costs or benefits become
significant. Thus, a maximum standard of 2 parts per million (ppm) of
5sulfur dioxide in the air suggests that air with 1.9 ppm sulfur dioxide
causes no damage, while air containing 2.1 ppm is enormously dangerous.1 0
The economists argue that damage functions are really continuous, and that
the marginal cost of small shifts away from the standard is really not
terribly large. This same argument has been used by opponents of the
ESA. They argue that since the law mandates absolute preservation of
critical habitat, it implies a discontinuous benefit function (species
need the current amount of critical habitat; any less is disastrous),
whereas the actual benefit function is continuous.1 1
Both the economists and the critics of the ESA are correct in their
analyses: The functions are continuous; small shifts away from the
standard are not generally of great cost. Based on this analysis, they
conclude that prohibitive policy is inefficient and that market-type
negotiation should be utilized instead. They argue that a means of balan-
cing the costs of compliance should be included in the policy, and that
at best, compliance should only be required when the marginal costs of
compliance are less than the marginal benefits received from carrying
out the mandate. They look at policy like the ESA and say that what it
should be doing is encouraging various interests to negotiate to provide
for the consideration of multiple objectives. They lament the use of what
they view as an inflexible means of intervention.
Proponents of this view make two implicit assumptions: First, that
prohibitive policy is meant to be implemented prohibitively; and second,
that prohibitive policy is implemented prohibitively. This thesis main-
tains that these are bad assumptions -- that, in practice, laws are passed
for reasons that may have little to do with their substance, and that
implementation does indeed include consideration of costs and social
6trade-offs, even if the legislation is prohibitive.
Political actions have symbolic value. Prohibitive policies, for
example, can be very effective as statements to placate a constituency.
In the case of the ESA, there is evidence that the Congress implicitly
thought that they were passing a referendum in favor of endangered
species -- an action taken to appease what had grown to be a powerful
environmental constituency, with few perceived real costs. Other cases
demonstrate the use of legislative statements as political symbols.1 3
Given the environment in which policy is conceived, it is not sur-
prising to find that the second assumption is in error -- that prohibitive
policy is in practice not implemented prohibitively. Part of this thesis
will demonstrate, for example, that in the endangered species case, the
legislative mandate was implemented extremely flexibly and that consider-
able inter-institutional negotiation took place: The designation of
species as endangered occurred slowly and responded to controversy. Regu-
lations were designed that included nonbiological input into presumably-
biological decisions. Decisions about how much habitat is critical to
the survival of a species were made while considering competing interests
for the land and water resources. Indeed, the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) estimates that of 4,500 interagency consultations on federal actions
that had the potential of impacting an endangered species, only three
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went to court. Even these three conflicts appear resolvable allowing
both economic and preseration interests to prevail.
In other areas of prohibitive environmental policy, it can be seen
that their prohibitive mandates were not achieved. Auto emissions stan-
dards were relaxed several times. Water quality deadlines were not met.
Some extractive uses such as mining are still allowed in wilderness areas.
7State stream standards are routinely exceeded -- the realized mode of
enforcement is that of negotiation rather than litigation to demand
compliance with the letter of the law. Non-absolutist enforcement of
absolutist policy appears to be the norm, not the exception.
The reason for this appears to be due to two factors: First, regard-
less of whether absolute standards are efficient, they rarely exist.
The direction that scientific data and analysis takes us does not generally
lead to two paths. It is usually not absolutely clear that a species is
endangered or not, or that a land area is critical to its survival or not.
Uncertainty is rampant throughout these decisions, even when they appear
to be based on science: Judgment becomes critical; administrative
discretion necessary.
This lack of absolutes makes the second factor -- the context in
which judgment takes place -- extremely critical. Administrative agencies
(the implementing agents) operate in an environment that is inherently
political. In a system that is pluralistic, that is, power is shared with
no one consistently dominanting the outcome, negotiation becomes the
common mode of interaction. Political negotiation is in essence not very
different from marketplace negotiation. Individuals, groups, and organi-
zations compete with each other to marshall resources to influence alloca-
tion decisions. The medium of exchange in this market is power -- to
influence decisions and to influence others to influence decisions.
Policy is formed and implemented in this political marketplace. This
thesis argues that the political market provides for negotiation and
trade-offs in the implementation of policy where "economic" negotiation
has been explicitly prohibited, that is, in the implementation of prohibi-
tive policy. In this view, the set of forces that influence the political
8arena become important in order to understand how negotiation takes
place around prohibitive policy. A legislative prescription is only one
force in this arena. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that laws are
often a minor force in determining the implemented character of a program.
Rather than a simple model where Ruth tells Bill to fetch a ball
and we see how Bill carries out his mission, implementation looks more
like the children's game of "telephone". In this game, not only does
Ruth tell Bill to fetch the ball, but Bill tells Marty, and Marty tells
Denise, who instructs Greg, and on down the line for twenty or thirty
children. Needless to say, at the end of the chain, the instructions
usually sound quite different than they did at the outset. What happened?
Well some of the children didn't understand the message but tried to relay
it correctly, some had their own ideas and changed it accordingly, others
didn't speak the language or were hard of hearing, and still others were
distracted and used their imaginations. Although a frivolous example,
the metaphor is actually quite appropriate to viewing the gauntlet a
policy runs when entering the implementation arena. Indeed, even if
Ruth's original instructions were prohibitive ("Don't eat pickles", for
example), it does not necessarily mean that they will be transformed less.
Policies are redefined through implementation because they are
carried out by a network of organizations and individuals that have
histories that predate enactment, and operating characteristics that may
be quite hostile to a new policy. The character of a program is influ-
enced, for example, by which and how many actors participate in implemen-
tation, by how these groups interacted formally and informally in the
past, and by the context in which the actors function. In the implemen-
tation of the ESA, several forces were most significant in shaping the
9character of implementation: Limited resources, conflicting organi-
zational goals, and bureaucratic and scientific conservatism were
forces that tended to resist change and retard the rate of implemen-
tation. They were countered by pressures arising from advocates and
interest groups, and from activities in the judicial and legislative
branches of government. It is through the dynamic interaction of
this set of institutions that policy is implemented. They help to
explain why program outputs often differ dramatically from policy
prescriptions even if the laws are specified precisely and absolutely.
If prohibitive policy is not implemented prohibitively, why use it?
The final chapter speculates on the answer to this question in detail.
But there does appear to be good reasons to support prohibitive
policies in some cases, depending on the objective in mind: Prohi-
bitive mandates are very effective as political statements, for
example. They have a significant influence on the ability of bureau-
cracies to carry out their missions depending on their desire to
comply with the legislative mandate. Prohibitive policy can also be
used as a strategic weapon by interest groups. Indeed, one of the
least recognized and most important effects of prohibitive policy is
its impact on the relative bargaining positions of the parties
involved in negotiating implementation.
There are also two substantive circumstances under which prohi-
bitive mandates seem appropriate: if a policy's intent is to define
or protect a social ethic; and if a proposed activity is extremely
costly or irreversible and the law's framers are risk-averse.
Nevertheless, there are some real costs associated with the use of
10
prohibitive laws. One such cost, for example, is the potential for
backlash, resulting not only in noncompliance, but also in recission of
the prohibitive law. This happened to some extent in the case of the ESA.
In two controversies, legal battles were initiated against the Act's
prohibitive mandates: It won the battles, but, in many ways, lost the war.
In March 1976, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stopped construction of
a segment of Interstate Highway 10 in Mississippi because it would
destroy habitat critical to the survival of the Mississippi sandhill crane.
In January 1977, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined construction
of the Tellico Project in Tennessee because it would destroy habitat
critical to the survival of the snail darter. The Supreme Court supported
this latter decision in June 1978. The Interstate 10 project could be
modified slightly to accomodate the cranes - a bird of significant
national appeal. The snail darter could survive in its present habitat,
however, only if the Tellico Project was altered immensely at a multi-
million dollar cost. The media and the Act's opponents seized upon the
image of a three-inch fish halting a huge dam to build a national
backlash -- one which the ESA did not survive totally intact.
Reauthorization legislationl5 was passed in October 1978 that included
an escape valve: In cases of "irreconcilable conflict", a federal project
could be exempted from the requirements of the Act after being reviewed
by a high-level interagency committee. In addition, proposals of critical
habitat would now have to include an economic impact statement. These
changes reduced the stringency of the statute's prohibitions. The amend-
ments were supported by the assumption that prohibitive policy is imple-
mented prohibitively -- that there was no room for negotiation or flexi-
bility in the administrative process. For example, the comments of
11
Congressman Robin L. Beard (TN) typify this perspective:
"The Endangered Species Act passed the Congress in 1973. It
was important egislation which embodied principles we cannot
allow to be undermined. The principal objective of this bill
was to insure that we would never again unthinkably cause the
extinction of unique plant and animal life. That principle
must be protected. However, as with so many pieces of legis-
lation which after enactment are exposed to the real test of
implementation, certain problems arise. One particular problem
which has been brought home to me rather forcefully, is the
lack of anyflexibility in the current law. There appears to
be no leeway whatsoever to allow valuable public projects to go
forward if there is a risk that any endangered specie might
be adversely affected."1 6
The data and case studies summarized in this thesis suggest that this
assumption is not true -- that there is in fact considerable discretion
and room for negotiation even in policy that is prohibitively prescribed.
A Note About Structure'and Method
The thesis examines prohibitive policy by studying the case of the
Endangered Species Act. The second chapter outlines the arguments that
environmentalists have made in advocating prohibitive policy to protect
endangered species. The third chapter examines the historical develop-
ment of legislation to protect threatened plants and animals to figure
out why the laws were framed prohibitively. The fourth, fifth, and sixth
chapters lay out the experience of implementing the 1973 Act: The fourth
chapter presents some measures of program output to determine how aggre-
sively the Fish and Wildlife Service has pursued the prohibitive goals
of the Act. The fifth chapter documents the necessity to exercise adminis-
trative discretion in implementation because of limited resources and a
great deal of technical uncertainty. The sixth chapter focuses on the
context of implementation to demonstrate that political considerations are
weighed and negotiated throughout implementation. The seventh chapter
12
then looks at nonstatutory forces that shape and control implementation.
The final chapter then examines the impact and uses of prohibitive policy.
The analysis focuses on three major elements of the 1973 Act: putting
a species on the endangered list ("listing"), designating habitat that
is critical to its survival, and consulting with development agencies
to resolve conflicts between projects and endangered species. There are
of course other important sections of the ESA: cooperative state-federal
agreements, control of international and interstate commerce in products
from endangered species, and regulation of taking (to name several).
These are not analyzed here because they are less illuminating in answering
the questions relating to the implementation of prohibitive policy, the
use of administrative discretion, and the process of interagency nego-
tiation. All policy seeks to modify someone's behavior. Much federal
policy seeks to guide or control private or state actions. The regula-
tion of taking and commerce in endangered species are examples of the use
of this power. The listing, critical habitat, and consultation provisions,
on the other hand, seek mainly to regulate federal agency behavior. This
is interesting because the same sets of incentives promoting compliance
and sanctions against noncompliance that work in the regulation of private
actions do not work in regulating federal agency activities. It is
usually not feasible to throw a program director in jail or fine him
for not implementing a program aggressively.
The interagency consultation provisions are of special interest be-
cause not only do they regulate federal agency behavior, but they seek
to put a constraint on other legislatively-mandated behavior. Few other
federal statutes do this as stringently: The National Environmental Policy
Act,1 7 the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,1 8 the Administrative
13
Procedure Act,1 9 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act2 0 all do this
to some extent; most do it procedurally.' But the' ESA was interpreted by
the courts as having substantive -- not just procedural -- requirements
for agency behavior. Hence it should be particularly illuminating in
helping to understand how administrative agencies cope with substantive
mandates that are injected into their "standard operating procedure".
The analysis uses several forms of data to describe implementation.
Statistics were computed to act as measures of output of the program.
These include summaries of the number of proposed and final listings,
proposed and final critical habitat designations, and unresolved listings
and habitat designations. In addition, average durations were calculated
to indicate how long it took the Act's administrators to implement the
provisions of the legislation. All of these data represent 100 percent
samples of administrative actions taken from enactment (December 28, 1973)
to the date that the Act was significantly amended (September 30, 1978).
Hence almost five years of implementation history is included.
While these statistics indicate the overall character of the program
and serve as a basis to support generalized conclusions, five major case
studies were undertaken to gather detail and test the hypotheses about
the implementation of prohibitive policy. Many other smaller cases were
reviewed and are also presented in the form of anecdotes throughout the
text. The five case studies were selected to provide the best illustra-
tions of specific kinds of activity, and do not represent a random sample.
They were compiled from interviews and published and unpublished docu-
mentary evidence: Letters, memos, notes, hearing records, draft rule-
makings, and other written materials were reviewed, and are cited in the
footnotes. Since many of the interviews focused on intergroup and
14
interpersonal relationships that are on-going, it was agreed to keep
specific quotations confidential. Hence, citations to many of the quota-
tions in the text are not noted. IThe' author has written records of these
interviews in his possession, however, for verification purposes.]
The five case studies are not presented in one location in the text;
rather, they are used as supporting evidence to the arguments presented
throughout and reappear in various levels of detail accordingly. The
five cases are described briefly as follows:
(1) Furbish lousewort: The Furbish lousewort is a rare snapdragon
(plant) that lives only in the Saint John River valley in northern Maine.
It was discovered by botanist Kate Furbish in the late 1800s, and was
thought to be extinct since the 1940s. But it was rediscovered in the
impoundment area of the proposed Army Corps of Engineers' Dickey-Lincoln
Project -- a $650 million (primarily-) hydroelectric project in 1976.
The lousewort case deals with.the listing, critical habitat designation,
and interagency consultation processes. It illustrates how changing
scientific knowledge influences administrative decision-making, how
political considerations enter into all three administrative processes,
how delay is used strategically to resolve controversy, how a hierarchical
administrative process works to mediate conflict, and how general policy
is modified in response to specific issues. The Furbish lousewort was
added to the endangered species list in April 1978. The FWS determined
that a designation of critical habitat was not necessary for the species.
(2) 'Houston'toad: The Houston toad is a secretive amphibian that
survives in several counties around Houston, Texas. The toad has long
been thought to be endangered and was listed in the 1968 U.S. "Redbook".
It was officially designated as endangered in October 1970. The toad
15
case concerns the process of how critical habitats are designated. It
illustrates how technical uncertainty pervades decisions on species that
everyone agrees are extremely rare. The case demonstrates that scientific
judgment is modified by political considerations in determining what is
critical habitat, and that delay is used as a strategic response to con-
troversy. Critical habitat was proposed for the species in May 1977;
several areas were designated in January 1978.
(3) Mississippi Sandhill crane: The Mississippi sandhill crane is
an extremely endangered subspecies of the Florida sandhill crane and
nests only in an area in southeastern Mississippi (near Pascagoula).
It has been on the endangered list since June 1973. The cases focuses
on the critical habitat and interagency consultation processes. It demon-
strates how scientists can be extremely conservative in taking action
that may deviate slightly from professional norms even in the face of
crisis. The case also illustrates how actions of the judiciary influence
how implementation proceeds, and how negotiated settlements of species-
project controversies are possible if both sides engage in good-faith
negotiation: The Department of Transportation had been building a section
of Interstate Highway 10 across the area that the cranes inhabit, but was
stopped in March 1976 by litigation brought by the National Wildlife Feder-
ation. A negotiated settlement was achieved, however. Critical habitat
was proposed for the species in September 1975, was modified by controversy,
and was finally designated in August 1977.
(4) Sea turtles; Three species of sea turtles (green, loggerhead,
Pacific ridley) were involved in controversy that dates back to the early
1970s. Two of the species' had been proposed for listing in December 1973,
but passage of the 1973 ESA intervened, and the proposals were withdrawn.
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The species were finally listed in August 1978. In the interim, a tale
of interagency.jurisdictional conflict, delay, negotiation, and scientific
debate unfolds. The case is the only one in which the' species is a
commercial resource; it demonstrates'that economic interests are considered
in implementing seemingly-scientific provisions of the ESA. It illustrates
the use of the "threatened" category to allow for exceptions to the
blanket prohibition provided by endangered status, and further suggests
that personal philosophy heavily influences scientific judgment, leading
to conflicting positions on technical decisions.
(5) Snail darter: The snail darter case is the most well-known of
the five cases. The discovery of the snail darter in the Little Tennessee
River in eastern Tennessee in August 1973, its subsequent listing as endan-
gered in October 1975, and the designation of its critical habitat in
April 1976 led to a major conflict with the Tennessee Valley Authority's
Tellico Project. The conflict turned into litigation that rose as high
as the Supreme Court. Indeed, the conflict was front-page headlines
across the nation in mid-1978. The case reiterates almost all of the
themes seen in the other cases, and adds a few: It particularly demon-
strates the problem of conflicting organizational goals and the use of
a hierarchical administrative network to work towards compromise. It
further illustrates how the interaction between the judiciary, the Congress,
the media, and the administrative agencies heavily determines the nature
of implementation, even when the statute is written as prohibitive.
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CHAPTER 2 -- THE CASE FOR PRESERVING ENDANGERED SPECIES
Government intervention to preserve endangered species is generally
considered appropriate because endangered species are public goods:
An individual does not perceive his actions (through hunting, commercial
exploitation, or habitat modification) as having an influence on the
status of a species; he has no incentive to take action to protect a
species since others cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of
his protective actions. The problem is especially acute in the endan-
gered species case because of its global scale: For example, if the
United States unilaterally bans the importation of leopard furs for
processing into coats, the furs will be processed in other countries. The
American fur industry will be hurt; the leopard will be no better off.
While the need for government intervention is conceded, the use of
prohibitive policy is at issue. Those who have pushed for prohibitive
endangered species legislation advance three sets of arguments: Plant
and animal species currently provide humans with goods and services and
are projected to continue to do so; humans depend on diverse networks
of species to provide global biotic stability; and humans have a
moral responsibility to protect other life forms.
The human-utilization arguments have at their center a particular
view about uncertainty and irreversibility. Most people would agree that
the extinction of a species is irreversible. Let us assume that we are
certain that a project will eliminate a species. The uncertainty lies in
how useful the species could be to humans and how important it is in main-
taining ecosystem stability. Proponents of absolute species preservation
take a risk-averse position in dealing with this uncertainty. They are
not willing to pay the opportunity costs of lost potential goods and
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services from the destruction of a species, or accept the risks of adverse
ecosystem changes that might result from policies that allow extinction.
Their opponents counter by arguing that substitutes will be found to provide
any product or service that could be provided by the species, and that at
the margin, individual species have little effect on ecosystem stability.
The ethical argument is based on a particular set of values and ideology.
It is much harder for opponents to argue against. The issue is not what is
most efficient, but what is right and wrong. It is not necessarily even a
question of what is good for human society, but rather what is appropriate
behavior in light of our place in a larger universe. It must be recognized
that all arguments have their bases in human-ascribed values of species.
There is no alternative. The term "value" is human-defined: Even if I
suggest that ecosystem stability is the appropriate measure for judging the
"worth" of species, it is my set of (human) values that makes me argue that.
To say that a species has purely ecological value is a truism: If it exists,
it plays a role in the natural system. If it had no "ecological worth,"
it would not exist. This chapter outlines these three arguments as a basis
for using prohibitive policy to protect endangered species.
Historical Perspective
The fact that species are in danger of extinction and have disappeared
in the past does not seem to be in question. Until the 1960s, the number of
plant and animal species on earth was estimated at 3 million. This estimate
encompassed a set of identified species including approximately 4,100
mammals, 8,700 birds, 6,300 reptiles, 3,000 amphibians, 23,000 fishes,
800,000 insects, and 300,000 green plants and fungi, and thousands of micro-
organisms such as bacteria and viruses. The remaining one-and-a-half million
species were statistically estimated to exist somewhere on the planet, yet
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were not identified. Since the 1960s, taxonomic and statistical advances
have increased the estimated number of species to 10 million.
Species diversity over geologic time has had its peaks and declines.
The earth is about 6 billion years old. Nuclear-celled organisms appeared
about 1.4 billion years ago. Most modern phyla became recognizable about
700 million years ago. From that time on, for about 400 million years,
species diversity remained approximately constant until it crashed at the
end of the Permian period. Thereafter diversity increased until another
crash occurred during the late Cretaceous period (approximately 70 million
years ago) in which about a quarter of all families (dinosaurs included)
vanished. Since that time, species diversity has increased fairly steadily.
Environmentalists are fond of using mathematically-correct, chronological
analogies to place evolutionary history into perspective. One such analogy
condenses the history of the planet into a single year. Under this scheme,
"The conditions suitable for life do not develop until late
June. The oldest known fossils are living creatures around mid-
October, and life is abundant for both animals and plants (mostly
in the seas) by the end of that month. In mid-December, dino-
saurs and other reptiles dominate the scene. Mammals, suckling
their young, and with hair covering their bodies, appear in large
numbers only a little before Christmas. On New Year's Eve, at
about five minutes to midnight, man emerges. Of these five minutes
of man's existence, recorded history represents about the time
the clock takes to strike twelve. The period since 1600 A.D.,
when man-induced extinction began to increase rapidly, amounts
to three seconds, and the quarter century just begun, when the
disappearance of species may be on the scale of all the mass
extinctions of the past put together, will take one-sixth of a
second -- a twinkling of an eye in evolutionary time."3
While this analogy is dramatic, it can have the effect of making human
activity appear so insignificant that it negates the need to worry about
any of our social choices and problems.
The history of extinctions in recent times also lends support to the
case for protecting endangered species. "To get some idea of the current
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rate of species extinction, consider that in one 3,000-year period of the
Pleistocene during which great numbers of organisms perished, North America
lost about 50 mammalian species and 40 birds -- or about 3 species per hun-
dred years. By way of contrast, since the arrival of the Puritans at Plymouth
Rock in 1620, over 500 species and subspecies of native animals and plants
have become extinct."4 This works out to a loss of about 1.4 species per
year. Currently another 236 U.S. species are officially considered to be
endangered or threatened with extinction.5 It is necessary to point out that
these data are somewhat misleading since taxonomic and other identification
techniques have improved over time. Nevertheless, most scientists would
agree that the rate of species extinction has increased significantly
paralleling the growth of human population and settlement. The net rate of
diversification is clearly negative -- an unprecedented occurrence over
geologic time when global climate has been stable.
One can argue that these extinctions are a part of a natural process,
similar to the mass extinctions of the Pleistocene. This argument builds on
ecological niche theory and suggests that the human species is doing exactly
what every species strives for (and ecological succession is fueled by) --
the expansion of its niche, the qualitative and quantitative growth of the
species. Clearly, Homo sapiens has broadened its niche dramatically over
time. Humans can survive in practically any habitat on the globe (and are
moving outward into other niches in the universe). Yet most would agree that
the expansion has increased the loss of other species. The primary impact
on other species has come through habitat modification, overutilization
(through hunting, commercial exploitation, etc.), and introduction of competing
7
exotic species.
The humans-as-purely-natural argument can be countered by two types of
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arguments: One maintains that human well-being is tied to the health of
the ecological community; the second argues that humans are fundamentally
different from other species -- having the capacity to reason and make
choices -- and hence have a responsibility to other life forms.
Human Utility -- Present and Future
The first counter-argument -- that species have value because humans
need them -- contains the most often stated reasons for protecting endangered
species: Species serve humans as food sources, industrial inputs, medicine
and drug sources, aesthetic resources, pollution indicators, and as part of
a network that provides ecological stability -- guaranteeing human survival
through the provision of oxygen, the disposal of wastes, the capture of
energy, and the recycling of nutrients.
Obviously, plant and animal species serve humans as food. Yet the range
of species utilized on a mass scale is extremely small. There are estimated
to be 80,000 edible plant species on the planet. Only about 50 species have
ever been cultivated in large scale and a total of 12 now produce ninety
percent of the world's food supply. Preserving wild plant species thus
opens up a wide range of agricultural possibilities. This is important
because species currently used for mass food crops have a very narrow genetic
base: The Green Revolution and agricultural industrialization have spawned
monocultural planting at an immense scale. While monoculture may appear to
be industrially efficient, it has three results: It is less stable in
response to catastrophic events such as climatic change or disease; it
displaces indigenous species which have evolved in conjunction with the
local climate and cycles; and it is dependent on massive inputs of energy
and petroleum-derived nutrients.
Indeed, some writers have suggested that the Green Revolution will
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prove a long-range disaster. Consider, for example, the following case:
"A few years ago one of the prized developments of the Green
Revolution, a strain of rice known as I.R.-8, was hit by tungro
disease in the Philippines. When rice growers switched to another
form, I.R.-20, this hybrid soon proved fatally vulnerable to grassy
stunt virus and brown hopper insects. So farmers moved on to
I.R.-26, a super-hybrid that turned out to be exceptionally resis-
tant to almost all Philippines diseases and insect pests. But it
proved too fragile for the islands' strong winds, whereupon plant
breeders decided to try an original Taiwan strain that had shown
unusual capacity to stand up to winds -- only to find that it had
been all but eliminated by Taiwan farmers, who had by then planted
virtually all ricelands with I.R.-8."8
There are other examples of similar "mistakes" due to monocultural
use of nonindigenous species with a narrow genetic base: Coffee crops in
Brazil were badly hurt in 1970 by unfavorable weather and leaf rust; a
fifth of the U.S. corn crop was destroyed in 1970 by southern corn blight;
the Irish potato disaster of the 1840s. Indeed, some scientists foresee
disaster for the currently-bred strains of food crops because they believe
that they will be unable to cope with future climatic changes, having been
bred in what some meteorologists believe to have been the wettest 30-year
period during the past thousand years.
Indigenous species have considerable wisdom built into their genetic
codes- The evolutionary period of thousands of years-makes species much more
tolerant of environmental changes than does the breeding period of tens of
years underlying Green Revolution crop strains. Modern crops are also
dependent upon massive inputs of nutrients, water, and energy for their
success. In a future where petroleum will most certainly be a high cost
item (politically and economically), the use of food crops which require
fewer inputs external to their ecosystem may be desirable. Hence, it can
be argued that indigenous species should be preserved because of their
potential use directly as food crops or as inputs into the genetic
development of alternative food sources.
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Medical and drug use of other species is considerable. Medical research
utilizes animals in experiments as surrogates for humans. The use of primates
and rats is well known. A remarkably large number of other species are
utilized because they closely mirror human response to specific drugs and
conditions. Armadillos, for example, provide a model for the study of
leprosy. Studies of long-flying birds such as the albatross have contri-
buted to an improved understanding of the heart disease, cardiomyopathy.
The desert pupfish tolerates extremes of salinity and temperature and may
assist researchers studying human kidney disease. Molluscs -- clams, snails,
mussels -- rarely get cancer. Mercenene, a substance that has been isolated
from the molluscs, has been shown to prevent or delay two types of cancer
in mice and has had no adverse effects when tested on human cells. Could
molluscs hold the key for a cure for cancer? It's possible.
Drug products from plants and animals are numerous. Snake venoms are
used as non-addictive pain killers. The alkaloids, a group of drugs derived
from tropical plants, are used in treating cardiac problems, hypertension,
and leukemia. Who would have thought that mold on a discarded fruit rind
could contain anything useful to humans? Yet the discovery of antibiotics
has probably saved more lives than any other pharmaceutical advance. Indeed,
it has been estimated that as many as one-half of all prescriptions written
in the United States contain a drug of natural origin as their primary
active ingredient. The value of plant medicinals is estimated at $3 billion.
Yet only 5 percent of all plant species have been screened for pharmacologi-
cally-active constituents. 12
Industrial uses of species are also numerous. As commercial products,
gum, rubber, latex, fibers, sponge and oil are good examples. Use of organisms
as "workers" provide further examples: Microbes and aquatic insect larvae
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are the fundamental elements of secondary wastewater treatment; yeasts that
feed on petroleum are being examined as a means of cleaning up oil spills;
Manatees (sea cows) are being used in Guyana and Florida to clear out water
hyacinths that clog canals and waterways. In a time when many synthesized
food additives are turning up carcinogenic, the potential for use of plant
extracts for sweeteners, coloring agents, and the like seem vast. Similarly,
biological pest control techniques show promise as an alternative to synthetic
chemical pesticides such as DDT.13
Species also have value as aesthetic resources. There are some 10
million species -- each unique and self-contained. The human species is only
one of these 107 elements of the biota. Yet we praise beauty at the level
of the individual and have complex rituals -- Miss America contests et al --
which celebrate the aesthetic value of individuals. But the aesthetic
resource is vast, with 107 unique life forms, not just variations on the same
theme. Each life form has aesthetic significance owing to the simplicity
of its function and complexity of its form. Under the microscope, even the
tiniest diatom shows incredible intricacy of structure with radiating lines
and variegated coloration. Humans do have rituals that celebrate the beauty
of specific nonhuman life forms such as flowers and butterflies, and have
dog, cat, horse and goat shows.
The aesthetic argument suggests that in a rational society where paintings
of one individual (creation time: a year or so) are preserved and praised,
the work of more powerful forces in creating a species (creation time: thou-
sands of years) should at least be accorded the same consideration as that
14
of human-created art. Indeed, it is easier to re-create a close approx-
imation of a piece of art than it is to re-establish a species. Humans
simply do not understand the creation process. Even with recombinant DNA
28
techniques, it is extremely unlikely that we will ever be able to create
a whooping crane or a passenger pigeon from the test tube. Poet William
Beebe has put the argument in this way:
"The beauty and genius of a work of art may be reconceived, though
its first material expression be destroyed; a vanished harmony may
yet again inspire the composer; but when the last individual of a
race of living things breathes no more, another heaven and another
earth must pass before such a one can be again."1 5
Ecosystem Stability
The idea that the biosphere is composed of an intricate network of
interspecific relationships lies at the heart of the remaining arguments
for preserving species. This is the "everything is connected to something
else" argument. Ecosystems are the fundamental operating units of the biota.
They are defined by the networks of organisms -- ecological communities --
that make them up. Most ecologists agree that ecosystems move through very
patterned directions as they mature. Odum suggests that among other things,
mature ecosystems are typically highly diverse with many species with narrow
niches and intricate connective pathways. It is generally agreed that
diversity provides stability in that catastrophic events (climatic changes,
disease) are more readily absorbed.
The exact relationship between diversity and stability, however, is
still in controversy. The most diverse ecosystem on earth, the tropical
forest, is very sensitive to human disruption, while the simpler temperate
zone forest is quite adaptive. Nevertheless, the general direct relationship
between diversity and stability seems to hold. Polluted systems are usually
characterized by their low levels of diversity. The fauna below a sewage
outfall may drop to only one or two species whereas many more existed before.
There are also classical examples where reducing the numbers of species
has reduced the stability of the system: Predator-prey relationships seem
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to stabilize population numbers. For example, on the Kaibab Plateau in
Arizona, a bounty was placed on cougars, wolves, and coyotes -- all natural
predators of deer. In 1907 when the bounty was put in place, the deer
population numbered about 4,000. Within ten years, the predator population
was almost destroyed and the deer population increased more than tenfold.
By 1924 the herd reached 100,000. In the absence of sufficient food, sixty
percent of the herd died off in two successive winters. By that time, the
food had been so overbrowsed and deer natality had so declined that after
the die-off, the system could only support a deer population of about half
the original size. 7 Thus, the naturally-evolved system acts to maintain
a population at its "optimum" size and protect it from oscillatory growth
patterns.
The case of the American alligator also illustrates the "utility" of
a species in an ecosystem. Alligators have been hunted persistently. The
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American alligator is currently on the U.S. endangered species list. What
difference does it make if alligators are exterminated?
"The alligator is a key factor in preserving the entire ecological
balance of the Everglades -- a balance on which much of the
increasingly urbanized state of Florida depends. The deep pools,
or "gator holes," that he digs collect water during dry spells
and provide a sanctuary so the birds and animals can live to re-
populate the glades after a drought. The large nesting mounds
that alligators make are popular sites for nests of herons, egrets,
and other birds essential to the life cycle in the glades. As
alligators move from their gator holes to nesting mounds they help
keep the waterways open, and they preserve a balance of game fish
by consuming large numbers of predator fish, such as the gar." 19
In Africa, the hippopotamus and the crocodile perform roles similar
to that of the alligator. In parts of Africa, a campaign was undertaken to
eliminate both animals. As a result, the streams became clogged, protein-
rich fish declined, and schistosomiasis -- an extremely debilitating disease --
spread among the human population. The hippopotamus and crocodiles had dug
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holes which ensured the survival of fish and had eaten plant growth and
stirred up silt which kept waterways open. As the water flow was reduced,
the streams became shallow and warm, ideal breeding conditions for the snail
that serves as a host for the parasitic flatworm that causes schistosomiasis.20
A final example is both humorous and dramatic:
"Malaria at one time infected 90 percent of the population of Borneo.
In 1955, the World Health Organization initiated a DDT spraying
program that has all but eliminated this dreaded disease. But other
things also began to happen. Besides killing mosquitoes, the DDT
killed other insects, including flies and cockroaches that inhabited
the houses. But these insects were the favorite food of house lizards
called geckos, which gorged themselves on dead insects and died from
the DDT. These lizards, along with dead DDT-laden cockroaches, were
eaten by house cats. As the cats died, the rat population soared.
The inhabitants of this island were then threatened by a new disease,
sylvatic plague carried by the rats. This threat was averted when
cats were parachuted into remote regions by the Royal Air Force in
what is known as 'Operation Cat Drop.'
"As if this wasn't enough, the thatched roofs of some of the natives'
houses began to fall in. The DDT also killed a number of wasps and
other insects that fed on a particular type of caterpillar (the larva
of a pyralid moth), which somehow avoided the DDT. With most of their
predators eliminated, the caterpillars had a population explosion and
proceeded to munch their way through one of their favorite foods, the
leaves that made up the thatched roofs."2 1
The point of all these cases is to show -- by example -- that there is
a relationship between species diversity and stability of ecosystems.
Further, it should demonstrate that we do not fully understand the dynamics
of ecosystems. As a result of these two conclusions, the absolutist argument
for preserving species maintains that we should not meddle with ecological
systems in such a way as to make our actions irreversible, that is, we should
not consciously destroy a species.
The ecosystem view also suggests a final way that species can serve
humans -- as indicators of ecosystem/community health. As in medical re-
search, sensitive species can become models of human reactions to pollutants
by examining them in vivo rather than in vitro. Canaries are the most well-
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known example of the use of species as pollution indicators. Their use in
mines to warn of noxious gas no doubt saved many human lives. Slugs were
used on the Western Front in World War I as early warning detectors of
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mustard gas. :Through the study of the fat of Antarctic sea birds, the
persistent qualities of chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides were discovered,
resulting in the reduction of the use of DDT and similar poisons.
Future use of species as indicators of community health seem promising:
Some lichen species, for example, are extremely sensitive to traces of
heavy metals and sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere. Freshwater snails are
extremely sensitive to water pollutants such as municipal wastewater. Their
decline in American waterways has been in direct proportion to increases
in water pollution. A mussel known as Mytilus is currently being used to
monitor pollution in U.S. coastal waters: It has already found a radioactive
hot spot off Plymouth, Massachusetts near the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating
Plant; identified PCB pollution in neighboring New Bedford harbor; and
confirmed that the waters off Southern California still have high concen-
trations of DDT, more than five years after the pesticide was banned.2 3
The argument for preserving species because of their indicator value suggests
simply that these creatures -- these fellow inhabitants of the earth -- can
tell us something, if we stop to listen.
To counter the ecosystem stability argument, opponents will point to
the low marginal value of any one species. It is known that the extermination
of all 107 species would destroy humans as well. Thus the "value" of all
species is in human terms almost infinitely large. Hence the "average value"
of a species is very large as well.24 Given this, it is unlikely that the
worth of any project would be equal to the average value of a species. This
argument, project-proponents will maintain, is irrelevant because the decision-
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making apparatus confronts species one (or a few) at a time, and hence face
the marginal value of the species. What is the marginal value of the snail
darter? Probably not very much in terms of stability of the ecosystem. Pro-
ject-proponents thus argue that many projects will provide benefits in excess
of the marginal value of a species that will be lost and hence should be
carried out.
The problem with all of this is that we have no way of linking marginal
and average values since we have no way of knowing when a threshold has been
passed where stability is indeed threatened (without crossing it and suffering
the consequences). Since with most species this cannot be predicted, we are
left with decisions based largely on (human-centered) values where biology
and economics do not provide clear answers.
Several writers have proposed weighting schemes to assign priorities
to certain species based on such factors as taxonomic importance, ecological/
economic importance, etc. 5 While potentially helpful in defining priorities
for action to help species, these schemes do not help with the question,
should the snail darter be exterminated. The weights are merely numerically-
codified values of one set of humans.
Other writers have suggested that the species level is not particularly
appropriate for decision-making and that instead the society should be pro-
tecting critical ecosystems. They argue that because of the information
and uncertainty problems associated with individual species and because what
we really care about in protecting species is ecosystem stability, that
management should operate on the system level. There is no doubt that there
is merit in this argument. Critical and sensitive systems should be mapped,
studied and protected. Recent federal legislative attention has been
27
oriented in this direction. The problem with this argument, however, is
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that is does little to help us when we confront the snail darter with the
Tellico Dam. While systems may be the desirable operating unit, species are
the actual ones. The ecosystem approach would tell us that the Little Tenn-
essee River system is moderately unique (at least regionally) and that the
Tellico Project would substitute a less-diverse lake biota for the present
flat-water river system. We are still left with human valuation of the
desirability of implementing such a change. TVA would value it highly posi-
tive (in light of project benefits); the Association for the Preservation of
the Little Tennessee River would value it highly negative.
The bottom-line on this discussion is a paradigmatic one. It should
be fairly clear by now that under the rational economic paradigm, it is
impossible to make an absolutist argument for preserving species. The loss
of the snail darter simply cannot be measured on the cost side of a benefit-
cost evaluation. Nor is it necessarily appropriate to do so.
The Ethical Argument
The last set of arguments about species preservation contends that the
paradigm is wrong -- that the homocentric, economic model should yield to
an ecocentric, biotic system-based view. This argument maintains that the
rational economic paradigm is a product of Western society and has guided
some human actions for only several centuries. The argument suggests that
cosmologies -- ways of looking at the universe -- are not static, but evolve
with the passage of time and the accumulation of wisdom. It further suggests
that a merger of environmental mysticism and latter-day rationality could
yield a progressive ideology to deal with the future.
At any one point in time, there are a range of social philosophies from
which the prevailing set of ethics is drawn. Not only do many of the dominant
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social philosophies encourage the preservation and protection of natural
objects, but their growth has also been in that direction. Although most
early Western conceptions of wild nature were negative ("subdue and civilize"),
many Eastern philosophies worshipped and viewed God through natural metaphors.
In this image, the earth-oriented culture of the American Indians viewed
natural objects as gifts from God to cherish and use with care. The Jains,
an Eastern religious sect, were perhaps the extreme proponents of this
philosophy in that they viewed all life forms as divine and sacrosanct.
The knowledge spawned by the Enlightenment led to new perspectives on
natural objects in Western culture. As a result of the new understanding
of the wild natural world, nature was viewed with awe as vast and complex.
The eighteenth century concept of the sublime led philosophers to view
wilderness with exhilaration, associating God with wild nature. Deism ap-
plied the reasoning of the Enlightenment to view nature as a complex and
beautiful indicator that God existed. Transcendentalism went further in
suggesting that nature was a vector by which men could learn divine revela-
tion and thought.3 0
There has also been a growth in the notion that humans have a moral
responsibility towards animals. There is currently a social ethic that says
that it is wrong to inflict pain on animals. Indeed, institutions such as
the A.S.P.C.A. have developed to act as guardians for the implied (and in
many places, express) rights of animals. This has not always been the case.
Early Western culture did not generally perceive a moral responsibility for
the care of animals. Francis of Assisi was an exception, whose ideas as to
human/animal inter-relationships were largely overlooked. Descartes and
other Enlightenment writers argued that since animals could not reason, they
could not feel. This concept began to change with the writings of Hume and
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Bentham, who viewed cruelty to animals as a metaphor for cruelty to humans.
These philosophies led towards protection of higher forms of life, that is,
those that were more human-like.
The notion of preservation of species also has precedent in religious
writings. The Old Testament maintains that animals and plants belong to God
and that humans are to act as His stewards on earth. The Noah story is taken
as a symbol of the sanctity and uniqueness of every living species. Through
all these philosophies, there is an increasing recognition that a reverence
for all life forms implies a reverence for human life, thus elevating the
human condition.
Based on this set of philosophic writing, preservationists make an
ideological argument in terms of the social evolution of rights, ethics, and
ecological community consciousness. Rights can be seen as bestowing claims
of ownership and control over an organisms' actions and existence. While
ethical soil nurtures the definition of rights, ethics go beyond rights in
defining a prescriptive theory of operation for dealing with new social
situations. In their definition, a basic differentiation is made between
what is considered to be social and antisocial conduct. Furthermore, by
prescribing a theory for action, ethics reduce the conflict and uncertainty
associated with life, in effect building a stable and predictable state in
which organisms may operate efficiently.
The definition of rights and ethics is not a static process, but rather
is dynamic, evolving as societies and philosophies change. Okun has described
the process of granting rights as defining where society is on a continuum
between an egalitarian image of society as conceived in a democratic politi-
cal system and an efficient social system as described by a capitalist market
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economy. The trend in present-day society has been to move further down
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the continuum towards the equality end, granting more rights to more organisms
(living and institutional) as we go. Thus, the right to some measure of con-
trol over one's life has been granted to American blacks where they were
formerly considered as white-owned property. The right to a decent working
condition has been extended to workers where they were formerly totally at
the mercy of their employers. Similarly, the rights to basic education and
equal employment have (in theory at least) been extended to all U.S. citizens.
It is important to remember that the definition of rights is at the margin
an extremely dynamic process -- one defined by judicial, social, political,
and economic factors. Further, rights change as knowledge and understanding
increase. Thus, for example, we are currently concerned with the definition
of sun rights for solar collectors and air rights for building.
Recent legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, and the Endangered Species Act can be
viewed as beginning to confer basic rights on nonhuman elements of the natural
environment. In these pieces of legislation, rights are usually bestowed
via procedural safeguards. For example, the NEPA attempts to make sure that
developers at least think about their effect on nonhuman species via an impact
statement requirement. But at least one writer has argued that natural objects
should be given the substantive right to sue on their own behalf.3 3
The ideological argument maintains that the growth of social philosophy
and the evolution of rights imply a need for a new set of social ethics, one
that confers value on species regardless of human utility. Ethics should,
and do, evolve over time to aid us in coping with new social situations.
First, ethics were defined in terms of one individual's relationship to an-
other. Then, as social systems were established, ethics were increasingly
defined which related individuals to societies. As the world has "shrunk,"
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there has been an increasing emphasis on the ethical relationships between
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societies. The final set of ethics to be defined deals with the inter-
relationships between societies and their global environment. It is argued
that their definition is necessary in order to cope with the increasing
awareness of interactions at the society-environment interface. As with all
ethics, an environmental ethic must prescribe a theory of action that makes
our actions less chaotic and uncertain.
Leopold has done pathbreaking work in the definition of a "land ethic."3 5
In his view, an ethic is a "limitation on freedom of action in the struggle
for existence." He suggests that, through the definition of ethics, indiv-
iduals and groups evolve modes of mutual coercion and cooperation such that
the result is a symbiotic assemblage, that is, an ecological community. The
ecological community concept is particularly powerful as a social ethic be-
cause it defines our ethical responsibilities towards other species as one
of neighbors operating with a shared set of property rights. The neighborhood
metaphor is helpful in a prescriptive mode. For example, it is taken for
granted in small communities that an individual's responsibilities extend
beyond his self-interest. Hence, we have PTA's, beautification leagues, and
volunteer fire departments.
Development of an ecological conscience through the land ethic is im-
portant -- according to Leopold -- because it is necessary for the future
health of the natural community of which humans are one element. Other
animals operate via competition and in doing so define a stable state for
the community. Humans have historically acted in an instinctually-competitive
mode, broadening their niche and destroying other life forms. The argument
maintains that because human health is tied to the ecological system's
health, it is necessary to turn to less instinctual modes of operation. It
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further suggests that by placing humans in an ecological perspective, their
status as a "higher" species is reinforced. Humans -- as rational animals
capable of planning -- are no doubt unique, in that they create the meta-
physical structure in which they survive. Other species are limited by
instinct and environmental constraints. By adopting this paradigm, humans
accept the responsibility that comes with the ability to manage and control.
Based on their particular attitudes towards risk and their set of values,
preservationists argue that prohibitive legislation is not only necessary
but appropriate. They argue that the opportunity costs of losing a species
in terms of lost current and future utility and the risks of disaster from
biotic instability are too large to consciously allow species to go extinct.
Further, they maintain that humans have an ethical responsibility for other
life forms -- one that does not allow for the balancing of the benefits of
human development actions against the costs of the loss of a species.
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CHAPTER 3 -- EVOLVING PROHIBITIVE ENDANGERED SPECIES POLICY
Even though the proponents of prohibitive endangered species policy
based their arguments on evaluations of risk and social values, the 1973
ESA was framed as prohibitive largely because of the symbolic nature of
the issue, because it was defined by experts as a technical problem, and
because it was not clear whose interests would be harmed by passing pro-
hibitive legislation. In addition, comprehensive federal endangered species
policy evolved out of developments in other areas of federal wildlife law,
and responded to changing values, scientific knowledge, constituent groups,
and patterns of intergovernmental relations.
The Evolution of Federal Wildlife Law1
Until the early 1900s, wildlife management was handled almost exclu-
sively by state and territorial governments. Federal legislation dealt with
wildlife in only a limited way.2 Wildlife populations had been heavily
exploited in the nineteenth century.3 Sportsmen and scientific groups
formed in the late 1800s to push for government intervention to manage de-
pleted animal stocks.4 Since wildlife was a public good, state agencies
were established to manage the resource. Supported primarily by hunters and
fishermen, they focused their attention on game animals and fish.
A federal role in wildlife management developed early in the twentieth
century and grew dramatically in comprehensiveness and control.5 The Lacey
Act was the first significant piece of federal wildlife legislation. It was
passed in 1900 to regulate interstate commerce in wildlife killed in violation
of state law. "The impetus for enactment of the Lacey Act ... was the in-
ability of individual states to protect wildlife resources adequately against
well organized commercial interests able to harvest excessive quantities of
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wildlife and promptly ship them in interstate commerce out of the reach of
the state where they were harvested." Other than regulating interstate
commerce, the federal role developed in three other areas: the regulation
of taking (killing) of wildlife, acquisition and management of wildlife
habitat,9 and requiring federal agencies to consider the impacts of their
actions on wildlife.1 0
Legislation to protect endangered species uses all four of these
themes to build comprehensive wildlife management policy. Indeed, the
endangered species laws were developed out of the experience gained in these
four areas of wildlife law with many of their provisions almost identical
to those contained in earlier laws. For example, the 1973 ESA regulates
taking and commerce, provides land acquisition authority, and requires
federal agencies to consider (and reduce) their impacts on wildlife popu-
lations. The departure of the 1973 legislation from earlier efforts, how-
ever, was in the degree of its prohibition, its comprehensiveness, and
broad scope.
Throughout the twentieth century, federal power grew vis-a-vis that of
the states, though the appropriate role of each remained a constant source
of conflict. State supremacy in the area of wildlife management was upheld
until the 1910s. The Supreme Court decided the Abby Dodge case in 1912 on
the basis of this doctrine, holding that a federal statute that prohibited
the taking of sponges from the Gulf of Mexico or the Straits of Florida by
means of diving equipment was unconstitutional if the taking occurred in
Florida's territorial waters. The courts based their decisions on the
"state ownership doctrine", which held that the states retained public
trust ownership of wildlife. But with enactment of laws such as the Lacey
Act (1900), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (1918), the Migratory Bird Conser-
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vation Act (1929) and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (1934), the
balance of power shifted rapidly to the federal government.
Developing a Technical Definition of the Endangered Species Problem
While the growing federal role in wildlife management in general was
important in opening the public agenda to the endangered species issue,
growth in scientific knowledge and in a set of interested agency experts
was more significant. Scientific knowledge and the role of the expert in
government expanded significantly in the post-War years of the 1940s and
1950s. Advances in knowledge led scientists to build larger, more holistic
pictures of how the universe functioned. Out of an early preoccupation with
describing and classifying organisms (taxonomy) and with theories of popu-
lation biology that allowed efficient commercial exploitation, the scien-
tific principles of community ecology and ecosystem modelling expanded
abilities to conceptualize and analyze the endangered species problem.
The definition of the problem changed accordingly from one concerned largely
with overutilization (corrected by regulation of taking and commerce in
endangered species) to one focused on habitat loss (corrected by refuge
acquisition). More recently it has been viewed as an international problem
(corrected by intervention through treaties and incentives).
Shifts in the institutional location of federal wildlife expertise
helped to generate a broader view of the endangered species issue. Origi-
nally, federal management of wildlife was handled by the Departments of
Agriculture and Commerce, promoting a production-oriented, commercial
attitude towards wildlife. In 1939, however, an executive reorganization
brought wildlife management into the Interior Department. This change
encouraged the development of a broader view of wildlife, and facilitated
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a research program aimed at understanding the endangered species problem.1 3
Research. initially focused on species that were known to be in danger
and that had vocal constituencies -- symbolic species'such as the trumpeter
swan, the whooping crane, and the Canada goose. Experiments were conducted
that led towards plans to captively-propagate endangered bird species.
For example, it was discovered that bird species that reached sexual matur-
ity later in development could only be successfully transplanted from the
wild early in their life cycle. Experiments proved that male birds would
accept and mate with females that were grounded in a captive environment.
Scientists also developed the concept of surrogate research: Rather than
experimenting on species that were in a depleted state, they used individuals
from related species to test their hypotheses. They could then apply their
results to efforts to propagate endangered species in captivity.
Development of this basic method of research resulted in progress for
individual species and in an enhanced understanding of the nature of endan-
germent. Experience with the whooping crane is illustrative: A count on
their winter range in 1945 indicated that only 17 individuals of the species
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survived. The Cooperative Whooping Crane Project (involving U.S. and
Canadian wildlife experts) was begun in the same year. Ten years later,
the population had not increased significantly. In 1956, a FWS biologist
proposed that captive propagation be considered as a way to save the crane;
but one faction in the FWS argued that there were too few individuals in the
population with which to gamble. In 1957 they proposed that experiments be
conducted with surrogates (in this case, the more prevalent sandhill crane).
An advisory group was set up in 1958, but the surrogate-propagation proposal
did not get off the ground until the change of administration in 1961.
President Kennedy sent out a directive to the executive agencies that
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encouraged'the presentation of new ideas. The propagation interests in FWS
used the'memo as a springboard to begin experimentation with surrogates.
An overall three-part research -method was outlined for the development of
endangered species data. For each endangered species this included: (1)
biologists in the field studying the'species in the wild, (2) specialists
(behaviorists, physiologists, nutritionists, etc) studying the species'
needs in the laboratory, and (3) a propagation unit whose goal was to
preserve a gene pool of seriously threatened species. This research stra-
tegy has paid off slowly but steadily for the whooping crane: After six
years of surrogate research, eggs were collected from wild whooping crane
nests and were hatched successfully at the Patuxent Research Station. The
crane population currently stands at 108 birds.1 5
Nascent understanding of the endangered species problem and a developing
cadre of interested professionals led to the first administrative statement
of the problem. In 1964, a Committee on Rare and Endangered Wildlife Species
16
was established in the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. Nine biol-
ogists were assigned to the team. In August 1964, they published a prelim-
inary copy of the "Redbook" -- the first official federal list of rare and
endangered species of fish and wildlife. 7 The 1964 list identified 63
vertebrate species considered to be threatened with extinction.
The criteria used to list species were vague but made no attempt to
include any nonbiological variables. Attempts at explicitly balancing
other considerations (such as utility or disutility to humans) were not
seen as necessary because the Committee perceived the problem as bounded
only by technical dimensions. After all, listing a species in the Redbook
did not provide formal federal protection of any kind. Therefore, since no
one would be economically harmed as a result of a species being included,
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it was not viewed as necessary to include nontechnical considerations in
the listing. The species listed in the 1964 Redbook were selected solely
on the basis of informal expert judgment. The Committee pointed out that
"criteria to be used in selecting species and subspecies to be included
have not yet been clearly defined. For the present," they continued, "the
list includes those forms which are generally believed to be endangered or
which, in the opinion of the Committee are likely to be in jeopardy in the
forseeable future if solutions to problems contributing to their decline
are not found."1 8
The introduction to the Redbook reflects the Committee's frustration
with the state of knowledge about the status of many species as well as the
divergent interests within the BSFW. Yet it highlights their belief in a
purely-technical definition of what was to be considered endangered:
"In some instances, almost diametrically-opposed opinions have been
received on the status of a given species and on measures necessary
to insure its survival. The proposed solution, including management
recommendations, reflect the opinion of the Committee ... made with
complete independence of Bureau policy or management or administrative
restrictions ... (and evaluated) solely on a biological basis."1 9
"Complete independence" was necessary because of competing programs within
the BSFW. For example, the 1964 endangered list included the bighorn sheep
-- a game species whose protection would go against the interests of hunters,
the BSFW's traditional constituency. It also included the Utah prairie dog
-- an animal considered a nuisance by western ranchers. The Bureau's
Animal Damage Control unit was (in 1964) funding a prairie dog poisoning
program to protect the ranchers' interests. Hence, while there was a
growing BSFW interest in the protection of declining species like the Utah
prairie dog, other elements of the Bureau were actively engaged in their
destruction.
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At the same time that the research pogram was developing in the U.S.,
an increasing awareness of the endangered species problem was developing
in the international scientific community. For example, the International
Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) was formed
in Morges, Switzerland in 1948 to serve as a clearing house for endangered
species material. In 1962, two international conferences were held which
highlighted the global nature of the problem: The 13th world conference of
the International Council for Bird Preservation was held in New York City,
and focused on an estimated 120 threatened bird species and how to save
20
them. Similarly, the First World Conference on National Parks was held
in Seattle. Out of the Conference came a recommendation that for each
endangered species, an appropriate area of habitat be established in a
national park of wildlife reserve.21
Development of basic scientific method, awareness, and understanding,
growth of the American endangered species research program, and formation
of the BSFW Committee on Rare and Endangered Wildlife Species had several
important effects in the American legislative arena: The scientists who
had focused their research on endangered species became an important
lobbying group that pursued protective legislation. Since they perceived
the problem to be a technical issue of acquiring refuge habitat and pro-
pagating individual animals, they did not worry about commercial interests
that might be affected by protective legislation. This in part reflected
their personal values as to the worth of animal or plant species. More
important: because the technicians were the first to define the problem,
it was their technical prescriptions that were later codified into law.
(For example, the first federal list of protected species was taken
exclusively from the animals identified in the 1964 Redbook.)
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A Growing and Changing Constituency
While technical understanding and professional interest were developing,
a broad national constituency was emerging that pressed for the enactment
of protective endangered species laws. This constituency reflected changing
national perspectives on the value of wildlife. The original view of
wildlife as a foe and an item of subsistence broadened to encompass commer-
cial, recreational, scientific, and aesthetic values. Indeed, with the
advent of animal anti-cruelty laws, wildlife have increasingly been viewed
as having some set of intrinsic rights.
In many ways, these attitudinal changes were the indirect result of
post-War affluence and increased accessibility. The access provided by an
improved national road system and the financial ability to purchase auto-
mobiles brought large numbers of city dwellers into the country. Increases
in leisure time and disposable income caused recreational demand to soar.
The series of reports published by the U.S. Outdoor Recreation Resources
Review Commission in 1962 not only projected a dramatic rise in demand for
recreation by the year 2000, but highlighted for the first time the increas-
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ing demand for nonconsumptive recreational opportunities. Outdoor rec-
reationists had traditionally been individuals in rural areas who hunted
or fished. The new recreationist, however, was someone who wanted to watch
birds, hike, or drive for pleasure. New land areas and management ideas
were needed to respond to these demands.
Legislative recognition of the national need for outdoor recreation
opportunities brought with it opportunities for federal acquisition of
habitat to protect threatened fish and wildlife species. The Land and Water
Conservation Fund Act (LWCFA)24 was enacted in 1964 to establish a fund for
state and federal acquisition of land,and development of programs for
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national recreation needs. Included in the Act, however, was the provision
that money in the Fund could be used "for the acquisition of land, waters,
or interests in land or waters ... for any national area which may be
authorized for the preservation of species of fish and wildlife that are
threatened with extinction. 2 5 With passage of the Act, the Department of
the Interior was explicitly given authority to purchase habitat for endan-
gered species preservation that -- for the first time -- was not on a
species-by-species basis.
The development of non-traditional attitudes towards wildlife and the
outdoors supported the growth of non-game-oriented interests groups. Even
though national interest groups such as the National Audubon Society, the
National Wildlife Federation, and the Boone and Crockett Club had been
active as lobbyists for years, their efforts had been largely concerned
with game species (primarily waterfowl). A more broadly-based environmental
movement was budding in the early 1960s, however. Publication of Rachel
Carson's book on pesticides, Silent Spring, in 1962 and court battles such
as the Storm King case in 196526 heightened general public awareness of
environmental issues, mobilized activist groups, and stimulated development
of non-management, preservation-oriented interest groups.
The media also contributed to the changing national perspectives on
wildlife. For many urban dwellers, wildlife was something to be feared
or at least ignored. Wild animals were viewed as blood-thirsty inhabitants
of the woods. The closest one would want to approach an animal was in a
zoo or a fur coat. Television, however, broadened the experience of many
urban dwellers. From a first-hand view, wild animals were seen as cuddly,
warm and down-right human. As a result of its broad appeal, the media
seized on wildlife as an issue that would sell well with the public.
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Media coverage of the endangered species issue grew rapidly. Emotion-
charged statements abounded. In mid-1965, for example, the BSFW published
a pamphlet entitled "Survival or Surrender for Endangered Wildlife."2 7 The
pamphlet bemoaned the loss of the passenger pigeon, and called for research,
education, and regulations to protect endangered species. It claimed that
"today the future of many kinds of wildlife depends on how brightly burns
a spark of concern." The Washingtoiin Post in a Sunday issue in late 1965
contained a feature article on "Wildlife: The Vanishing Americans" which
began, "While the United States is in the midst of a population explosion
(of people), much of our animal population is heading in the other direction
-- toward extinction." 8 General public sentiment in favor of endangered
species protection grew rapidly. Television shows such as "The Wild Kingdom"
helped to "spread the word". School children sent contributions to the
Department of the Interior to help preservation activities.
Why was the endangered species issue so popular? For one thing, the
image of furry animals drawing their last breath is an extremely poignant
one. In the BSFW's words, "The subject has headline value." Further,
"this is the kind of story youthful minds can grasp and champion."29
FWS official Ray Erickson feels that the issue was so popular in part due to
the nature of the times: "Protestors were anti-everything in the Sixties.
Endangered species was like motherhood -- perhaps even better because
motherhood became controversial."
The endangered species issue was in many ways a symbol of the concern
for environmental quality. It was an issue that a wide variety of people
could identify with and understand. Further, it seemed to be a solveable
problem since the experts made it appear as a technical issue. It was never
clear that some interests might have to bear significant costs of protection.
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The First Step: The 1966 Legislation
The broadening knowledge of the endangered species problem, the growth
in public values and political activism, pressures from the administrative
experts, and Congressional awareness of a symbolic issue that "no one was
against" led to the passage of the first piece of federal legislation that
dealt explicitly and somewhat comprehensively with the endangered species
problem. Up until the mid-1960s, Americal legislation that dealt with
endangered species protection was framed on a species-by-species basis.
For example, Congress passed a bill in 1958 that authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to develop a research, propagation and management program
for the Hawaiian nene goose.31 A similar program for the whooping crane
was described above.
A comprehensive international treaty had been signed in 1940 with the
potential of controlling international trade in endangered species, but had
little net effect because of inadequate implementation. Provisions of the
Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western
Hemisphere3 2 were quite far-reaching, directing the signatory nations to
examine the possibility of setting aside national wildlife reserves where
no motorized transportation or commercial development would be allowed, and
to propose or adopt laws and regulations to protect flora and fauna within
their national boundaries. International trade in protected species (those
listed in an Annex of Species appended to the Convention treaty) was pro-
hibited within a legal export document from the country of origin. Perhaps
most remarkable was one of the purposes laid out in the Convention's preamble,
"to protect and preserve in their natural habitat representatives of all
species and genera ... in sufficient numbers and over areas extensive enough
to assure them from becoming extinct .. ,33 Unfortunately, this lofty
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purpose was not met by adequate implementing action. Further submerged by
the World War, the 1940 Convention had very little net impact on the
endangered species problem.
Technically, impetus for the 1966 legislation came from two sources.
First, a "housekeeping" bill was necessary to organize administration of the
national wildlife refuges. Second, even though authority to promote pro-
tection of several species had already been delegated to the Interior Depart-
ment and that land acquisition for threatened species had been outlined in
the LWCFA, the BSFW had no explicit authority to undertake a comprehensive
program to conserve endangered animals.34 The Endangered Species Preserva-
tion Act 5 was designed to satisfy both refuge organization and program
authorization needs.
The primary force behind the legislation was the BSFW's scientists and
wildlife managers. Development of an on-going research program had generated
an administrative constituency for preservation actions. Draft legislation
on refuge organization had been sent by Interior to the Bureau of the Budget
in 1958. A draft bill authorizing a comprehensive conservation program
was prepared in 1962. The proposals were later combined and cleared by the
Budget Bureau in 1965. Interior Secretary Udall sent the draft legislation
to the Congress on June 5, 1965. In a cover letter he pointed out that,
"The principal objective of this proposed legislation is to authorize and
direct the Secretary of the Interior to initiate and carry out a comprehen-
sive program to conserve, protect, restore, and where necessary to establish
wild populations, propagate selected species of native fish and wildlife...
that are found to be threatened with extinction."3 6
The Interior Department proposal was introduced into both houses prac-
tically verbatim.3 7 (The bills as finally enacted are summarized in
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Appendix J,) Both hills were geared to protect native species of fish and
wildlife thought to be threatened with extinction. Non-native species were
not eligible. Further, the'legislative history makes it clear that only
vertebrate species were to be considered for endangered species status.
Criteria were defined to guide the Secretary of the Interior in iden-
tifying which species were to be considered as endangered. As had been the
case in the 1964 Redbook, the criteria only included technical factors.
A species was to be designated if "its habitat is threatened with destruc-
tion, drastic modification, or severe curtailment, or because of over-
exploitation, disease, predation, or because of other factors ..." No
attempt was made to consider whether the species was important or valuable
to humans.
The bills were largely perceived as "refuge bills" with little or no
impact on any other interests. They would let the Interior Department pur-
chase habitat to protect endangered species. Refuge acquisition was by
this time a well-established function of the federal government. The bills
simply gave Interior the authority to use existing fund-providing laws for
endangered species purposes.39 Appropriations were quite limited --
$5 million annually, with a maximum of $750,000 to be used for any one area.
The taking of endangered species was also prohibited, but this provision
was extremely limited. Taking was only prohibited on federal lands that
were designated for wildlife refuge purposes.
For efficiency reasons, the bills also required federal agencies to
consider the impacts of their actions on wildlife populations. It seemed
inefficient to have Interior protecting endangered species while other
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federal agencies disregarded them on their lands. A mandate was thus
inserted into the bills that encouraged other agencies to consider wildlife
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impacts. But the mandate was far from absolute. The bills required the
Secretary of the Interior to utilize other Departmental programs "to the
extent practicable" to further'the purposes of the policy, and to encourage
other agency heads to do the ame.' The'Senate amended its version to add
a policy statement that the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture and Defense
"shall seek" to protect endangered species and more importantly to preserve
the habitats of these species on lands under their jurisdiction, but only
"insofar as is practicable and consistent" with their primary purposes.
This amendment was included in the enacted version.
The fourth theme of federal wildlife law, the regulation of commerce in
endangered organisms, was not included in the bills introduced in 1965 and
1966. This was important to the bills' passage because it kept all commer-
cial interests out of the debate. Indeed, as could be expected, the bills
were remarkably uncontroversial.41 Testimony at the Senate hearings was
totally in support of the concept contained in the proposed legislation.
National conservation organizations strongly supported the legislation. The
only real debate took place over the constitutional issues of federal appro-
priation of the states' historic rights to manage resident wildlife species.
Both the senators and the conservationists addressed this question. Predic-
tably, both the senators and a portion of the conservation community --
those groups with a game management constituency -- were protective of the
states' role. The other set of conservation groups (those with more diverse
constituencies) seemed to push for a greater federal role or at least a
42
clear separation of powers.
Both Senate and House bills passed easily by voice vote. Floor debate
in both houses was short. Supporters gave speeches which lauded the honor
and wisdom of their actions. Amendments were largely of a clarifying
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nature and dealt.mostly with the National Wildlife Refuge system reorgani-
zation. The'only really interesting change was deletion of subspecies as
candidates for endangered status. Even.though both House and Senate bills
as introduced extended'protection to subspecies, the Senate Committee (and
subsequently the conference committee) deleted them for unknown reasons.
The legislators perceived the issue as a "no-lose" situation: They
could vote to protect endangered species at little cost. A few refuges
might be set up, with hunting restricted on them, but it was not clear
where they may be or who if anyone would actually be hurt by the restric-
tions. Further, the Interior Department had testified that only some 78
species were considered to be endangered. Mammals and birds (and an occa-
sional favorite game fish) were given almost exclusively as examples: The
bills were seen as aiding whooping cranes and grizzly bears, black-footed
ferrets and prairie chickens.43 By passing the bills, the Congressmen
would also respond to an administration need for legislative authority and
direction, and more importantly, would make a symbolic statement that would
satisfy an increasingly-vocal set of interest groups, and would look good
to the general public.
To oversimplify somewhat: In passing the 1966 ESPA, Congress can be
seen as having passed a referendum in favor of endangered species and envi-
ronmental quality at a time when the tune was beginning to rise in the charts.
In passing the 1966 Act and hence in recognizing the issue as a national
problem, they also began an incremental process of legislative redefinition
that culminated in 1973 with a prescription that mirrored a degree of
comprehensiveness and prohibitiveness not imagined in 1966.
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Incremental Expansion The 1969 Legislation
A -middle-ground step was taken in 1969 with enactment of the'Endangered
44Species Conservation Act. The 1969 Act amended the 1966 legislation to
include the fourth theme of federal wildlife law -- regulation of commerce
in endangered species. It did this by prohibiting the importation of
endangered species (or portions or products thereof) into the United States,
and by extending the Lacey Act's ban on interstate commerce in unlawfully-
taken wildlife to include reptiles, amphibians, molluscs and crustaceans.
In many ways, in passing the 1969 legislation, the Congress responded to
the same forces as before. Both of the bans on interstate and international
commerce were symbolic responses to highly emotional issues (overexploita-
tion of the American alligator and the great cats). Further, the technical
experts of the BSFW were again a potent force in defining the problem and
its solution as a technical issue. The history of the 1969 Act is different
than that of the 1966 Act, however, because the presence of commercial
interests that would be harmed by the legislation forced the BSFW to include
balancing provisions in what could have been an extremely prohibitive Act.
Recognition of the international dimension of the problem was probably
the most significant element of the 1969 Act. Pressure for this component
came from both the Interior Department and from interest groups who decried
the overexploitation by the fur industry that was threatening the larger
species of the cat family (leopards, jaguars, etc). The United States was
under pressure to set an example. The Secretary-General of the IUCN wrote
to Senator Yarborough, indicating that 66 nations were prepared to follow
the U.S. example: "I wish to state that the adoption of this Bill is
critical from the international standpoint not only for its own worth but
also for the reason that if the Bill is enacted other nations will be
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prepared to follow the example set by the United States. Both the
Interior Department and influential wildlife interest groups4 7 picked up
quickly on this argument in favor of the legislation.
Extension of Lacey Act protection to reptiles, amphibians, and some
invertebrates responded almost entirely to-one issue -- heavy poaching on
alligator populations in the southeast. In the hearings and Senate and
House reports, illegal traffic in alligator hides was repeatedly given as
justification for extension of federal protection to these lifeforms.4 8
There was never any opposition to this extension, even though it had the
potential of causing the official federal endangered species list to
swell dramatically.
The symbolic nature of the endangered species issue continued to trigger
public support. The animals that would be protected by importation restric-
tions were enormously symbolic: Polar bears, elephants, leopards, rhinos --
all were large animals that presented emotion-provoking images. Newspaper
headlines played to these images: "Are the Days of the Arctic's King Running
Out?" 4 9 The metaphor of war was used: "Africa's Wildlife Under Siege,"50
"Can Africa's Wildlife Be Saved?" 51 Further, the problem was cast as the
result of the very rich selfishly demanding extravagant "fun furs" and
wasteful sport. In a story about the killing of polar bears for sport,
for example, one Washington Post article was titled, "Precious Meat for
Millionaires."
Having witnessed the ease of passage of the 1966 Act (signed into law
on October 15, 1966), the BSFW lost no time in drafting legislation that
incorporated the importation and interstate commerce prohibitions. Congress
was already on record in support of endangered species preservation. The
BSFW staff thought that the amendments would be warmly received. They sent
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draft legislation to Congressman John Dingell D-Mich) on February 8, 1967.53
Shortly thereafter, Dingell introduced a bill54 that was quite prohibitive.
55An identical version was introduced into the Senate: The bills not only
added the importation and interstate commerce prohibitions, but expanded
protection to subspecies as well. Criteria for listing endangered foreign
species were the same as those specified in the 1966 Act for native fish
and wildlife. The bill allowed the Secretary of the Interior to grant
permits to allow importation but only for zoological, educational, and
scientific purposes. All-in-all, the Dingell-BSFW bill was quite expansive
with a strong potential for significant impact upon commercial interests
like the domestic fur industry.
But in House and Senate hearings, there was no opposition to the bills.5 6
The House bill was reported practically intact with unanimous committee
support in February 1968, and was passed without opposition on August 1, 1968.
Senate hearings concluded with Acting Chairman Senator Daniel Brewster (D-Md)
stating that he would recommend to the Commerce Committee that the bill be
reported favorably.57 By the end of the summer, it seemed almost inevitable
that the Senate bill would also be reported and passed, and that the Presi-
dent would shortly sign it into law. But two things prevented this from
happening: the rapidly approaching pre-election adjournment of the 90th
Congress, and the twelth-hour (but not too late) involvement of the fur
industry.
The BSFW experts had never thought it necessary to involve representa-
tives of commercial interests in legislative discussions because this was
a technical matter to correct a technical problem. The fur industry was
clearly taken by surprise when the House passed its bill.5 8 Industry
representatives hurriedly began negotiations with the Department of the
60
Interior and the Senate Commerce Committee. Herman Ringelheim, representa-
tive of the New York.Fur Dressers Association described the situation
as follows:
"Our presence at these hearings is prompted by the fact that we were
among those sections of the fur industry that were stirred into action
late last summer by the news that the House of Representatives
had passed H.R. 11618 aimed at protecting animal species threatened
with extinction. That bill, we'felt, could have done serious
harm to our industry.
"I was a member of a delegation from the industry that visited the
representatives of the Department of the Interior shortly after we
became aware of this proposed legislation, to make our views and our
fears known. It is a source of great satisfaction to us to realize
that our representatives to the Department were taken very seriously,
and that substantial progress has been made in meeting many of the
major objections we raised."5 9
The primary argument used by the fur industry was that the problem was
international in dimension and that unilateral action by the United States
was inappropriate and would result in inequitable damage to American
furriers. They proposed many amendments including one which would require
as prerequisite to listing a species as endangered, official agreement of
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nations with 75 percent of the world's supply of the species. Another
amendment suggested by the industry would allow the species to be listed
only if "such determination shall not be contrary to the public interest
in terms of its impact on domestic consumers and businesses."6 1
After much negotiation, the Interior Department backed off its earlier
support of the prohibitive wording of the bill passed by the House. It
proposed an amendment which would limit species eligible for endangered
status to those threatened with'wOrldwide extinction. Hence, declining popu-
lations of species were not eligible for protection unless they were threat-
ened in global aggregate. In determining endangered status, the amendment
would require the Secretary to consult with interested persons. Further,
it provided that the Secretary could permit the importation of endangered
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species or products made from them to prevent "undue economic loss or
injury." No time limit was set on the permits, leaving it up to the Sec-
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retary's discretion. Hence, permits could now be provided for zoological,
educational, scientific, propagation, or commercial purposes'-- a significant
weakening of the prohibition.
The Senate Commerce Committee reported an amended version of the bill
on October 10, 1968. The Senate version included Interior's weakening
amendments. It also contained a new subsection that provided a 180-day
grace period from the time of enactment to the time when the law would take
effect. According to some conservationists, this provision would allow
importers to stockpile endangered species merchandise and build a case for
receiving a hardship permit by entering into contracts for the products.
It is problematic, of course, to wonder whether the fur industry would have
received the same set of concessions if the Senate Interior or Environment
and Public Works Committees had considered the bill. Commercial interests
are certainly high on the priority list of the Committee on Commerce. Never-
theless, the bill was reported favorably. Differences between House and
Senate versions were considerable. A conference committee would have been
necessary, but the 90th Congress adjourned four days later. The bills died
a natural death.
Analysts at the time claimed that an endangered species bill would have
passed in the 90th Congress had the fur industry not opposed it. Columnist
Joshua Lederberg, for example, wrote that the legislation would have been
enacted had it not been for the "opposition of such laws (which) came from
an irresponsible part of the fur trade, whose natural supplies will soon
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evaporate if they are not promptly protected." A more recent analysis
claimed that, "Suddenly, at the last minute, the American fur industry,
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aware that some of its profits might also hbe endangered by this legislation,
managed to kill the hill through pressure on the Senate Commerce Committee."6 4
The conservation interest groups and the administrative experts were
surprised at their loss of control of the outcome of the debate. In the
waning moments of the 90th Congress, Senator Ralph Yarborough (D-Texas)
expressed the conservationists' disappointment and set the stage for the
next year:
"I assure all of those who have worked so hard with me for passage
of this legislation that we are only down, and not out. Our fight
will go on. When the 91st Congress convenes in January 1969, I
again will introduce legislation to protect endangered species.
It is my hope that the Congress will respond to this great need.
In January, Congressman John Dingell (and others) introduced a bill
that was identical to the strongly-worded, prohibitive bill that had been
passed by the House the previous session. But the need for compromise with
the fur industry was obvious. The Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen (AFL-CIO) brokered two meetings at which representatives from the
conservation groups, the two Congressional committees, the Interior Depart-
ment, and the fur and leather industries discussed their demands.6 6
Following the change in administration (from Johnson to Nixon) and
feeling the mood of compromise, the Department of the Interior drafted a
new bill. 7 The Administration's new version was introduced into the House
by powerful Congressman Edward A. Garmatz (D-Md), Chairman of the full
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. A similar bill was intro-
duced into the Senate by Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the full Commerce
Committee. The new bills were similar to the bill reported by the Senate
Commerce Committee the previous year. Provisions added to respond to the
commercial interests were kept, including the requirement that species be
threatened with extinction worldwide, the provision allowing import permits
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in cases of economic hardship, and the 180-day grace period.. The Secretary
of the Interior was also required to use "the best scientific data available
to him" to make decisions about endangerment.
In contrast with the previous year, testimony at the'1969 House and
Senate hearings was split pretty much evenly between conservationists and
fur industry groups. It was clear that a consensus was building around
the Garmatz bill: Commercial interests recognized the inevitability of the
bills' passage; both commercial and environmental interests recognized the
need for compromise. The prime source of debate was around the need for
international action. Elements of the fur industry again argued against
unilateral action by the United States and for weakening amendments:69
"To be blunt, our industry would be seriously handicapped if the
United States were unilaterally to declare a species endangered
while other countries permitted skins to be taken and processed ...
The prospect of my being forbidden to process certain skins which
would then simply go to my competitors in Europe or Japan is
extremely disturbing. To force us to export jobs in this manner
would help neither the species in question nor the United States
unemployment rate."70
For different reasons, the environmentalists were also concerned with the
mandate for international cooperation.7 To respond to these concerns, a
new section was added that required the Secretaries of Interior and State
to seek an international ministerial meeting prior to June 30, 1971 in which
"included in the business of that meeting shall be the signing of a binding
international convention on the conservation of endangered species."7 2
One other significant compromise was included in the bill that was
finally signed by the President in early December 1969.73 To satisfy the
conservation groups, a one-year maximum time limit was set for hardship
permits. To satisfy the fur industry, a petition process was established
that required the Secretary of the Interior to review the status of a species
upon petition by an interested party.
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In passing the 1969 Act,.the Congress expanded the federal program to
conserve endangered species'one step. It was getting increasingly compre-
hensive with greater federal involvement. The'global nature of the problem
was recognized. All four elements of federal wildlife law were included.
While many of the same forces'that were responsible for enactment of the
1966 law were also critical influences'in 1969 (Congressional perception of
a symbolic issue; technical pressures and problem definition), a balancing
of interests took place in the 1969 law because an aggrieved party was
present and able to press for compromise. What had started out to be an
extremely prohibitive statement was modified by negotiations that provided
an opportunity for the inclusion of non-preservation interests.7 4
Building Comprehensive, Prohibitive Policy: 'The'1973'Legislation
Legislation was passed in 1973 that replaced the two previous laws with
a comprehensive and prohibitive policy that went far beyond the earlier
endangered species programs. The 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA) was one
of the last pieces of symbolic environmental legislation passed to satisfy
a powerful environmental lobby with ostensibly few associated costs. In
contrast to the atmosphere of negotiation that pervaded the history of the
1969 law, the ESA was framed as prohibitive because it was not obvious who
it would hurt: Congress defined the law prohibitively because no one
told them not to.
Environmentalism grew significantly in the early 1970s. The public
increasingly placed pollution control and environmental quality higher in its
list of social priorities. For example, while only 35 percent of a nation-
wide sample considered water pollution to be a serious problem in 1965,
74 percent were concerned by it in 1970. A similar survey regarding the
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seriousness of air pollution showed an increase in concern from 28 percent
in 1965 to 69 percent in 1970.7 5 The first Earth Day was held in the spring
of 1970 prompting interest and activity in primary and secondary schools,
colleges and communities. At a time when the Viet Nam War continued to
drain the national psyche, environmental quality was something everyone
could be in favor of -- seemingly at low cost to society.7 6
Environmental interest groups proliferated and matured. Old groups
were bolstered by new interest at the local level. Their early preoccupation
with conservation (management) shifted towards advocacy of preservation as
more and more non-consumptive (generally non-hunting) recreationists joined
their memberships. New groups were created in response to local and regional
controversies. Their skills at lobbying -- while still adolescent -- were
increasingly effective and organized. Politicians could get elected on
environmental platforms.
The mood of the times, the swelling and maturing environmental con-
stituency, and an increased belief in federal regulation as appropriate
public policy led to numerous legislative victories for the environmentalists
77in the early 1970s: The National Environmental Policy Act, the Clear Air
Act Amendments,78 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments,79 the
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Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, the Marine Mammal Protection
Act,8 1 the Noise Control Act,82 and the Coastal Zone Management Act 3 were
all fairly expansive elements of federal regulatory policy fought and won
by an increasingly effective and entrenched environmental constituency.
Enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 probably represents the
peak of this wave. Endangered species was the quintessinal environmental
issue. Interest-groups were well-organized, and were supported by wins in
1966 and 1969. Key congressmen were allied with the activist groups.84
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All of these factors enhanced the power of preservationist interests and
resulted in a remarkably comprehensive and stringent Act. In contrast to
the legislative histories of the 1966 and 1969 laws, bills which evolved
into the ESA increased in prohibitiveness and coverage. The final version
incorporated almost all of the most restrictive elements of the "seed"
bills. The ESA was one of the last pieces of environmental bandwagon
legislation -- already set in motion prior to the 1973 Arab oil embargo
and resultant "energy crisis".
The substantive impetus for the 1973 Act came primarily from three
sources: (1) The 1969 Act had done nothing to regulate the taking of endan-
gered species within the United States (other than on federal property);
(2) In addition, earlier legislation had overlooked "almost-endangered"
species. Protection was provided only for species "threatened with world-
wide extinction." To be eligible for protection, species had to be in global
intensive care, not just in the hospital; (3) The United States was still
under pressure from the international conservation community to set an
example. An international meeting had not been held by the 1971 deadline
as required by the 1969 Act.
Some analysts have also seen inadequate implementation of the 1969 man-
dates by the Interior Department as a source of pressure leading to adoption
of the 1973 legislation:
"The Department of Interior's intransigence in carrying out its duties
under the 1969 Endangered Species Act did have at least one beneficial
side effect: it helped spur efforts to strengthen and amend the law.
Part of the problem in the department's inability or unwillingness to
take needed action came from its legal department, the Office of the
Solicitor. Their lawyers insisted on a narrow, legal interpretation
of the 1969 law, and did their best to prevent the department from
taking actions which might conceivably exceed the authorities it had
been given."85
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Bills broadening the provisions of the 1969 Act were introduced in the
Congress in 1970 and 1971, but did not really get off the ground until early
in 1972. President Nixon's Environmental Message of February 8, 1972
pointed out that "even the most recent act to protect endangered species,
which dates only from 1969, simply does not provide the kind of management
tools needed to act early enough to save a vanishing species." 8 7 He proposed
legislation that "would make the taking of endangered species a federal
offense, and would permit protective measures to be undertaken before a
species is so depleted that restoration is impossible." The prohibition on
taking and the addition of a threatened category were thus central ideas in
the proposed legislation.
The Administration's bill was drafted by staff of the BSFW and the
House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and was introduced
by Congressman Dingell and 24 co-sponsors into the House on February 8, 1972.
Identical legislation was introduced in the Senate by Senator Mark Hatfield
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on February 18, 1972. These two bills became the base for the legislation
that was finally signed almost two years later.
The Dingell-Hatfield bills would repeal both the earlier laws (excluding
the portion of the 1966 Act dealing with National Wildlife Refuge system
organization) and would substitute a comprehensive program under the aegis
of one law. They contained the following key provisions: (1) They extended
protection from species "presently threatened with extinction" (endangered)
to those that "will likely within the forseeable future become threatened
with extinction" (threatened). In addition, they dropped the requirement
that species be threatened with worldwide extinction, adding species that may
be abundant locally, but are threatened in "a significant portion of their
range." The bills also dropped the foreign/native distinction contained in
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the earlier laws and added an additional reason for listing a species:
"ithe inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms." '
(2) The' bills gave joint jurisdiction to the Secretaries of the Interior
(BSFW) and Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration -
National Marine Fisheries'Service) as divided in Reorganization Plan #4 of
1970.90 Commerce was to have control over'endangered ocean species.9 1
(3) The taking (pursuing, hunting, shooting, capturing, collecting, or
killing, or attempting to do the same) of endangered species anywhere in the
United States was prohibited regardless of state jurisdiction or whether
the species was resident (confined within one state) or migratory. This was
to be a major federal excursion into an area long cherished by the states --
control over resident wildlife. Exceptions were provided for native (largely
Eskimo) claims and for hardship permits. In addition, to satisfy proponents
of state control, the Interior Secretary was given the power to delegate
federal authority over the taking of species to state management agencies
if they had adequate endangered species programs.
(4) The 1966 requirement that the Interior, Agriculture, and Defense
Departments seek to protect endangered species while carrying out other
programs was extended to all federal agencies:
"All other Federal departments and agencies shall ... utilize, where
practicable, their authorities in furtherance of the purpose of this
Act by carrying out programs for the protection of endangered species
and by taking such action as may be necessary to insure that actions
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the
continued existence of endangered species."92
(5) Finally, the maximum limits on land acquisition funds were deleted,
providing the Secretary of the Interior unlimited authority to purchase
habitat for endangered species, pursuant of course to available
appropriations.
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While the bills provided the opportunity for halancing other legislative
mandates, the'draft environmental statement CDES) prepared y the BSFW on the
Endangered Species' Conservation'Act of 1972 indicates'how strong a state-
ment the bill's drafters felt it to be. 3 For example, in reference to
the requirement that federal agencies'seek to protect endangered species,
the BSFW stated, "this provision of the proposed legislation is the first
piece of substantive law which agencies'would have'to 'adhere'to in carrying
out their programs and duties, as it would prevent them from taking action
which would jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species.94
Regarding the state-federal jurisdictional question, the BSFW stated that
the bill "would in effect remove listed species from the states' juris-
diction" overlooking the state-delegation clause. Regarding their own
multiple-use discretion, the DES stated that "To conserve and protect some
endangered species it will be necessary to set aside certain areas and
maintain them for the use of the species in question. Generally these areas
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will not be available for commercial uses such as agriculture. In net
effect, the DES expressed the BSFW's desire for the enactment of stringent,
prohibitive legislation.
In July 1972, a second, more restrictive Senate bill was introduced
that extended protection to plants, to all animals (including unnamed inver-
tebrates such as insects), and to species that were similar-in-appearance
to endangered species. It deleted the exemption for Eskimo use of endan-
gered species and deleted permits for taking for zoological or educational
purposes. It added a section calling for the convening of an international
convention to sign a binding agreement regulating trade in endangered species
(the same meeting that was supposed to have been held by mid-1971).
Commercial interests did not testify in either House or Senate hearings.
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Indeed, there was very little opposition to the'major concepts of the bills
hecause theydid not threaten any readily-identifiable interests. Instead,
the major disagreements reflected a split in the environmental community.
Different camps were developing among the'environmental groups. One group,
typified by the Wildlife Management Institute, supported a traditional,
management-orientation to the endangered species problem. It wanted
primary regulatory authority to rest with the states so that federal
interference with game animal management would be limited. The other group,
including organizations like Defenders of Wildlife, were in favor of a
preservationist, prohibitive, federal regulatory presence in the area.
Indeed, preservation interests that had not been present at the hearings
preceding the 1966 and 1969 laws were very much involved in the 1972
hearings. This included groups such as the Fund for Animals, the Society
for Animal Protective Legislation, the National Parks and Conservation
Association, and the Committee for the Preservation of the Tule Elk.
The issue of federalism was central to the discussion at the hearing,
but for the first time, most groups were agreeing that some federal juris-
diction over resident species was necessary. Representatives of the Interior
Department were less apologetic about their increasing role in wildlife
management. Even the representatives of the International Association
of Game, Fish and Conservation Commissioners (IAGFCC) -- the brotherhood
of state wildlife agencies -- felt that some federal control was necessary.98
The addition of the threatened category was supported by all groups but
for different reasons; Preservation groups supported the pre-endangered
classification so that more species could receive protection. Management
groups supported the designation so that it would be possible to get around
the blanket prohibition provided by the endangered classification.
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For example, if a species had one population in danger and another abundant,
regulations could he written that would allow the harvest of the abundant
population. The alligator was again cited as an example of the need for
the legislation. In parts of the'United'States, the alligator population
was clearly depleted; but in other areas, it had made such a comeback that
it was considered a nuisance, reportedly eating pet dogs and inhabiting
backyard swimming pools.
Beyond the federalism issue, there were two areas of major disagree-
ment in the 1972 hearings: who should have jurisdiction and what to do
about plants. Most of the environmental groups were opposed to giving the
Commerce Department a hand in the bill's implementation and were in favor
of including plants in the proposed legislation. The Administration sup-
ported the joint role as an issue of expertise, and felt that the plant
problem was not well enough understood to include in this piece of legis-
lation (preferring to defer it until later).
The preservation groups also suggested a number of specific, more
stringent provisions -- most of which were included in the final version
of the legislation, expanding its coverage and making it more prohibitive.
These amendments included expanding protection to all animals and expli-
citly to isolated populations of species regardless of global status,
allowing the states to adopt more restrictive legislation, tightening the
federal agency mandate by deleting the "where practicable" language, and
adding a citizens' suit provision. Even though the Senate reported a bill9 9
in September 1972, there was not enough time left in the 92nd Congress to
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work out the bugs. Nevertheless, the 1972 proceedings set the agenda
for the next legislative session.
In the meantime, two other events helped pave the way for the 1973 Act:
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The Marine Mammal Protection Act MMPA) was signed by.the President;
and an international meeting was held and a binding Convention signed that
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regulated international commerce'in endangered species. Passage of the
MMPA provided another inertial thrust behind the environmentalists and set
several precedents since several of the MMPA's provisions were similar to
those at issue in the endangered species controversy. For example, the
jurisdictional question was settled by sticking with the Commerce-Interior
split provided by Reorganization Plan #4 (1970). The MMPA also contained
provisions for a "depleted" category which was similar to the threatened
category in the endangered species bills.
The signing of the International Convention pressured the U.S. to
enact strong domestic legislation both to set an example and to establish
implementing procedures and authority. The Convention was the result of an
international meeting held in March 1973 -- over a year and a half past
the date specified in the 1969 Act. The Convention regulated international
commerce in species listed in three appendices: Appendix I species were the
most vulnerable (endangered) and would require import and export permits
from the importing and exporting countries; Appendix II species were less
vulnerable (threatened) and would need only an export permit; Appendix III
species included those that were unilaterally identified by a country of
origin as threatened and in need of aid.
With the beginning of the 93rd Congress, it was fairly clear that an
endangered species act would be passed. The degree of comprehensiveness,
federal control, and prohibitiveness still had to be settled. On January 3,
1973, Congressman Dingell (and 70 cosponsors) introduced a bill similar to
that reported by.the Senate Commerce Committee the previous year. The
Dingell bill included the threatened and similarity-of-appearance categories,
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split jurisdiction between Commerce and Interior, allowed delegation of
authority to the'states provided'for permits for scientific, propagation
or hardship purposes, and extended-protection to all animals (but not
plants). It contained the federal agency mandate to protect endangered
species'wherever 'practicable. It deleted the exemption for Eskimos, and
added a new section requiring the Smithsonian Institution to study the
plant problem.
The President's Environmental Message on February 15, 1973 reiterated
his concern with the problem. A new Administration bill was transmitted to
the Congress on the same day1 03 and introduced shortly thereafter.104 The
Administration bill had several provisions that were weaker than those in
the Dingell bill (H.R. 37): It would not protect all animals (leaving out
invertebrates such as insects), had no provisions for plant protection or
study, and would allow permits for zoological or educational purposes as well
as scientific and hardship purposes. Two more stringent provisions, however,
were important: The Administration bill did not provide for delegation of
authority to the states, and contained a new prohibitive mandate for
federal agencies.
The preservationists, the BSFW experts, and the House Committee staff
105
had pushed for an absolute mandate for federal agencies. The Adminis-
tration bill responded to this pressure by deleting the "where practicable"
language. The legislation now'required agencies to take "such action
necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them
do not jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species."1 0 6
In House hearings, a small amount of discussion was focused on the agency-
mandate provision, but in general it was not controversial. After all, it
was not at all clear who would be hurt by the mandate, and seemed counter-
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productive and inefficient to allow one hand of government to harm endan-
gered species while another spent money to protect them. Further, the
mandate seemed inocuous because it was not tied' to any specific area of land.
The agency-action mandate was expanded, however, in the version of the
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bill reported by the Senate Commerce Committee. In this bill, agencies
were required to insure that their actions do not "result in the destruc-
tion or modification or any habitat" determined by the Secretary of the
Interior "to be a critical habitat" of an endangered species. Hence, a
measurable requirement was placed on agencies not to destroy critical
habitat.
None of these provisions received much attention in hearings and debate,
however. As in the previous year, discussion primarily centered on the
federalism issue. The Commerce-Interior jurisdiction issue was raised
again, as were suggestions for extending protection to plants and isolated
populations. By this time, it was certain that a tough bill was going to
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be enacted, but it was not clear who would control it and how far it would go.
At each step in the framing of the final legislation, the bills got
more comprehensive and more prohibitive. In part this was due to the pro-
ponents' strength and persistence; but more important, it was the result of
the lack of opposition to a very popular issue. The Senate passed its bill
in July by an overwhelming 92-0 roll call vote. It extended protection to
all animals, plants, and isolated populations. It contained a mandatory
agency-action provision, and the requirement not to modify critical habitat.
It also included a citizens' suit provision, yet still contained the state-
delegation clause. The House bill was even more prohibitive and was passed
in September by an equally overwhelming vote (390-12). It had no provision
for the delegation of management authority to the states, and added a new
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prohibition that would make it unlawful for U.S. citizens to take endangered
species in foreign countries.
It was up to a conference committee to work out the differences between
the House and Senate versions of the bill. Compromises were achieved where
opposing interests were evident. Prohibitive provisions were included when
no one argued against them. The state-delegation issue was resolved by
providing a 15-month period in which states could retain control over the
management of resident species if they established strong state plans through
federal-state cooperative agreements. The jurisdiction issue was settled
by not allowing the Commerce Department to unilaterally de-list species.
The House-included prohibition on taking in foreign countries was dropped
under pressure from the Senate Commerce Committee staff (since this would
endanger commercial activities such as safari-hunting).
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The Conference Report was submitted on December 19, 1973 and was
adopted immediately by voice-vote in the Senate. The conference bill was
passed the next day in the House by an overwhelming vote of 355 to 4, and
was signed by the President on December 28.
The Endangered Species Act of 1973: In Summary
In spite of the compromises made in the Conference Committee, the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973 was an extremely strong, comprehensive, and
prohibitive statement: The Secretary of the Interior was required to esta-
blish a list of species, subspecies and/or isolated populations that were
considered to be endangered or almost-endangered (threatened). Any animal
or plant was eligible (excluding insect pests and bacteria and viruses) from
whales and elephants to beetles and snapdragons. The Secretary was authorized
to make the list based solely on biological information from the best
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scientific and commercial data available. The criteria for endangerment
outlined in the Act covered any reason -- natural or manmade -- for the
decline of a species. Further, even species that looked like endangered
species could be protected to avoid enforcement problems. Additions (or
deletions) to this list could be proposed by anyone (who presented sub-
stantial evidence); the Secretary was required to respond to these petitions.
Furthermore, anyone could file a citizen's suit to try to force the
Secretary to act.
Given this list of species, a number of actions were prohibited: It
was unlawful to import or export an endangered or threatened species (pro-
duct or part thereof). It was unlawful to "take" an endangered or threatened
species within the United States, its territorial waters or on the high seas.
Taking was defined extremely broadly as actions which would harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect organisms (or
attempting to do the same). A few exemptions were allowed through a per-
mitting procedure, but only for scientific or propagation purposes, for sub-
sistence by Alaskan natives, and for cases of "undue economic hardship" for
periods of a maximum of one year.
More significantly, all federal agencies and departments were required
to review their own actions (and actions funded or permitted by them) and
be certain that they do not jeopardize any listed species or destroy or
modify critical habitat. Thus, for example, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development would have to review its public housing projects for
impact on endangered species; the Army Corps of Engineers would have to
review its dredging projects; the Environmental Protection Agency would
have to review each application for a wastewater disposal permit to insure
that endangered species or their habitats would not be harmed.
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Other provisions were important; A program of cooperative state-
federal agreements and grants was established. The Smithsonian was directed
to review the status of endangered plant species. Land acquisition author-
ity was provided, without maximum acquisition limits. For the first time,
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authorizations were included to run the program. Implementation
authority was provided for the International Convention. Penalties up to
$20,000 and one year imprisonment were outlined for violations of the Act.
The Endangered Species Act was the comprehensive end-product of
seventy years of incremental federal wildlife law. It was spawned by an
extremely symbolic issue that fed public sentiment and support, and was
buttressed by an amazingly strong and well-organized set of activist groups
and a powerful set of congressional staff and members. It was defined as
a technical problem that would not harm any domestic interests, and was
framed prohibitively because no one perceived any costs of doing so. The
Act was seen as a low-cost, "no-lose" legislative situation. It was framed
in a time when strong federal regulation was considered to be appropriate
policy and in a context where affluence provided the opportunity to
worry about issues of environmental quality.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1. For a more elaborate description, see Bean, 1977, p66-261, 288-319.
2. See, e.g., Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 240, which prohibited the
killing of certain Alaskan fur-bearing animals; Act of February 28,
1887, 24 Stat. 434, which regulated the importation of mackerel into
the United States.
3. Udall, 1963.
4. For example, the American Association for the Advancement of Science
was formed around the issue of forest reform in 1848; the American
Fisheries Society was started in 1870; the American Forestry Associa-
tion in 1875; the National Rifle Association in 1871; the Boone and
Crockett Club in 1887. (National Wildlife Federation, 1977)
5. The federal role in wildlife protection developed on the basis of three
federal constitutional powers: the power to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce (Article I, Section 8); the power to make rules
regarding U.S. property (Article IV, Section 3); and the power to make
international treaties for which implementing legislation takes prece-
dence over state regulation (Article VI). (Boyd, 1970)
6. Bean, 1977, p293.
7. The Lacey Act prohibited the interstate transport of any wild animal or
bird killed in violation of state law. It was based fairly solidly on
the power of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce.
It also prohibited the importation of injurious animals and authorized
the Secretary of Agriculture to adopt affirmative measures necessary
for the "preservation, distribution, introduction and restoration of
game birds and other wild birds," subject to the laws of the states
and territories (31 Stat. 187, 1900). "Although the Lacey Act was
recognized as early as 1910 as an act designed to protect endangered
species (Rupert v. U.S., 181 F. 87, (8th Cir, 1910)), it suffers
from a major deficiency in that it is dependent upon local and foreign
laws for its usefulness." (Palmer, 1975, p258)
Although the Lacey Act was written as applying to any wild animals or
birds, in practice it was applied only to game birds and fur-bearing
mammals. (Bean, 1977, p114) The Black Bass Act of 1926 (current version
at 16 U.S.C. 851-6(1970)) was passed to extend protection to several
species of fish. An amendment in 1935 (Act of June 15, 1935, 49 Stat.
380) extended the prohibition on interstate commerce to wild animals
or birds taken contrary to federal or foreign law. A subsequent amend-
mend in 1949 (Act of May 24, 1949, 63 Stat. 89) illustrates the changing
constituency for (and evolving values in) wildlife. It prohibited the
importation of "wild animals or birds" under conditions known to be
"inhumane or unhealthful." A further amendment in 1969 extended Lacey
Act protection to molluscs, crustaceans, amphibians and reptiles
(18 U.S.C. 43 (1970)). Hence the history of regulation of commerce in
wildlife reveals a widening federal role which expresses the changing
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values in wildlife and shifting state-federal power balances.
8. Federal actions to regulate the taking or killing of wildlife did not
really get off the ground until almost 1920. Prior to that, several
small-scale actions prohibited taking on federal land under authority
of the property clause of the Constitution. Hunting, for example, was
prohibited in Yellowstone National Park in 1894 (Act of May 7, 1894,
28 Stat. 73). Similarly, the hunting of birds on the newly-created
federal wildlife refuges was prohibited in 1906 (Act of June 28, 1906,
34 Stat. 536). The first attempt at exerting major federal regulation
over the taking of wildlife came with passage of the Migratory Bird
Act of 1913 (Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 828). The 1913 Act declared
all migratory game and insectivorous birds to be within federal custody
and prohibited their hunting except under federal regulations. (There
was of course no incentive for the states to regulate the taking of
migratory animals because of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" or "Tragedy of
the Commons" nature of the problem). Although the Agriculture Depart-
ment claimed that the Commerce Clause gave the federal government the
right to such regulation, the Act was declared unconstitutional in
federal district court.
To counteract the adverse decision, a treaty was signed with Great
Britain (on behalf of Canada) in 1916 for the protection of migratory
birds (Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, August 16,
1916, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628). The 1918 Migratory Bird Treaty
Act was very similar to the 1913 legislation, but was now supported
by the treaty-making powers given to the federal government and the
supremacy clause in the Constitution. The constitutionality of the
Act was upheld in 1920 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Missouri
v. Holland (252 U.S. 416 (1920)). The 1918 Act set the stage for
later federal efforts to regulate taking. Even the language used
in defining "taking" recurs and is closely mirrored in the endangered
species legislation.
9. Federal habitat acquisition activities began in the early 1900s. Pelican
Island refuge (Florida) designated in 1903 is generally considered to
be the first federal wildlife refuge. Shortly thereafter Congress
authorized the President to designate wildlife ranges within the
Wichita and Grand Canyon National Forests (Act of January 24, 1905;
33 Stat. 614; Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 607). In 1908, Congress
itself established the National Bison Range in Montana (Act of May 23,
1908, 35 Stat. 267).
A systematic program of refuge acquisition was begun with the passage
of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 (16 U.S.C. 715 (1970 &
Supp IV 1974)), which established a commission to review and approve
Interior Department proposals for refuge purchase or rental. Although
the 1929 Act provided that the refuges be operated as "inviolate
sanctuaries," amendments in 1949 and 1958 provided for limited hunting
if compatible with wildlife interests. Passage of the 1934 Migratory
Bird Hunting Stamp Act (which taxed all migratory bird hunters) pro-
vided a constant source of revenue for refuge acquisition, but limited
acquisition primarily to lands benefitting migratory waterfowl (16 U.S.C.
718 (1970 & Supp IV 1974)). The Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration
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(Pittman-Robertson) Act (16 U.S.C. 669 (1970)) passed in 1937 and the
Federal Aid in Fish Restoration (Dingell-Johnson) Act enacted in 1950
provide funds for state habitat acquisition and maintenance projects,
but focuses these funds on game animals and fish. For example, the
administrative regulations define a substantial (and hence fundable)
project as "one which will provide benefits to hunters and fisher-
men ..." (50 CFR 80.1(g)(1975)).
It was not until 1966 that the National Wildlife Refuge System was
established to consolidate the various land units already acquired.
(Sections 4 and 5 of the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966,
80 Stat. 926, contain the National Wildlife Refuge System Administra-
tion Act.) The 1966 Act gave the Secretary of the Interior authority
to permit any use (hunting, fishing, recreation, etc.) on the refuges
as long as they were compatible with the major purposes for which the
areas were established.
The other dominant source of federal wildlife habitat has been on other
public lands. Most other federal land systems (National Forests, etc)
have multiple-use implementing legislation which encourage the develop-
ment of wildlife programs. Recent legislation, however, has mandated
the development of comprehensive plans for wildlife conservation on
public lands under the aegis of the Departments of Interior and Agri-
culture. The Sikes Act Extension enacted in 1974 (16 U.S.C. 670(g)-
670(o)(Supp IV 1974)) directs the Secretaries to "develop, maintain,
and coordinate programs for the conservation and rehabilitation of
wildlife, fish, and game." Indeed, the programs must include "specific
habitat improvement projects and related activities and adequate pro-
tection for species considered threatened or endangered."
10. The fourth theme appeared latest in the legislative chronology. The
requirement that federal agencies consider their impacts on wildlife
populations was spawned by an evolving awareness of the magnitude of
habitat alteration incurred by federal water projects. Having focused
on the problem of habitat loss, it was clear by the 1930s that refuge
acquisition was an inadequate solution. Legislation was therefore de-
veloped with the goal of injecting wildlife values into the planning
of activities taking place outside of the refuges.
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934 (Act of March 10, 1934,
48 Stat. 401, current version at 16 U.S.C. 661-667e(1970)) was probably
the first major law which employed this strategy. The 1934 Act was
quite progressive for the time, authorizing investigations to determine
the effect of pollutants on wildlife, encouraging a supply-oriented
management program for wildlife on the public lands, and advocating
state-federal cooperation to develop a national wildlife conservation
program. Unfortunately only a couple of the provisions of the Act
appeared to be mandatory. They required consultation with the Bureau
of Fisheries prior to dam construction to see if measures to aid fish
migration were necessary and economically practicable and to determine
if the impoundments behind the dams could be used to benefit fisheries
or migratory birds.
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The administrative response to the mandates of the 1934 Act was minimal
at best. Accordingly, Congress expanded the scope of the legislation
by passing amendments in 1946 (Act of August 14, 1946, 60 Stat. 1080).
The amendments made consultation necessary not only for dam construction
projects, but "(w)henever the waters of any stream or other body of
water are authorized to be impounded, diverted, or otherwise controlled
for any purpose whatever by any department or agency of the United
States, or by any public or private agency under federal permit".
The object of the consultation was broadened from efforts to aid fish
migration to efforts which prevent "loss of and damage to wildlife
resources", where wildlife was defined extremely broadly as "birds,
fishes, mammals, and all other classes of wild animals and all types
of aquatic and land vegetation upon which wildlife is dependent"
Further, whenever consultation was required, agencies were required
to make "adequate provision ... for the conservation, maintenance, and
management of wildlife" as long as they were consistent with the
primary purposes of a project.
In 1958 Congress passed further amendments to the Coordination Act
(Act of August 12, 1958, 72 Stat. 563) which directed that wildlife
conservation be given "equal consideration" with other features of
water projects (16 U.S.C. 661 (1970)). Further, the amendments moved
beyond the goal of reducing damage to wildlife resources to incorporate
the goal of wildlife enhancement.
11. 223 U.S. 166.
12. Act of June 20, 1906, 34 Stat. 313.
13. While endangered species research was conducted in the 1940s and 1950s,
a formal endangered species research program was not established until
1965, after staff of the BSFW Division of Wildlife Research lobbied for
an amendment to the Interior Department appropriations bill. The Amend-
ment provided $350,000 to acquire a permanent location and staff for
the research program. The program was housed at the Patuxent Wildlife
Research Center in Maryland and provided a permanent home for propagation
efforts that had already been started with the whooping crane surrogate
experiments. Earlier efforts had been conducted at Monte Vista National
Wildlife Refuge in southern Colorado, but the severe climate and iso-
lation from academic resources led to the appropriation request.
Senator Karl Mundt (R-S.D.), a former leader of the Izaak Walton League
and ranking minority member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
on Interior and Related Agencies, was a key supporter of this early
effort at Congressional recognition of the endangered species problem.
See, e.g., his comments at 111 Congressional Record 9007, April 29,
1965; 111 Congressional Record 10928, May 18, 1965; 111 Congressional
Record 12602, June 4, 1965.
14. Allen, 1974, p94.
15. "Death Claims the Great White Bird", Department of the Interior News
Release, Fish and Wildlife Service, April 2, 1979.
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111. P.L. 93-205, December 28, 1973, 87 Stat. 884.
112. Interior: FY 1974, $4 million, FY 1975, $8 million; FY 1976,
$10 million. Commerce: FY 1974, $2 million; FY 1975, $1.5 million;
FY 1976, $2 million.
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CHAPTER 4 -- IMPLEMENTING THE 1973 ACT
When the ESA was passed in 1973, supporters looked forward to rapid and
stringent implementation by the Interior Department and other federal agencies:
More taxa would be listed, more rapidly, based on technical not political
criteria; critical habitats would be designated promptly; agencies would be
forced to modify or abandon actions that would damage the habitat of endan-
gered species. When the ESA was amended in 1978, opponents of the Act claimed
that the supporters' expectations had been realized and bemoaned the "inflex-
ibility" of the Act.
Both of these groups made a series of assumptions about the ESA that
are usually presumed about prohibitive policy: First, that there are binary
technical definitions of what is endangered (or critical habitat) and what
is not, and that prohibitive policy hence prescribes clear and certain
criteria for implementation; second, that prohibitive policy limits agency
discretion; third, that prohibitive policy precludes any balancing of costs
and benefits; and fourth, that prohibitive policy excludes outside parties
from influencing implementation. At bottom, these assumptions translate to
an expectation of rapid action.
Implementation, however, brought a somewhat different reality. Even
though the criteria for listing species were broadened by the Act, listings
were slow to come. The listing process took place in a context characterized
by controversy, with environmental groups and newspaper editorials decrying
bureaucratic foot-dragging, while commercial and sporting groups lamented
arbitrary over-regulation. The listing of species as endangered or threatened,
the designation of habitat critical to the survival of a species, and the
nature of the consultations on federal projects responded to and was modified
by this controversy.
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This chapter outlines the procedures established to implement the 1973
Act and documents its sluggish implementation history. Evidence of delay
and conservative action suggests that the effect of prohibitive policy may
be different than expected, and that its implementation may exhibit many of
the same properties as that of policy that is not prohibitively prescribed.
Listing Species and Their Critical Habitats: In Theoryl
How is the listing process supposed to work? There are two main imple-
menting agents: the Office of Endangered Species (OES), FWS, in the Department
of the Interior; and the Office of Marine Mammals and Endangered Species,
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), in the Department of Commerce.
The exact jurisdictions of these two groups were uncertain until mid-1977,
but FWS has clearly been the dominant force. Indeed, of the 661 species on
the endangered and threatened list, NMFS has regulatory authority over only
14 of them.
The formal listing process has four steps. (See Appendix A for a flow
diagram of the entire listing process and Appendix B for a compilation of
actions taken.) It begins with the nomination of a candidate species. This
can occur either from in-house or external sources. When outside parties
petition FWS or NMFS to review the status of a species, the agencies are
required by the Act to examine the petitions and conduct a status review if
substantial evidence of the need for a change in status (from unlisted to
listed, from listed to unlisted, from endangered to threatened and vice versa)
is presented by the petitioner. In fact, while 108 petitions for listing
had been submitted by the end of 1977, species on only 18 percent of them
had been proposed for listing under the Act by the end of 1978. Even
though petitioners have nominated a large number of species for protection,
many species that are proposed for listing start out the process from in-house
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sources -- implying a great amount of administrative discretion.
In response to a petition, FWS (or NMFS) officials can move in three
directions. They can decide that the data submitted with the petition does
not support the nomination and reject the proposal. In fact, formal rejec-
tions are rare -- only 2 of the 108 petitions were turned down. Instead,
a proposed listing can be produced right away (Step 3 of the process), or
officials can prepare a Notice of Review -- the optional second step. A
Notice is a holding action where information is presumably gathered and reviewed
Since it is published in the Federal Register and the governor of the state
is notified, it does have the effect of notifying interested parties prior
to a formal listing action. Thus it is used in controversial cases to gather
information and to move slowly. In addition, according to one staff biologist,
the use of a Notice of Review puts less pressure on the agency to list the
species at the end of the process. Nevertheless, it is the policy of FWS
to use Notices "sparingly."3 '4 By doing so, FWS officials limit outside input
prior to the time that a preliminary determination is made in the Proposed
Listing process that a species is in jeopardy.
The third step -- Proposed Listing -- is mandatory. FWS (or NMFS)
staff determine whether the evidence warrants a change in status. They must
propose either unthreatened, threatened, or endangered status. (The diff-
erence between threatened and endangered is fairly significant, because the
taking of threatened species is allowed by the Act under regulations produced
along with the listing, while endangered species are much more completely
protected.) In the proposal stage, the staff must solicit data, prepare
a status report, notify the appropriate state governor(s), and prepare an
environmental assessment that begins a NEPA review process. In the implemen-
tation history so far, it has also been the end of the review process. FWS
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officials have never prepared an impact statement on a listing action (NMFS
staff have prepared one) even though they do indirectly have significant
impacts on the environment. For example, listing the snail darter as endan-
gered had the net effect of stopping the Tellico Project -- a project which
had required an impact statement because it was a "major federal action that
would significantly affect the quality of the human environment." It can
be argued that stopping a major action is itself a major action. In any case,
by bypassing the NEPA-review process, FWS has limited one source of external
review over its listing actions, reflecting its belief in a technical defi-
nition of the problem.
In preparing a proposed listing, the proposal "package" is reviewed by
at least seven FWS offices (beginning with OES and ending with the Associate
Director for Federal Assistance). After approval by all of these offices,
6
a notice of the proposed listing is published in the Federal Register. Then
at least 60 days must be provided for public comment (90 days for state gov-
ernors if no Notice of Review was published) prior to completing the final
listing step. During this time, outside parties can request a public hearing
on the proposal. FWS or NMFS officials can grant or deny this request. In
practice, few public hearings have been held on species listings. In pre-
paration for the final rulemaking, all submitted comments and data must be
compiled and analyzed, and a final determination made as to the actual status
of the organism. The internal review process is repeated and the final rule
published in the Federal Register. This ends the formal process.
Critical habitat designations and reclassifications (change in status
of presently-listed species) go through approximately the same procedure.
By the end of September 1978, 99 critical habitats had been proposed, al-
though a quarter of these were made in the last three months of the period.
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Reclassifications have been fairly rare. "Down-listing" has occurred in the
case of only seven species (the American alligator was down-listed twice)
although others were proposed. Only one of these was ever taken completely
off the list.
The Legacy of Past Action
How has this process worked? To start with, new policy rarely begins
its life in a new institutional environment. When the 1973 ESA was passed,
there was already an official list of endangered species. A small Office
of Endangered Species had been started in 1966 with two staff members. Using
the authority in the 1966 and 1969 laws, this office had designated a total
of 392 foreign and domestic species as endangered by the end of 1973. This
list came largely from two sources: Foreign species had been identified
under provisions of the 1940 International Convention; and domestic species had
been periodically listed in a series of "Redbooks" begun by the BSFW's Comm-
ittee on Rare and Endangered Wildlife Species in 1964.7 (Appendix C outlines
the evolution of the endangered species lists to the end of 1973.)
Criteria used to identify species for listing in the Redbooks are quite
vague. The Committee recognized this in its 1964 publication: "Criteria to
be used in selecting species and subspecies to be included have not yet been
clearly defined." In its 1966 list, it stated, "there is no general agreement
on what constitutes a 'rare' or 'endangered' form of fish and wildlife."9
The Committtee resolved this problem by using an expert jury approach in which
consensus of a group of experts (or lack of consensus but support of the Comm-
ittee) represented a yes vote. In general, two group of species were included --
those thought to be currently endangered (in immediate jeopardy) and those
thought to be likely to be endangered in the near future. The 1966 Redbook
separates these into "endangered" and "rare" classifications which correspond
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roughly to the "endangered" and "threatened" categories defined in the 1973
Act.
This informal method of developing the unofficial Redbooks of course
makes sense in light of the staff and information problems present in the
mid-1960s. However the conjecture of this nine-man committee became a
codified legacy shortly after passage of the 1966 Act. This Act contained
criteria by which a domestic species could be considered endangered, but
these were specified so broadly that any native, vertebrate species threat-
10
ened with extinction could be included. Sixty-four species were listed
under the 1966 Act. All 64 were among the 82 species the Committee had con-
sidered to be endangered in the 1966 Redbook. Of the 18 others, a third were
oceanic species (whose nativeness was in question), and at least another third
were politically controversial, like the grizzly bear, the red wolf, and the
American alligator.
This early listing procedure set out two basic themes that will be dis-
11
cussed in detail later: Listing officials appeared to respond to controversy
by delaying action; and they consistently acted conservatively throughout the
process. The official U.S. list of protected foreign and domestic species
always contained fewer species than lists produced by other groups. For
example, the 1973 Redbook identified 188 domestic species as threatened with
extinction, while the 1973 official list contained only 62 percent of these.
In Appendix I of the International Convention (CITES) signed in March, 1973,
420 species were identified as "threatened with extinction." Of these, 368
were foreign. On the official U.S. list, however, only 75 percent of these
appeared by the end of 1973. The grandfather of all endangered species lists
is that developed by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources (IUCN) of Morges, Switzerland. The IUCN published a
95
a "Red Data Book" that predated the American Redbooks by several years. The
IUCN's list is lengthier than either the American or the CITES lists. Indeed,
the IUCN currently estimates approximately 1000 birds and mammals to be in
jeopardy, while the U.S. list contains only half as many.
Post-73 Listings and Habitat Designations
The disparity between the international lists and the official U.S. list
can perhaps be explained by the 1969 Act's requirement that species could
be listed only if they were "threatened with worldwide extinction." The 1973
Act changed the criterion: It threw out the "worldwide" requirement, and
broadened coverage to include isolated populations as well as species and
subspecies. It also extended protection to all invertebrates and plants, as
well as to species that look like endangered species, and created a "less-than-
endangered" category to protect threatened species. About the same time, the
staff of the Office of Endangered Species more than doubled in size.1 4
With broader criteria and more staff, it was expected that more species
would be added to the U.S. list faster. But this was not the case. Table 4-1
for example, details the history of final listings on the U.S. list from 1967
through 1978. In aggregate, 392 new species were placed on the endangered
list prior to enactment with 269 species added from 1974 through 1978. Thus,
about the same number of new species were added to the list per year both
before and after the criteria and staffing changes. Indeed, if anomalous
listings are deleted from the record, the post-73 record is reduced by half.1 6
While not many species have made it through the entire process and been added
to the protected list, very few proposed listings (only 5) have ever been
formally rejected at the final listing stage. Most go on a back burner that
may or may not be turned on at a later date.
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TABLE 4-1: NUMBER OF FINAL LISTINGS BY YEAR, 1967-1978
Year Total New Listings*
1967 64
1968 0
1969 0
1970 304
1971 0
1972 3
1973 21
SUBTOTAL 392
1974 3
1975 10
1976 198
1977 21
1978** 37
SUBTOTAL 269
TOTAL 661
* does not include actions which reclassified
species already on the list
** through September 30, 1978
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The number of critical habitats designated during the tenure of the Act
is equally unimpressive. Only 33 final designations of critical habitat were
made in the 4-3/4 year period. Of these, most (82%) were designated in
the last two years of the period. Indeed, the first final designation did
not occur until April, 1976 -- well over two years after enactment. It is
true that the concept of critical habitat was undefined until April, 1975.
But even so, it took almost a year after the definition was published in the
Federal Register before the first final designation was made.
Indeed, it is not clear that any critical habitat designations would
have been made had the FWS not been under pressure to do so because of on-
going litigation. The first proposed critical habitat designation was for
the Mississippi sandhill crane and was published in response to litigation
over Interstate 10. The first final designation was made for the snail darter,
produced in the midst of the court battle over the Tellico Project.
It would seem necessary to know what habitat is critical in order to
determine whether a species is endangered or threatened due to habitat loss --
a determination that should be made at the time of listing the species: Why
then did critical habitat designations not accompany most of the final list-
ings since habitat loss is a central threat for most of the listed species?
Of 269 new listings, only 19 had critical habitat designated. The other 14
designations were for species that had been listed before enactment of the
1973 Act -- many going back to 1967.
How long does all this take? FWS estimates a total of 255 days expended
between the time a petition is received and the time when a final listing
is published in the Federal Register. If the Notice of Review step is by-
passed, this estimate drops to 195 days. In practice, listing actions took
much longer than the FWS' estimate. Rather than the 2/3 or 3/4 of a year
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required to list a species estimated by FWS, it actually took about 2 years
to put a species on the list.
The designation of critical habitat has also been time-consuming. The
33 designations that made it from proposed to final status took slightly over
300 days on average.20 If the habitat was proposed and designated sequen-
tially after listing, almost another year would have elapsed before a species
received full protection -- a grand total of about three years from petition
to habitat designation. In fact, FWS has a stated policy of proposing crit-
ical habitat at the same time it proposes additions to the endangered list.
Of the 33 designations, 45 percent were made at the time the species were
added to the list. However, for the others, almost two years elapsed on
average between the date when they were listed and the date when their critical
habitat was designated. Indeed, 42 percent of the designations were for
species that had been added to the list prior to 1973.
The dusky seaside sparrow is one of these. The range of the sparrow
is well know. It is confined to several small salt marshes near Cape Cana-
22
veral, Florida. Its population in 1968 was estimated at 1,000 birds. The
species was included in the 1964 Redbook and was listed as endangered on the
first Federal list in 1967. Yet critical habitat was not designated until
August 1977 -- ten years after it had been added to the list, over 3-1/2
years after enactment of the 1973 legislation, and over two years after
critical habitat had been formally defined.
Listing of critical habitat for the whooping crane took a similar pat-
tern. The whooping crane was also identified as endangered in the 1964 Redbook
and was listed in the 1967 official list. Yet its critical habitat was not
designated until May 1978 -- 4-1/2 years after passage of the ESA, three
years after the FWS defined the concept of critical habitat, and almost 2-1/2
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years after the habitat was proposed for designation as critical.
The establishment of formal procedures to carry out the provisions of
the Act has taken a long time as well. "Critical habitat" was not defined
until April 1975. Final regulations for interagency consultation were not
published until January 1978 -- over four years after enactment. It is true
that the proposed regulations underwent a large amount of review prior to
final rulemaking. Indeed, the Federal Register publication of the final
regulations stated that "(t)hese regulations have been subjected to more
critical review by other Federal agencies than any other set of regulations
issued by the FWS and the NMFS..."2 5 However, guidelines were first
issued in April 1976 that formed the foundation for the subsequent regulations.
Indeed, the regulations that were finalized 1-1/2 years later differ only in
their stringency, and were tightened more in response to intervening events
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than from the numerous opportunities for agency comment.
All of these delays -- in listing, in critical habitat designations,
and in the promulgation of regulations -- were extremely frustrating to many
parties involved in the process. The dissatisfaction of interest groups in
favor of protecting a species by listing it is easily understood. Federal
agencies like the Corps of Engineers were frustrated by the uncertainty
associated with project planning without final regulations for interagency
consultation. Private developers were also affected by the uncertainty
accompanying the delays: Even though private actions are not affected by
the Section 7 requirements, most developments require a federal permit of
one kind or another. Hence they come under the scrutiny of the Act. Once
a critical habitat is proposed, an informal hold goes into effect on these
developments. If the proposals are not finalized fairly rapidly, the delays
can be quite costly.
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The Houston toad case is a good example. In oversight hearings,
Donald Simpson of the Pacific Legal Foundation used the toad case to point
to the public harassment effect of the delays:
"A different deficiency in the Endangered Species Act and a
different method by which the public may be harassed is illus-
trated by the Houston Toad case. The inclusion of a shopping
mall as part of the Toad's Critical Habitat can, of course,
be written off as simply an administrative error. The failure
to reach a conclusion as to the Critical Habitat however is
seriously injuring property values. A first study on the
Critical Habitat was set aside because of error. A second
study was inconclusive. A third is now underway. In the mean-
time, persons owning property are fearful to commit funds to
its improvement for fear that they will find themselves in the
Tellico-like situation of being unable to get use permits for
completed projects. No one is willing to buy the property
until the problem is resolved. And so the studies go on while
the property owners are helpless. If the third study is
inconclusive, can Interior undertake a fourth study and a fifth
study and so forth until the property owner is forced to let
the property go for taxes? The Endangered Species Act places
no limitation on this kind of activity by Interior." 27
Implementing Prohibitive Policy Nonprohibitively
The relatively large amount of time that it took to complete each of
the listings and designations, and the resultant small number of final ac-
tions to date have repeatedly led to charges of delay and obstruction against
NMFS and FWS. The primary complaint voiced in oversight hearings held in
1975 and 1976 -- that the agencies were dragging their feet in implementing
the 1973 Act -- was reiterated in newspaper headlines: "Extinction by Red
Tape; "Botanocrats Are Holding Up Listing of Endangered Plants." Jack
Anderson alleged that "today, the endangered animals are in as much peril as
they ever have been. The reason is that the act has been entrusted to balk-
ing bureaucrats to administer ... Our sources report that the Fish and
Wildlife bureaucrats are obstructing the experts who were brought in to
protect the disappearing wildlife."
101
FWS and NMFS officials have always countered the charges by claiming
staff and funding limitations. While these constraints were certainly present,
they do not explain why the average number of final listings per year did not
increase when staff size increased. Nor do they explain the extremely few
listings made during the first two years of the post-73 program. (NMFS has
an even worse record than FWS. In the 4-3/4 years since enactment, NMFS
proposed only six species for listing, and finalized actions on only four of
them. Of these, NMFS repeatedly delayed action on three species,3 and listed
the fourth over ten years after it was identified as a rare species in the
U.S. Redbook.)
FWS has also argued that it was using a cautious approach to avoid legal
challenges. "Sure, we've been going slow, but I'm trying to avoid the hard
confrontation until we've got some firm foundations built in law and pre-
cedent ...I'd rather avoid confrontation until I'm firmly entrenched and
it's harder to blow me out of the water. Then we'll lay it on 'em," said
Program Manager Keith Schreiner in mid-1975.32 To their credit, the average
time to go from proposed to final listings does seem to have been decreasing
33
since 1976. But even well-intentioned caution does not explain the few
listings and the large amount of time expended for each. Some species pro-
posed even before enactment of the 1973 Act were not listed for several years.
Two species of sea turtles, for example, were proposed for addition to the
list in December 1973 and not finally listed until 1978, a delay of four and
a half years. Plants could not be listed until regulations governing their
use were drawn up. It took 3-1/2 years before this happened and another two
months before the first plants were listed.
Well-intentioned caution is also a poor explanation of the delay in
listing a number of primate species. FWS contracted in 1973 for a status
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review on the world's primates. A draft report was completed by the Bird
and Mammal Laboratory, Smithsonian Institution in January 1975,25 and con-
tained evidence to support the listing of 27 species of primates. A report
prepared by OES in May 1975 stated that "there are sufficient data to warrant
a proposed rulemaking that the (two species of) chimpanzee are 'threatened
species' ... the chimpanzee has disappeared from large parts of its original
range, and is thought to be declining seriously in some places where popu-
lations still survive." 3 6 Yet neither the chimps or the other primates were
listed until October 1976, over a year later.
It is also difficult to understand why the Appendix I species agreed
upon by the International Convention in March 1973 were not listed until
June 1976. Three of the Appendix I species that were proposed in September
1975 were not listed in 1976 with the rest of the package because the FWS
had "inadvertently" forgotten to notify the appropriate state governors since
they were resident species. The 1976 rulemaking stated that a final deter-
mination would be made following the governors' 90-day comment period.37 In
fact, one of the species was never listed (plain pocketbook mussel), and the
other two (Marianas mallard, tan riffle shell pearly mussel) were listed a
year or more later. In announcing the final rulemaking on one of these
species, the Marianas mallard, the FWS' endangered species technical bulletin
made it clear that it was "owing to a procedural oversight (that) the Marianas
,,38
mallard was not included in this final rulemaking (the 6/76 listing)." 3 8 No
explanation of the additional nine months delay was given. By the time of
listing, there were only two to 25 Marianas mallards left in the world.3 9
Staff scarcities and well-intentioned caution are also inadequate in
explaining why proposals for critical habitat have not appeared for several
species that were listed in the first official endangered list published in
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1967. For example, the critically-endangered black-footed ferret was listed
in the 1964 Redbook, officially listed in 1967, and was ranked in 1976 as
having top priority for designating critical habitat, but the Service has
yet to propose areas to protect the species. The Kauai oo is in the same
situation: This Hawaiian bird has been listed since 1967, and has a FWS-
assigned critical habitat priority index of 80/100 (extremely high). But
critical habitat has never been proposed for the species, even though it is
the last survivor of a genus that contained four species, and the current
population is estimated at a dozen birds.4 0
Why so few final listings and critical habitat designations? Why so
long to move from proposed to final rulemakings? Delay (in terms of a long
time to get something done) and a lack of aggressive action are not by them-
selves de facto evidence of anything much. It is generally accepted that
"the wheels of government move slowly." In this case, however, delay sug-
gests at minimum that prohibitive policy works no more rapidly than other
kinds of policy; hence we can hypothesize that the implementation of prohib-
itive policy may not be all that different from the implementation of other
types of policy.
Indeed, the evidence provided in the next three chapters suggests that
most of the assumptions about the effect of prohibitive policy on implemen-
tation are wrong: Technical decisions are not clear-cut; an enormous amount
of administrative discretion is exercised throughout implementation; costs
and benefits of protective actions are implicitly weighed; and external
forces heavily influence the outcome of the process.
Actions throughout the implementation of the ESA exhibit an enormous
amount of administrative discretion. Discretionary judgment (and policy
redefinition) was required because of staff shortages that forced the
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development of implicit and explicit priority systems. The opportunity to
use discretion -- labelled technical uncertainty or "biological opinion" --
came from the huge amount of technical uncertainty in most of the biological
decisions in the process. The expeditious use of administrative discretion
turned into multi-party negotiation because of the political context in
which implementation takes place. These three themes -- resource scarcity,
technical uncertainty, and political context -- recur throughout the history
of implementation. They help explain why discretion was used and why nego-
tiation took place in carrying out the seemingly-prohibitive provisions of
the 1973 Act.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. Numerical analyses presented in this chapter are compiled from data
representing implementation from- the passage of the' ESA (December 28,
1973) through September 30, 1978'when the Act was reauthorized and
significantly amended. Almost five years of implementation
history are thus included in the'compilations.
2. In total numbers of species, however, these proposals represented
2,027 species or about 90 percent of all proposed listings for the
1974-1978 period. Nearly all of these species (1,999) were proposed
as a result of two petitions -- one for inclusion of all species
listed in Appendix I of the International Convention (CITES), and
another covering native plants, presented by the Smithsonian
Institution. (See the description of these proposals at note 16
below.) Ignoring these as anomalous, 11 percent (28 of 239 net
total listings) came from nominations from the petition process.
This is a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't situation: If
we take the 90 percent as representative, it means that FWS and
NMFS spend all their time reviewing petitioned species and have
no time to undertake any systematic review. If the 11 percent
figure is right, then it means that almost all listings start
internally. In fact, this latter statement is probably closer
to the truth and suggests a source of a great amount of adminis-
trative discretion.
3. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1976, p28.
4. In fact, even though in gross terms 3,463 species were identified in
Notices of Review for the four-year period (a large number), most of
these (3,187) were taken from the Smithsonian Report on plants.
Indeed, only 64 animal species that were listed in Notices of Review
made it to the proposed listing step. (See note 19 below)
5. This internal review procedure is referred to by the FWS staff as
the "surname" review.
6. While a significant number of listing proposals (2,246) have been
published by the FWS and NMFS, most of these came from the packages
involving the Appendix I species or the Smithsonian-identified plants.
Indeed, only 239 listings were proposed that were not in the Appendix I
or Smithsonian packages, or were not reclassifications of previously-
listed species (See Appendix B).
7. See Chapter 3 for a description of the work of this committee.
8. U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, 1964, p i.
9. U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, 1966, p i.
10. The criteria are listed in the table in Appendix J.
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11. See Chapter 7.
12, 42 Liying Wilderness 142);12,. July/September 1978.
13. This is of course true since there is no political or economic costs
associated with listing by the IUCN.
14.
..-Fiscal Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
-Technical
2
2
7
11
12
21
19
26
Staff*.
Secretarial
2
2
2
5
7
10
8
13
* includes temporary and part-time
Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, "Staff Assigned to
the Office of Endangered Species and Endangered Species
Scientific Authority on the Last Day of the Fiscal
Year", in 'Briefing'Book, unpublished, undated.
15. 1967-1973 average = 56.0 species per year; 1974-1978 average = 56.6
species per year.
16. Of the 198 species added in 1976, 159 were CITES Appendix I species.
Appendix I species were internationally-designated as endangered in
1973. Since the U.S. was a signatory nation, these species should
theoretically have been added to the official list automatically.
In reality, the Interior Department was pressured by the State Depart-
ment and by the Fund for Animals (a wildlife interest group) to add
these species. In response to this pressure, FWS published a pro-
posal in September 1975 to list all Appendix I species that had not
been listed previously. Of these 216 species, most (159) were listed
pro forma in mid-1976. (Of the difference, 45 were plant taxa which
were not listed because plant regulations had not been published yet;
6 were bird species whose listings were opposed by the International
Council for Bird Preservation; 3 were delayed because of a procedural
error; 1 was determined not to be a valid species; and 2 were delayed
because of contrary evidence.) If we assume that this package of
species took very little staff effort (as the evidence indicates),
and that they were probably already protected by previous federal
action, then the number of new species to be granted federal protection
since enactment of the 1973 Act drops to 110, or an average of 23
species per year. (See Appendix D for a numerical description of
the historical data.)
17. See Appendix D.
Total
4
4
9
16
19
31
27
39
.. . . . . ...........
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18. The FWS estimates the following "average" time durations in each step
of the listing procedure;
.. tep'.. ..
Petition and Notice of Review
Proposed Listing
Final Listing
Number' of Days
Required.
44
120
91
Cumulative Number
. '. ' of .Days.. '..
44
164
255
Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, "Operation Steps in Normal
Listing Procedure Showing 'Average' Time Frames for Each
Step"', from Briefing Book, unpublished, undated.
19. The actual mean durations have been computed for each step of the
listing process. Durations indicate the number of days elapsed
between the following events: 1) Petition Step -- receipt of petition
by FWS to publication of Proposed Listing in the'Federal Register (FR);
2) Review Step -- FR publication of Notice of Review to 'FR publication
of Proposed Listing; 3) Listing Step -- FR publication of Proposed
Listing to FR publication of Final Listing; 4) Critical Habitat Desig-
nation Step --'FR publication of Proposed Critical Habitat to 'FR
publication of Final Critical Habitat.
Mean durations were computed including values for all species that had
completed a step from the enactment of the 1973 ESA (December 28, 1973)
through September 30, 1978, when it was amended. Hence the mean dura-
tion for the Review Step incorporates many more values than does the
Listing Step because many more species completed it.
Data were identified from unpublished FWS lists, Federal Register
citations, the official U.S. list of endangered and threatened species
(reprinted at 42 Fed Reg (135):36420-31, July 17, 1977, and updates),
and the Endangered Species Technical Bulletin. Durations were computed
by a calculator subroutine. Mean durations were calculated by summing
durations for each step for each species and dividing by the number of
species. Mean durations for the Petition Step was calculated by
summing the durations of each petition and dividing by the total
number of petitions. The results are as follows:
Action
Petition*
Review*
Listing:
All
All - App I***
Critical Habitat
All Animals & Plants
Mean Number
of Days
Number of
Species
All Animals**
Mean Number
of Days
378 days average for 19 petitions
346 1,921 512
310 277 279
374 118 307
314 33 298
Number of
Species
64
255
96
31
108
* Note that these are equivalent and not additive.
** Deleting plants reduces the effect of the anomalous Smith-
sonian proposal. See discussion at note 16 above.
*** Deleting CITES Appendix I species eliminates the'effect of the
anomalous proposed and final listing of several hundred species.
See discussion at note 16 above.
Aggregating the data: On average, the Review Steps took slightly
over a year and the'Listing Step took slightly less than a year.
Hence, the average time elapsed for a species to receive protection
was about two years.
20. See note 19 above.
21. For these 18, an average of 705 days intervened between the date they
were listed as endangered (or the date critical habitat was defined
(April 22, 1975) whichever came later) and the date when habitat was
finally designated.
22. Curry-Lindahl, 1972, p199.
23. Appendix E outlines the chronology of activities undertaken to imple-
ment the Section 7 consultation provisions.
24. 40 Federal Register 17764-5, April 22, 1975.
25. 43 Federal Register (2):870, January 4, 1978.
26. The nature of the intervening events is discussed in Chapter 7.
The regulations were more stringent than the guidelines in three ways:
1) Rather than leaving it to the agency's discretion whether it should
initiate consultation, the final regulations imposed a mandatory
requirement to request consultation if the agency's actions will affect
an endangered species. 2) The final regulations also applied the Act
to all projects, not just those started after 1973. 3) Further, they
contained the requirement that while an agency was in the consultation
process, it should not make an irreversible or irretrievable commitment
of resources to the project.
27. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
1978b, p853.
28. New York Times editorial, January 1, 1976.
29. Gainesville Sun, September 21, 1975.
30. Washington-Post, March 15, 1975.
31. These were the green, loggerhead, and Pacific ridley sea turtles.
See discussion in Chapter 7.
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32, 108 Science News (6):94, August 9, 1975.
33',To the Service's credit, the amount of time elapsed between proposals
and final designations does seem to have decreased' over time. For
example, the following table lists the mean durations of the listing
and critical habitat steps over time from 1974 to 1978.
.. . ...Listings -.
Mean Number
.. ofDays .
273
275
445
226
116
Number 'of
. .Species. .
3
190
64
18
2
.Critical Habitat Designs
Mean Number
.. '.of.Days' 
404
319
283
187
Number of
. .Species
0
7
8
17
1
* Species are listed in the year that they were proposed.
The calculation procedure to arrive at these data was discussed in
note 19 above.
The reader should note that this data biases the results somewhat
because species are counted in the year that they were proposed.
Thus, the means for later years have to be small. Species that
were proposed and finalized in 1978, for example, can have a
maximum duration of about 270 days. The only way around this bias
is to redo the results in 1980 or so. Nevertheless, the general
trend of declining durations in recent years is probably accurate.
34. The green and loggerhead sea turtles were proposed for listing as
endangered under the 1969 Act (38 Federal Register (248):35485,
December 28, 1973.) They were finally listed as threatened species
(with two green populations as endangered) in July 1978 (43 Federal
Register (146):32800, July 28, 1978).
35. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1976, p6 0.
36. Quoted in Washington Post, February 8, 1976.
37. 41 Federal Register 24062, June 14, 1976.
38. 2 Endangered Species Technical Bulletin (6):4, June 1977.
39. Ibid.
40. Curry-Lindahl, 1972, p314.
...Year*.'.'. 
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
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CHAPTER 5 -- COPING WITH SCARCE RESOURCES AND TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTY:
EXERCISING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
One of the central assumptions about prohibitive policy is that bi-
nary technical decisions can be made: Species are either endangered or
not; a federal project will either damage a critical habitat or not. In
fact, rather than a binary, yes-no situation, a range of probabilities is
more likely: "If the trade is stopped, then the species has a reasonable
chance of surviving;" "if the project is undertaken, nesting might be
disrupted with a potential reduction in population recruitment." The
ability to make binary technical decisions is quite limited because of
resource scarcity and large amounts of technical uncertainty. Since staff
and information are often limited, administrators are constrained in mak-
ing optimal decisions. But even with adequate staff, technical uncertain-
ty pervades the decision-making process, limiting the ability of adminis-
trators to make decisions on technical grounds alone.
The result is that agency staff exercise a great deal of administrative
discretion. They set priorities to overcome the resource scarcity problems,
and make technical judgments based only in part on technical data. This
counters a second common assumption about prohibitive policy, that it
limits agency discretion. In implementing the ESA, discretionary judgments
were made about such factors as what species to review in what order,
which experts to talk with, what data to believe, what research to under-
take, what is the current population status of a species, what will happen
to it in the future, what threatens it, what taxonomic unit should it be
considered part of, what degree of regulation should be proposed, what
external interests should be considered, and what regulatory exceptions
should be allowed.
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To answer these and similar questions, administrative experts use a
mix of science, art and politics to make decisions. Their individual
attitudes, values, and professional norms weigh significantly in the pro-
cess. Administrators welcome prohibitive mandates because they appear to
the outside world to define a technical decision-making process, hence
limiting external review of administrative actions. In fact, the assump-
tions about prohibitive policy hide enormous amounts of administrative
discretion. As this chapter documents, the need to make administrative
judgments about presumably-nondiscretionary decisions comes as a result of
limited resources and large amounts of technical uncertainty.
Resource Limitations: 6000'Years of Work
In an often-reprinted interview, Keith Schreiner, Endangered Species
Program Manager (and Associate Director of FWS), talks about the enormity
of the listing job:
"The endangered species universe has about 2 million species
of plants and animals, give or take 100,000. There are probably
four or five times that many subspecies and God knows how many
populations. Now there is good evidence to suggest that as many
as 10 percent of all animals and plants on earth are endangered
right now.
"The simple facts are these," he says. "It takes us a minimum
of 36 professional man days to list a single plant or animal species
and I've only got six full time professionals who work at this --
among other things -- for the whole lot of them. It will take
us, at this rate, the next 6,000 years just to list all the
endangered plants and animals that need protection by the Endan-
gered Species Act, not to mention developing programs for them.
So I just can't think in terms of time. We'll never get the job
done, so it becomes important that we priorize our list and do
the most important ones first."l
Staff limitations on listing and critical habitat designation have
indeed been great. Even though the entire FWS endangered species program
had 198 persons assigned to it at the end of April 1978, only eight pro-
fessionals were assigned to the listing and habitat designation tasks (in
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the Biological Support Branch of the OES). Although more staff members
were supposed to have been assigned to the review tasks in mid-1978, most
were siphoned off to deal with interagency consultation which had by then
become the squeaking wheel of the program. NMFS has never had much staff
to deal with endangered species. Only one professional deals with listing
in the Washington office. Most of NMFS' endangered species' activities
have taken place as field research.
There has not been a large staff to handle interagency consultations
either. Consultations are generally handled at the regional level. While
30 endangered species positions were authorized in the regional offices,
there were only 18 specialists as of mid-1978 -- an average of 2 to 3 per
region. If there were indeed 4,500 consultations in fiscal year 1977 as
the FWS estimates, then specialists handled on the average one consultation
apiece every working day of the year, which is a lot of work considering
that consultation is only a part of their work.
Since there are so few staff members and so many species that may be
endangered, the staff has to set priorities to select species for review.
Thus, at the outset, there is a tremendous opportunity to pick and choose
which species have a chance of getting on the list. Priorities are -- in
theory at least -- based on a number of biological factors, giving priority
to higher taxa over lower taxa (full species over subspecies), domestic
species over foreign species, species that are in greater trouble over
those less in jeopardy, and species that can be helped over those for which
little can be done. Higher order species are also generally given priority
over more primitive ones.
In practice, priorities are also influenced by how loudly petitioners
scream (the threat of legal action, for example, is very effective), by
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how controversial a listing might be, and by who is on the staff, what
their pet interests are, and how loud they are. All of the OES biologists
display the professional values that accompany devoting their lifework to
the study of plants, reptiles, birds, or mammals. Taxonomists seek to
differentiate between small differences in morphological and behavioral
characteristics. Hence, they are trained to value fine details that dis-
tinguish between groups of organisms. Description of a new group is a
powerful professional goal. The biologists value each taxon highly both
because they are trained to do so and because they become familiar with
them. Each biologist has a specialty though, and sees great value in the
organisms that he or she studies. This is no different than the values
held by other professionals: Nuclear engineers tend to promote nuclear
power (because they understand it and it is their livelihood); anthropolo-
gists tend to place a high value on relict populations of primitive
societies. Similarly, botanists tend to see significant value in preserv-
ing the Furbish lousewort and ichthyologists in protecting the snail darter.
Since each professional tends to value the species he or she studies,
there is a tendency for their personal values to influence what species
get put on the list. One of the reasons, for example, that there are so
many molluscs (snails, clams, crustaceans) on the list is because there
was an assertive malacologist on the staff up until mid-1978 (when he was
transferred to a research station in Missouri!) Indeed, molluscs account-
ed for almost a quarter of all non-plant proposed listings over the entire
4-3/4 year period. Since the malacologist was not replaced, it is unlikely
that many molluscs will be reviewed in the near future: Which species are
reviewed depends in large part on who is in the shop. It is certainly no
accident, for example, that of the 14 domestic fish species that have been
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added to the list since 1973, eight live in the interior Southeast: The
staff icthyologist used to be head of the Alabama Conservancy and is an
expert on southeastern fish species. (Only 2 of the 26 domestic species
listed prior to 1973 were native to the Southeast.)
Staff priorities also determine which species get help after they are
put on the endangered list. These priorities unabashedly include non-
biological considerations. To set action priorities, a"priority index" is
calculated that combines (i) a degree of threat rating, (ii) a taxonomic
factor, and (iii) an ecological/socioeconomic factor. The "degree-of
threat" rating indicates how much a species is endangered. The taxonomic
factor gives weight to higher taxonomic units. The ecological/socio-
economic factor is clear evidence that non-technical considerations are
routinely injected into the process. This factor "measures" the ecological,
commercial or popularity value of a species. A full 10 points are given,
for example, to "species of greatest popularity or having economic im-
pacts."4 This score could appropriately be called a "constituency factor"
because it measures whether anyone cares about the species -- either to
preserve it or to exploit it. The priority index is calculated by multi-
plying the degree of threat rating times the sum of the taxonomic and
ecologic/socioeconomic factors. Thus the "constituency factor" can have a
large influence on the priority index. Using the maximum values of the
degree of threat and taxonomic elements, the priority index can vary from
100 out of 100 (top priority) to 60 depending on how popular the species
is. Priorities for setting critical habitat use the priority index as a
base and are hence determined in large part by nonbiological factors.
Information is scarce too. Schreiner points to this as. another reason
for delay: "For every species, my botanists have to write all new material.
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Contact the experts of the world, find out what is known about everything.
Then come out with the best current scientific and commercial information
available -- that's what the law requires."5 To cope with these demands,
OES uses an information network that consists primarily of the national
and international scientific community (mostly scientists located in
universities) and the state fish and game agencies. (Appendix F diagrams
this information network within the institutional environment of the list-
ing and critical habitat designation processes.) A secondary source of
information comes from interest groups and the FWS' regional offices.
Different types of groups are better sources for different types of organ-
isms. The state agencies, for example, are more knowledgeable about bigger
animals -- birds and mammals -- because of their historic orientation
towards game species. The universities are better at lower orders.
Information is not equally distributed over all types of life forms.
More is known about game animals than nongame; more about crop plants than
others. The availability of information reflects research priorities that
usually relate poorly to endangered species' priorities. They are more
closely related to what people are interested in and what they can get
paid for doing. In discussing plant listings, for example, the staff
botanists reflect their reliance on a sporadic data-gathering process:
"We just don't have the time to go check out these plants
ourselves, in most cases. We also don't have a lot of contract
money to pay other people. But we have to know whether a species
is endangered throughout all or a significant portion of its range
-- that's what the law requires in order to call it endangered --
how many plants there are and data on the critical habitats. So
we're telling botanists around the country, 'You go out and do the
hunting in your areas.' We have to rely on your free help and
commitment.'
"In a region where no one cared enough to volunteer his time,
the plants could just become extinct. That's why we have to
put pressure on the botanical community."6
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The information network is very important because it provides documen-
tation of the endangeredness of species, and, in effect, determines which
species get listed. The Deputy Director of the FWS, George Milias, de-
scribed the operations of this network as follows: "We have a vast number
of scientists on our own staff at Interior and the way this works is those
people know pretty well who are the top men, up to full speed on a parti-
cular animal or species or what we may be dealing with at the moment.
They know where to go to get the best expertise if we are going on a con-
tract basis, and presumably -- and all of these things are subjective.
Who is to say this is: the best man in the world or that one is?"7 Thus,
to whom the staff chooses to talk about the status of a species is very
important. In practice, professional contacts are neither random nor com-
plete. Old professional ties get reinforced. Staff members call old
professors or people they have worked with -- the "old boy network" channels
the action.
Resolving Technical Uncertainty: 'A Mixture of Art and Science
The need to use administrative discretion that is due to scarce staff
and limited information is reinforced many-fold by the huge amount of
technical uncertainty inherent in decisions involving taxonomy and popula-
tion biology. It is not necessarily clear how much a species is currently
jeopardized or what its future condition will be even when there is a lot
of published information about it. Indeed, periodically someone finds a
thriving population of a species that had been thought to be extinct for
8
many years.
Many biological dilemmas must be resolved in order to list a species.
For example, what constitutes a species? In general, species are defined
on the basis of morphological and behavioral characteristics. In theory,
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one could develop a chromosome map of a species, but there are different
chromosomal characteristics at the individual level. How significant are
small changes in external appearance? The snail darter differs from its
darter relatives by the presence of a single additional ray on its pectoral
fin. What about blue eyes versus brown in humans? Are there really two
human species -- Homo blue and Homo brown?
How significant are behavioral differences? As with morphology, there
is much variation at the individual level but some species are distin-
guished by behavioral characteristics. The Houston toad (Bufo houstonensis),
for example, is extremely difficult to differentiate from its close rela-
tive B. woodhousei on the basis of appearance alone. The leading expert
on the species says that "extreme familiarity with both species is
necessary to distinguish them. The most reliable differential character
is the call." 9 Mating calls are given only in the spring. B. houstonensis'
call consists of a 7 to 25 second, high-pitched trill. That of B. wood-
housei is a 1 to 5 second feeble trill.
The old standby definition -- species are groups of organisms that
interbreed -- does not stand up. The Houston toad interbreeds with two
other species; one of the hybrids yields fertile offspring. The Mexican
duck interbred itself off the endangered list.
If it is difficult to determine what is a species, what constitutes a
subspecies or an isolated population is even more discretionary. "Taxonomy
goes beyond science into art," says one of the OES biologists. While there
are codes of nomenclature for naming species, 0 there isn't a formal
review procedure for registering a species. Generally the "expert's judg-
ment" is relied upon to make a determination about how significant a species
is in terms of morphological and historical differences. According to one
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of the OES scientists, "the expert's judgment can vary on the same data
depending on his philosophy. From a conservation point of view, you want
to push organisms to higher levels of classification so that they get more
sympathy. Also, the more splitting you make between differences in organ-
ism, the more protection you end up with." Thus, ideology can enter into
taxonomic decisions with a significant impact on regulatory policy.
Differences in expert judgment about taxonomic status have been present
throughout the implementation of the ESA. Texas A&M University scientists
disputed the validity of the Houston toad as a unique species in 1974.11
TVA biologists (and a nationally known Professor Emeritus of Ichthyology
from Cornell University) disputed the designation of the snail darter as a
species in 1975.12 Chances are there is at least one "expert" on each
side of most issues. Thus, to whom the FWS staff listens becomes very
important.
Taxonomic judgments are important because they have influenced the de-
gree of protection accorded to various species. The glacier bear, for
example, was included in the CITES Appendix I. It was listed in all four
U.S. Redbooks (1964 through 1973). When the Fund for Animals petitioned
that it be listed as endangered, FWS determined (based on evidence from the
State of Alaska) that the glacier bear was an uncommon color variety of the
black bear and consequently did not qualify for listing under the Act.1 3
The Mexican duck is another good example. The duck was first listed
as endangered in 1967. But by mid-1978, the FWS had determined that the
species (Anas diazi) should be taken off the list, in part because of hy-
bridization:14 The duck had interbred with the common mallard (Anas plat-
yrhynchos) and produced a hardier duck (Anas diazi platyrhynchos). Since
the Interior Department's Solicitor had determined in 1977 that the ESA
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did not apply to hybrids, the now-identified Mexican duck-mallard hybrid
did not quality for protection. The editors of the Washington Post la-
mented the change in the duck's status: "In short, most of the Anas diazi
will be deregulated because they have played around, and the rest will be
deregulated even though they have not." 1 5 The change in taxonomic status
may have a real impact on the duck, since now hunting of both the pure
remnant population and the hybrid cross is possible (although it could be
regulated under the provisions of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918).
The gray wolf (Canis lupus) provides another example. There are four
subspecies of gray wolves: the eastern timber wolf (Canis lupus lycaon)
which lives in Minnesota and Michigan; the gray wolf (Canis lupus monstra-
bilis) in Texas and New Mexico; the Mexican wolf (Canis lupus baileyi) in
Mexico, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas; and the northern Rocky Mountains
wolf (Canis lupus irremotus) in Wyoming and Montana. Up until 1978 all
four subspecies were listed as endangered. Considerable pressure was
placed on the FWS to downlist the eastern timber wolf so that wolves that
allegedly preyed on farm livestock in northern Minnesota could be killed.
In March 1978, the Service combined all four subspecies' listings as the
endangered gray wolf (Canis lupus) with the Minnesota population listed as
threatened. The change to threatened status provided the opportunity to
take depredating wolves. It can be argued that the combination listing
made it easier to downlist the eastern timber wolf because it made it
appear not unique.
Taxonomy is not static. Dr. Stephen Edwards, Executive Secretary of
the Association of Systematics Collections pointed out in Senate hearings
that, "Species names are not fixed. Any species may not be recognized
forever. Through time, many students may review groups of species and
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synonymize -- a process in systematics biology by which a number of pre-
viously recognized species names are referenced under a single name -- or
,,16
split currently recognized species. Taxonomy is a dynamic process...
Taxonomic reclassification is a common practice. Grizzly bears (Ursos
arctos), for example, have been classified several times since they were
first described by Lewis and Clark in 1805. For many years, American
scientists debated how many different species were involved in the grizzly-
brown bear group and how they related to Old World brown bears. Since the
species is distributed widely and exhibits much variation, C.H. Merriam
recognized 86 different species and subspecies originally inhabiting North
America. Recent work by Robert Rausch of Alaska has led to a classifica-
tion of all the world's brown bears as one species (Ursus arctos) with
only two distinct North American races, the grizzly bear (Ursus arctos
horribilis) and the Kodiak bear (Ursus arctos middendorffi). "The dispute
is not yet completely settled, for many scientists also recognize the
relict Mexican population as Ursus arctos nelsoni. Also, the barren ground
grizzly of the Alaskan and Canadian tundra may be distinct."1 7 While the
dispute may not be settled, it does affect regulation of the species under
the ESA. If there are 86 taxa of North American brown bears, chances are
that many are endangered, whereas if there are only two taxa, their status
is more secure. One can argue that since the Act provides protection for
populations and subspecies as well as species, taxonomic distinctions make
no difference. But this argument is countered by the priority systems to
review species: Populations are not particularly important; species are.
Regardless, taxonomic decisions contain enormous discretion and little re-
view, yet affect the degree and type of protection organisms receive.
Taxonomic discretion has been used in the implementation of the ESA. In-
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deed, it has been used strategically.
Resolving Technical Uncertainty: Population Size and Status
Given that we have a valid taxon (species or whatever), there is an-
other source of technical uncertainty in assessments of the taxon's cur-
rent and future population status. How is the extent of the current
population known? Usually field research is necessary in which samples
are used to statistically determine a population size. The rarity of
individuals in most potentially-endangered species restricts accurate
population estimates in two ways: First, there are generally so few in-
dividuals over a large area that statistically-significant samples are
hard to achieve and are costly. Second, and more important, is that most
declining species will not tolerate sampling. A standard population-
estimation technique is the capture-recapture method is which a sample is
caught and individuals are marked in some way (ear tags, paint, leg bands,
clipped fins), and then released. Some time later, a second sample is
taken from the same area. A simple ratio is then established to determine
an estimated population size. 8 The problem is that most endangered species
are very sensitive to human contact -- that's how most become endangered
in the first place. Sampling is destructive because it subjects the popu-
lation to an unnecessary stress. 9
Much of the controversy around a species' listing comes from discrep-
ancies in experts' current estimates of the size and range of the species.
In the snail darter case, for example, FWS contended that the snail darter
existed only in the Little Tennessee River. TVA and Dr. Edward Raney of
Cornell University contended that the species survived in the Tennessee
River as well.2 0 The Furbish lousewort was thought extinct until it was
rediscovered in 1976. At that time, the population was estimated at 200
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plants -- all in the proposed impoundment area
project. In another year, the estimate went
end of 1977, the estimate was up to 880 plants
percent in the reservoir area.23
Discrepancies over the population size and
were also present. In the springs of 1974 and
were spent (and 10,000 miles driven) to survey
population. In 1974 a single calling toad was
Texas. In 1975 a single chorus of 10-20 calls
of the Dickey-Lincoln
up to 350 plants. By the
in 21 colonies -- only 40
range of the Houston toad
1975, over 500 man-hours
the status of the toad's
observed in Burleson County,
was observed in the same
county, and almost 50 were heard in Bastrop County. From these data and
historical records, the population size was estimated at 1,500 individuals.2 4
In 1977, one hybrid toad and one adult male were observed in Harris County
(where Houston is located). Based on this observation and historical re-
cords, Harris County was included as potential range for the toad. De-
velopment interests reacted loudly. More studies were conducted in 1978
which concluded that there weren't any Houston toads in Harris County.
This conclusion was contested by the author of the original report, a
scientist at Texas A&M University. "He viewed the decision to contract
with the University of Houston to do the work as 'handing it over to the
enemy,"' said one FWS biologist. "Houston toads breed according to weather
conditions. This has been a bad year. If the study goes through August,
it might miss signs of Houston toad occupation."
Resolving Technical Uncertainty: Predicting the Future
Since the FWS has limited staff and money for fieldwork, it must rely
on expert judgments from experts around the world, and these experts differ.
Given that a taxon is accepted and the status of its present population is
not in question, a third and probably greater source of disagreement and
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discretionary judgment arises from a need to predict the future: Can the
existing population survive at its present level and rate of growth
(decline)? What's causing the problem? What is the threat? Is the species
very badly off (endangered) or just badly off (threatened)? Given the sit-
uation, what should be done about it?
The common method of predicting the future is through the use of
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models. But with most endangered species, neither the base data nor the
historical data exist, knowledge of its population biology is not adequate,
an understanding of its ecological relationships with other plants and
animals is sketchy, and an awareness of its tolerance of human-induced
environmental changes is even sketchier. The result is that once again
"expert judgments" form the basis for decision-making. And these experts
differ in their judgments. For example, in reviewing the data describing
the progress of the transplanted population of snail darters in the Hi-
wassee River, TVA biologists forecast success while FWS staff forecast doom.
The sea turtles case provides one of the best examples. An ad-hoc Task
Force on the Commercial Exploitation of Marine Turtles was established un-
der the aegis of the IUCN to determine whether commercial mariculture
enterprises should be allowed to continue the "farming" of sea turtles.
Meetings were held in late 1974, concluding with the recommendation that
"the present operations of Mariculture Ltd. (the largest commercial oper-
ator) can not be regarded as being in the conservation interests of the
Green Turtle." '2 6 However, this report was accompanied by much controversy
generated by other turtle experts. Indeed, it was alleged that membership
on the ad hoc task force was limited to anti-mariculture interests. For
example, consider the comments of Peter Reichart, World Wildlife Fund
mammal expert, in a letter to California State Senator Behr regarding pro-
posed state legislation to ban the importation of sea turtle products into
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California:
"... the communication you will receive from the IUCN regarding this
matter is not the majority opinion of the TSG (Turtle Specialists
Group), but rather the advice of an ad-hoc committee formed by, and
consisting of nly those persons in the TSG who are pposed to the
activities of Mariculture Ltd. ... In November 1974 the ad-hoc
committee met in Florida ... but Dr. Schulz (head, Surinam Turtle
Preservation Program) and other 'neutral' or 'pro-mariculture'
members were not invited ... Therefore, I urge you not to place any
faith in the recommendation of the IUCN, because (unbeknown to them),
it will be based on a 'kangaroo court' decision of a highly-biased
ad-hoc committee, and'not on a cooperative agreement reached by all
members of the TSG." 27 -
One turtle expert wrote, "I am astonished by the strong bias and by the
vindictiveness shown by some of the opponents to turtle ranching and farm-
ing, and in this I see a proof of the weakness of their argument."2 8
When the experts disagree, how does a technical decision get made? In
practice, the FWS experts make an internal judgment based on their own
values and attitudes. One of the key decisions they have to make is how
much uncertainty is acceptable. Often this decision is made higher up the
line in the surname review procedure. In several cases,: the Associate
Director implicitly made this decision by sending the package back to the
scientists for more information. The amount of uncertainty within differ-
ent listing actions varies depending on the species. It is conceivable
that no information exists about a species because it is rare. A species
could fade away while the administrators wait for more and more data prior
to making a decision.
So discretionary judgments are made about how much uncertainty is ac-
ceptable. Two contrasting examples: The endangered status of the Furbish
lousewort was well known (low uncertainty) yet the listing was delayed. A
listing of two butterflies is towards the other end of the continuum:
After a proposed listing was published, a letter was received from the
Department of Agriculture which stated: "... It would appear that no
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scientific survey (biometrical survey) has been made for a population in-
dex. This appears to be a basic fact in determining endangerment..."29
In responding to the letter, FWS stated that:
"While the Service recognizes that statistically sound popu-
lation data are a very desirable ingredient in the process of
determining whether a species is Threatened or Endangered, it
also recognizes that seldom are such data available, particu-
larly for the less studied, frequently obscure forms that become
candidates for such determinations. While a biometrically defen-
sible documentation of a critically low or precipitously declining
population would, of itself, be considered sufficient reason to
determine a species to be Threatened or Endangered, such refined
data are not necessarily a prerequisite to such determinations.
"...the Service cannot support the view that the protection
provided for by the Act should be denied a species, which the
information available indicates is Endangered or Threatened,
while biometrical surveys are conducted to gather additional
data."30
Due to all this uncertainty and discretion, listings have often ap-
peared quite sporadic. Critics have charged the FWS with arbitrary imple-
mentation. Groups have filed suit contesting the validity of listings.
Safari Club International, for example, has filed a lawsuit that alleges
that several species including the antelope-like lechwe are not endangered
and should be delisted. The FWS has published a Notice of Review to
reconsider the listing status of 65 foreign species it listed in mid-1976.3 2
Further, several of the OES staff privately contend that some of the molluscs
that have been listed in the past should never have been put on the list:
"The data just isn't there." But an assertive malacologist was.
Given that a species made it to the list, another set of biological
questions has to be resolved: With the current status and projected growth
(decline) rate, what should be done to help the species? Is research
needed? Is artificial propagation in order? Should critical habitat be
designated? In practice many of these questions are examined by recovery
teams set up by FWS. As of early 1978, 59 teams had been established.3 3
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But these teams face a large task in trying to pick a strategy given the
sensitive nature of these species, the scarce information that exists
about them, and in many cases, theories of population biology and ecology
that are inadequate to use as theoretical guideposts. As in the listing
and critical habitat area, these experts often have differing opinions
as to what should be done. For example, in responding to the FWS-sponsored
"recovery plan" for the Houston toad, one expert offered the "opinion that
if this recovery plan is put into action, its main effect will be to hasten
the trend toward extinction of Buf6 houstonensis. I don't know who the
Yahoos were that wrote up this plan, but they didn't know anything about
aurian ecology."3 4
Clearly one question that the Service has to resolve is whether they
should designate critical habitat. Is habitat loss the central problem
facing the species? Is there a specific kind of habitat that is limited
and critical to preserve the species? What size habitat is necessary?
What dimensions of habitat are required by the species? Air? Water?
Land? Isolation? The only real statutory guidelines that the FWS has in
establishing the bounds of a critical habitat is that it must be based
solely on biological factors. FWS recognizes that there is a lot of dis-
cretion beyond this criterion: "There may be questions of whether and how
much habitat is critical ... or how best to legally delineate this habitat
... ,35 Indeed, in practice it is very difficult to determine what is
critical to the existence of a species. 100 acres or 120 acres? All areas
with sandy soil and standing pools of water or just those that have evi-
dence of current habitation?
All of the critical habitat proposals are somewhat arbitrary. Over
100,000 acres in nine sites were proposed as critical habitat for the
.
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Houston toad,3 6 but only 83,000 acres in two sites were finally designated.3 7
Eighteen thousand acres of habitat near Houston thought critical by one
set of FWS experts was dropped from the final designation.38 About 20,000
square miles of habitat in three ecosystems has been proposed as critical
for the grizzly bear.39 Are 18,000 sufficient? Are 25,000 really neces-
sary? Perhaps the grizzly will survive adequately if only two of its
currently-inhabited ecosystems are protected.
In the emergency designation of critical habitat for the Mississippi
sandhill crane made in June 1975, approximately 100,000 acres were listed
as critical to the survival of the species.4 In the final designation
made in August 1977, only about 26,000 acres were listed.41 FWS explained
that the reduction was due to a reassessment of the biological data:
"After reviewing this information, it became apparent that much of the land
area in the original proposal is of little or no known use to the crane.
There are winter feeding areas in farmland to the north of the Critical
Habitat zones delineated below, but these sites are scattered over a large
area, and their use varies with the crops and other factors." But the
Service goes on to warn that, "all Federal agencies should be aware of the
presence of the feeding sites and other areas of sporadic, but possibly
important use within the overall zone originally proposed... Federal
agencies are required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to
insure that their actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of
Endangered species, and this requirement should be considered with respect
to any actions within or near the area delineated above."42 These are
somewhat contradictory instructions, On one hand, federal agencies have
to make sure that their actions do not adversely modify the crane's crit-
ical habitat as designated by the FWS. On the other hand, they have to
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watch out that their actions do not interfere with these extra feeding
sites. This kind of dual form of habitat designation is difficult for
federal agencies to deal with. If they assume that critical habitat is
encompassed by what the FWS calls "critical habitat" and go ahead with
activities close to the area, they may find themselves in violation of
Section 7 of the Act. What finally gets determined as formal critical
habitat is fairly arbitrary and presents the administrators with an enor-
mous source of discretion.
Even given that a species is listed and its critical habitat designated,
there is a final set of discretionary decisions that are very difficult to
make on technical grounds. What actions can coexist with an endangered
species? There is the temptation to say all human activities should be
banned. But this is inefficient and politically infeasible. The FWS works
very hard to counter the inviolate image of critical habitat designations.
In almost every case, the Federal Register notice of a proposed designation
pointed out that there may be many kinds of actions that can continue in a
critical habitat:
"There has been widespread and erroneous belief that a Critical
Habitat designation is something akin to establishment of a wilder-
ness area or wildlife refuge, and automatically closes an area to
most human uses. Actually, a Critical Habitat designation applies
only to Federal agencies, and essentially is an official notification
to these agencies that their responsibilities pursuant to Section 7
of the Act are applicable in a certain area."4
Given that some actions can coexist with a species, how do we deter-
mine which and how much of each are acceptable? This is the modelling
problem discussed above. Under the best of circumstances, it is hard to
say for certain that a transmission line crossing a corner of Everglade
Kite-habitat will affect the species very much. It is extremely difficult
to determine what impact the reduction in flow of the Platte River from
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820,000 to 760,000 acre-feet per year will have on the whooping crane.
Similarly, it is not clear whether a highway crossing the Mississippi sand-
hill crane's habitat will have significant adverse effects, or whether
timber cutting in a 500 square mile area of the grizzly's 20,000 square
mile habitat will hurt the species' chance for survival. The clearest
situations are those that will totally change a habitat such as that in
the case of the Tellico Dam. But there were project proponents who argued
that the snail darter would adapt to the change from a river to a lake.
Considering the litany of biological dilemmas that faces the staff, it
is not surprising that decisions are difficult to make. At bottom, the
staff's decisions represent judgments based only partly on technical in-
formation. Due to the discretionary nature of these judgments, there is
the opportunity for the staff to weight evidence and priorities based on
non-technical considerations. At the extreme, there is the potential for
administrators to act capriciously and disruptively in implementing the
Act. The head of the Program recognized this potential in Senate hearings
on the designation of grizzly bear habitat:
"Senator, there is no question in my mind, and I suspect there is
none in yours, that the Federal government through indiscriminant
administration of Section 7 has the potential to adversely impact
economic and social development in many areas of the United States.
For this reason the service intends to proceed in a responsible
manner in carrying out its responsibilities under Section 7."44
How does the Service define what is "responsible?" How does it chart
a course between preservation and economic development? In practice it is
heavily influenced by its institutional context. This context allows
political pressures to be transmitted into the technical decision-making
process. As the next chapter indicates, the administrators respond to
these forces by modifying their "technical decisions." Negotiation often
takes place simply because there are not very good grounds for making
decisions any other way.
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in Briefing Book, unpublished)
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CHAPTER 6 -- COPING WITH THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT:
NEGOTIATING SCIENTIFIC DECISIONS
Since prohibitive policy is presumed to establish technical rules for
implementation, a common assumption is that its prohibitive nature limits
any balancing of costs and benefits associated with individual actions and
excludes outside interests from influencing implementation. In fact, since
the administrative process is laced with discretion, it is heavily in-
fluenced by the political context in which implementation takes place:
Balancing occurs; outside interests participate; and negotiation takes
place.
Politically-responsive modifications of decisions took several forms
in the implementation of the ESA: Listings and critical habitat designa-
tions were delayed; controversial species were given low priority for
listing and critical habitat designation; the degree of protection (threat-
ened or endangered) was influenced by which interests would be affected;
regulations were drawn to meet the needs of commercial interests; and
boundaries of critical habitats were altered. In addition, interagency
consultation resulted in compromises that allowed projects to proceed even
though they would have an impact on endangered species or their critical
habitat. Finally, general policy was altered in response to pressures to
resolve specific controversies.
Negotiation was facilitated by a hierarchical administrative network
where scientific expertise was concentrated at lower levels, and management
and political skills at higher levels, Goals, rewards and agendas varied
through this network forming a dynamic system with significant pressures
to resolve controversies at the lowest possible internal level. The suc-
cess of this system at building compromise suggests that even when policies
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are prohibitive, the context of implementation provides a vehicle for the
balancing of social costs.
Responding to Political Controversy
Most of the FWS biologists concede that the process does indeed in-
clude political considerations. For example, Bruce MacBryde, a staff
botanist, has stated that:
"There's no question about it, politics does play a role.
I consider myself first and foremost a botanist, and we're all
on the side of the organism in the Endangered Species Office.
But we have to consider the impact of protection. You take the
LaFarge dam project, for example. We not only have to find out
if Sullivantia and monkshood and the others -- Bird's eye-primrose
and Forbes' saxifrage -- would be destroyed by the dam impoundment
area. We have to find out what the cost would be in terms of jobs.
Economics. This all goes into our impact assessment report. But,
we just give the data on the impact. Someone else must balance
these factors -- the dams and the plants."1
In listing species and designating critical habitat, this balancing
usually occurs at bureaucratic levels above the staff experts. The
surname review process and the hierarchical levels of authority tend to
provide substantial control over what gets done by the staff. Negotiation
occurs when there are conflicting interests at stake -- especially when
these interests can mobilize political pressures. The FWS is, after all,
a federal agency responsive to the interests of the President and subject
to the fiscal whims of Congress -- interests that often conflict with the
protection of endangered species. Negotiation takes place to try to avoid
these conflicts. No one in the federal bureaucracy wants to be the squeaky
wheel, There is a tremendous incentive to resolve things before they
bother Congress or the President.
A General Accounting Office study of the endangered species program
concluded, for example, that FWS officials delayed listing species because
they were potentially controversial and feared the political ramifications
136
of listing. In fact, there are numerous proposed listings that have never
been formally resolved (either rejected or finally listed). For example,
as of September 30, 1978, a total of 1,962 proposals were outstanding for
an average of 812 days. The proposal of 1,783 plant species en masse
tends to exaggerate this data: If all unresolved plant proposals are
disregarded, only 156 animal proposals were still unresolved. This would
not be a bad record considering that 247 new animal species were listed in
the same time period -- but a quarter of these open cases were from 1976
or before, and the average number of days since proposal for these 156
species was 458 days -- considerably longer than the average of 279 days
that it took listed species to be resolved.5
Case studies and interviews suggest that delaying final listing to
avoid political conflict is a reasonable hypothesis to account for some of
these unresolved proposals. The Furbish lousewort case is a good example.
The package of materials in which 13 plants were added to the endangered
list began the surname review process in July 1977 -- that is, the experts
were finished with it and had made their biological determination that all
13 were either endangered or threatened. Yet the package was not published
in the Federal Register until April 1978 -- ten months later. Ten months
is a lot longer than the estimate of nine days that the FWS testified to
in oversight hearings. Nor were these 13 species pathbreaking, since
other plants had been listed earlier.
The final determination was delayed because the Furbish lousewort
was in the package. As of July 1977, the lousewort was known to exist
only in an area that would be inundated by the Dickey-Lincoln hydro-
electric project. At the time, FWS was already immersed in the Tellico
Dam - snail darter controversy. Congressional oversight hearings were
being held. The media were having a field day with the image of a three-
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inch fish stopping a $110 million dam. Think of the possible headlines
with the lousewort conflict: "Parasitic Snapdragon Stops $650 Million
Dam;" "200 Plants Defeat President's Energy Independence Plan;" "Dickey-
Lincoln Project Crumbles When Rare Plant Takes Root."
The listing of all 13 plant species was delayed almost a year because
the Furbish lousewort was a potential embarrassment for the program. The
delay had nothing to do with technical aspects of the decision; rather,
it occurred so that the agency could find a way around the potential con-
flict. Material throughout the listing package commented on the contro-
versial nature of the listing, even listing politicians supporting and
opposing the Dickey-Lincoln project. One OES information handout went so
far as to comment that the "energy value of (the Dickey-Lincoln) dams is
debatable." 7
While all levels of staff were aware of the Dickey-Lincoln problem,
the delay came at the highest levels of the FWS. Cover notes by the As-
sociate Director and the Director identify the lousewort problem as the
focal point of their attention and concern. Indeed, the Director suggested
that the staff be certain to point out that other stands of lousewort had
been located, "some of which are not subject to problems with Dickey-Lin-
coln."8 The Associate Director pointed out the politically-sensitive
nature of the material in the package in a handwritten note: "This needs
to be cleared by AS (Assistant Secretary of Interior Herbst) and S (Secre-
tary of Interior Andrus) -- Furbish lousewort in this package."9
The lousewort case suggests that the administrative process breaks up
into a hierarchically-arranged procedure whereby political considerations
are increasingly incorporated at higher levels of the bureaucracy. The
more controversial -- the greater the amount of conflicting interests --
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the greater the involvement of politically-sensitive management. Keith
Schreiner made this point quite clear in responding to Senator Gale McGee
(D-Wyo) at a special Senate hearing on the proposed designation of grizzly
bear critical habitat:
"I cannot tell you that the final determinations are based only
on biological evidence, because you know as well as I do that
other considerations -- political, economic, and the like --
enter into such matters. But it is the Fish and Wildlife
Service's job to obtain the best biological data available and
recommend certain actions. The final decisions rest with the
Secretary, and it is at that level where other considerations
can enter into the decisionmaking process."1 0
At that level, an implicit benefit-cost analysis goes on. Negotiation
takes place to resolve conflicts. In the lousewort case, the delay gave
FWS and the Corps of Engineers time, and freedom from lawsuit, to work out
a compromise solution to allow both Dickey-Lincoln and the Furbish louse-
wort to survive.
Modifying Listing Actions
Negotiation in the listing process can take several forms. Postponing
a controversial decision because of competing political demands compromises
endangered species objectives. Reviewing "safe" species over controversial
ones delays action and is a concession to opposition interests. Changing
the status of a listing -- from endangered to threatened, for example --
is another kind of response to political controversy that has occurred.
By listing the three sea turtle species aS threatened rather than endangered,
NMFS and FWS got around the problem of incidental catch by commercial fishers.
If the species had been listed as endangered (as petitioned), incidental
catch would have been prohibited and serious problems would have arisen
for enforcement and commercial fishing. The threatened classification got
commercial fishermen out of the blanket prohibition. Further, while making
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a concession to the fishing industry, it allowed the agencies to prescribe
procedures to follow if a turtle was accidentally caught by the fishermen:
"any specimen so taken must be handled with due care to prevent
injury to live specimens, and must be returned to the water imme-
diately whether it is dead or alive unless it is a sea turtle
which is alive and unconscious, in which case before returning
it to the water, resuscitation must be attempted by turning the
turtle on its back and pumping its plastron by hand or foot."ll
The use of the threatened classification can be very helpful in re-
solving competing demands. The gray wolf case discussed above is a good
example where a species was protected while other interests were satisfied
(in that case, livestock interests). Another example deals with captive
populations of species that are endangered in the wild. Zoos, circuses,
and breeders were having difficulty transporting and trading animals that
were listed as endangered. They claimed that the animals survived in
populations that were captive but self-sustaining -- and that they were
actually helping to propagate endangered organisms, not depleting their
wild populations. FWS responded by listing the captive populations of
eleven species as threatened with accompanying permit regulations for
transportation, exhibition and interstate sale of individuals of these
species.1 2
Even within the threatened classification, the development of regula-
tions provides another avenue for the balancing of disparate interests.
Indeed, environmental groups have contended that FWS has been too compro-
mising in its regulations. The listing of the grizzly bear and three
species of kangaroos are often given as examples of overreaction to com-
mercial demands. The grizzly bear was listed as threatened in July 1975.
In the regulations accompanying the listing, 3 the taking of bears was
allowed in four cases: The first three were not terribly controversial --
taking in self-defense, taking to relieve a "demonstrable but non-immediate
140
threat to human safety," and taking to control "significant depredations
to lawfully present livestock." The fourth was different: ".. a person
may hunt grizzly bears in the Flathead National Forest, the Bob Marshall
Wilderness Area, and the Mission Mountains Primitive Area of Montana" as
long as no more than 25 bears in all were taken a year and the taking was
in accordance with Montana state law. Thus, sport hunting was allowed
without a federal permit. To-many critics, the hunting for sport of a
species that is "likely to become in danger of extinction within the fore-
seeable future" was a sell-out to commercial interests. "Here you have the
Interior Department formally endorsing large-scale hunting of an animal
they admit is a threatened species -- it's a mockery," said Lew Regenstein,
Vice President of the Fund for Animals. Since hunters must pay $210 in
state license fees to go after a grizzly, preservationists argued that only
wealthy, big-game hunters would benefit from the provision. "Interior
just caved in to the trophy hunting lobby again," commented Regenstein.1 4
A second example of the use of regulation to balance competing inter-
ests is the listing of three species of kangaroo. These Australian species
were listed in December, 1974. Even though overutilization for commercial
and other purposes was one of the reasons for listing them as threatened,
the regulations allowed the FWS Director to permit commercial importation
into the U.S. if the Australian government developed a "sustained-yield
program" for managing the species.l5 Again, critics argued that a species
considered to be in jeopardy of extinction should not be exploited for
commercial purposes at all.
The U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) took strong exception
to the regulations produced in both the grizzly bear and the kangaroo
cases. In a letter to the Secretary of the Interior, the CEQ pointed
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out that the ESA's goal was to provide for the conservation of threatened
species where conservation was defined as using methods and procedures
necessary to help the species improve its status so that it could be de-
listed. Such methods included "regulated taking" only "in the extraor-
dinary case where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be
otherwise relieved."1 7 The CEQ maintained that the FWS did not prove
that the kangaroos or the grizzly bear were extraordinary cases, nor did
it prove that population pressures could not be otherwise relieved.
Grizzly bears, for example, could be live-trapped and moved to other areas.
Kangaroos -- if they were managed so as not to be threatened with poten-
tial extinction -- could be taken off the list.
Modifying Critical Habitat'Designations
The designation of critical habitat moves the administrative process
more clearly into the political arena because for the first time endanger-
ed species become spatial: The Mississippi sandhill crane is no longer
a rare long-legged bird; it is now a potential limitation on federal
agency actions (and private ones that need federal permits) in 39 square
miles of southeastern Mississippi. The Houston toad is no longer an un-
seen mating call in the spring; it is perceived as a potential constraint
on the growth of Houston. The snail darter is no longer an obscure three-
inch fish; it is a national headline -- David slaying the TVA Goliath.
Yet because there is so-much discretion involved in picking and choosing
habitat that is critical to a species, this process responds as well to
the pressures of its institutional environment.
Politically-responsive modifications of critical habitat can occur
in more ways than those in the listing process. Delay can certainly occur.
Allegations of strategic delay and footdragging in the designation of
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critical habitat have been prevalent since FWS first defined what critical
habitat meant in April 1975. As of September 30, 1978, there were 65
outstanding proposed designations of critical habitat, compared with 33
final designations. These proposals were unresolved an average of 292
days. This fugure is about the same as the average time it took for the
33 designations to move from a proposed to a final rulemaking (313 days) --
not an indication of significant delay. However, of the 65 outstanding
listings, 24 were proposed at the very end of the time period -- July and
August 1978. Disregarding these proposals raises the average time for the
unresolved designations to 424 days -- considerably more than the average
for the 33 final designations. Indeed, of the 65 outstanding proposals,
a third had been made prior to the middle of 1977.
The grizzly bear is probably the best example from this group. The
grizzly was put on the endangered list in July 1975. Critical habitat
was not proposed until November 1976, well over a year later. Over two
years have gone by and the designation has never been finalized. Although
there is an element of technical uncertainty in this designation, a large
amount of research has helped to define the status of the grizzly. In-
deed, the areas identified as critical habitat in the proposed designation
are almost identical to those listed in the map attached to the news
release that proposed the grizzly for listing. In almost two years,
very little change had occurred in the areas thought to be habitat for
the grizzly: Technical uncertainty appears to be a minor factor.
Controversial cases take longer than most even when there are no im-
portant technical issues to be resolved because political pressures must
be dealt with. The grizzly listing was extremely controversial because of
opposing interests in the form of livestock ranchers (who alleged signifi-
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cant depredation) and sport hunters, and because of its generally bad
image. Designation of critical habitat for the grizzly would be contro-
versial all by itself, But the range of the animal (and large individual
territories) means that the critical habitat designation would be larger
than others previously made -- 20,000 square miles were proposed. (The
largest critical habitat ever proposed before this one was that for the
American crocodile -- about 1000 square miles, and the largest habitat
ever designated throughout the tenure of the Act was slightly over 7000
square miles (for the gray wolf).) Thus, the nature of the species and
the size of its range made this designation extremely controversial. Ex-
plicit evidence of its controversial nature can be seen in the fact that
FWS held more public hearings on it than for any other designation. In
addition, a Special Hearing was held by the Senate Committee on Appropri-
ations in Wyoming in late 1976 -- the only time legislative review of a
proposed designation has occurred. 9 Finally, of the 15 proposals made
in 1975 and 1976, the grizzly proposal is the only one still outstanding.
The black-footed ferret case is another example of political inter-
vention in critical habitat designation. The black-footed ferret is a
predator of prairie dogs in the prairies of South Dakota. Prairie dogs
have been routinely poisoned as nuisances. The ferret died with the
prairie dogs and is considered to be one of the most endangered American
mammals. It has been listed as endangered since 1967, and was listed in
the first U.S. Redbook (1964). In the 1976 list of endangered species
priorities, the ferret was ranked extremely high (69/100 -- only 3 other
mammals out of a total of 27 were ranked higher). Indeed, the score given
for action to determine critical habitat was second highest. But critical
habitat has never been proposed for the species. At least part of the
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reason is the conflict with grazing interests: If the prairie dogs are
killed because of the amount of grass they consume (competing with live-
stock) and because of the damage their burrows cause to passing livestock,
think how critical habitat designation would be perceived. Since much of
the grazing land is in federal ownership, all grazing in the designated
habitat could be subject to a FWS-induced veto. Livestock interests that
have obtained millions of federal dollars to get rid of the prairie dog
menace would find it difficult to accept grazing restrictions to protect
a rarely-seen, weasel-like animal (the fact that it is their ally in
destroying prairie dogs would be worthless to them).
Not only can the designation of critical habitat be delayed in re-
sponse to political considerations, but the boundaries of the designations
can be modified. Since there is so much technical uncertainty, it is hard
to know with confidence what is critical and what is not. Hence, bound-
aries shrink or distort depending on outside pressures. Environmental
groups alleged that to be the case with the failure to designate critical
habitat for the California condor in an area with phosphate-mining poten-
tial. John Grandy of the Defenders of Wildlife stated in oversight
hearings that:
"...the critical habitat excluded nesting and loafing sites for
the Condor which conflicted with the proposed phosphate lease.
In addition, the proposed boundary of the critical habitat for
the Condor is contiguous with the boundary of the phosphate lease
for about one and one-half miles, an amazing coincidence. Not
surprisingly, the nesting and loafing sites for the Condor which
are not included in the designated critical habitat would have led
to conflicts with the proposed phosphate lease, Mr, Chairman, this
kind of political biology is a sham which threatens the integrity
of the entire endangered species program."2 0
The case of the Houston toad is a better example of the modification
of critical habitat boundaries in response to controversy and illustrates
145
how different levels of an agency like FWS have different priorities and
interests, Under a FWS contract, Dr. Robert Thomas, a Texas A&M expert,
recommended areas in Burleson, Bastrop, and Harris (Houston) counties as
critical habitat for the toad. In December 1976, the Washington Office
asked the Regional Office to redefine the boundaries of the recommend-
ation: "The Harris County areas proposed for critical habitat pose
serious difficulties ... Dr. Thomas' proposal includes a very large area
in south Houston where toads have not been reported; this area is appar-
ently heavily developed. We are of the opinion that the Harris County
critical habitat submitted by Dr. Thomas is in error and should be re-
defined ...,21 Thomas wrote to the Regional Office: "I am sure that the
critical habitat proposal posed 'serious difficulties.' I assume that any
proposal involving a metropolitan area would. The localities submitted
on the referenced map are genuine localities on which Houston toads have
been observed during the past two years by competent scientists ... I
hope that I don't appear to be a rabid preservationist. I simply want to
ensure that species are given a fighting chance."2 2
The Regional Office wrote to the Washington Office reiterating
Thomas' remarks. Indeed, their memo questions the Washington Office's
motives: "We were rather surprised at the Washington Office comment that
proposing exact locations for critical habitat posed 'serious difficul-
ties.' The tone of this statement is that politics may make designating
this area as critical habitat difficult. Although this is undoubtedly
true, now does not seem the time to raise the problem ... There seems no
doubt as to these areas being essential to the survival of the species."2 3
The proposed'determination was published five-months later and in-
cluded the Bastrop and Burleson sites, and seven areas within the Harris
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County area.24 All sorts of controversy broke out: Letters were sent to
and from the White House. Newspaper articles poked fun at the notion of
a toad stopping Houston's growth.2 5 Even an NBC News show segment was
filmed about the controversy.
A special investigative team comprised entirely of biologists was
formed as a strategy to cope with the controversy. The team met in Octo-
ber 1977 and surveyed the sites. They concluded that of the nine areas,
seven should be included in the final
and five of the Harris County sites:
of the proposed critical habitat site
presently supporting toad populations
The team made their recommendation on
necessarily habitat that was currentl
of the sites were extremely marginal.
undergoing rapid development and its
designation -- Bastrop, Burleson,
"After careful review, all but two
s were believed by the team to be
and essential for its survival."2 7
the basis of suitable habitat, not
y supporting Houston toads. Some
For example, "Site 1 is presently
future as toad habitat is already
questionable because of the extensive underground drainage recently in-
stalled. 2 8 Nevertheless, since the biologists would not have to deal
with the political ramifications of the designation and could bill their
decision as technical, they decided to include even the marginal sites.
The FWS Regional Office had a different set of priorities and inter-
ests, however. To reduce adverse reaction to the designation, Regional
Office -managers decided to recommend the designation of only the Bastrop
and Burleson sites, with the others marked for further study. The Re-
gional Officels formal recommendations to the Washington Office noted
that "(t)he remaining Harris County sites still contain potential Houston
toad habitat," but claimed that siting data was inadequate. The memo
further stated that, "(i)f the Fish and Wildlife Service finalizes
147
critical habitat determination in these areas ... but is unable to show
that the toads have even used the sites within the last 10 years, it is
our belief that the public outcry will be immediate, vociferous, and with
some justification." 2 9
The Washington Office followed the Regional Office's advice and de-
signated the Burleson and Bastrop sites in January 1978, leaving the
Harris County sites for further study 30 The briefing statement that
accompanied the final listing package again pointed out the Service's
awareness of the controversial nature of their actions:
"The proposal was very controversial with regard to certain areas
in Harris County, especially because of alleged prohibitions on all
development in those areas, a misinterpretation fostered by the press.
The Critical Habitat designation should not in the least be contro-
versial in Bastrop and Burleson Counties; these areas are sparsely
settled and no federally authorized or funded projects are known
which would be involved. The deletion of the two areas in Harris
County will relieve much of the controversy and is biologically
justified. The retention of the remaining five areas in Harris
County as proposed areas may be controversial when viewed by de-
velopers as a measure which leaves their status in question and by
conservationists who view this action as failure to act in accord
with the Act.
"The best way to avoid controversy is to conduct as complete and
conscientious a survey as possible in Harris County and to engage
a program of public education in the Houston area on the conserva-
tion of this species. When the survey is completed (it may require
several breeding seasons), the results should be made known as
quickly as possible. An effort to insure a proper interpretation
of Critical Habitat should be made. In any case, if areas in Harris
County are finalized as Critical Habitat in the fture, it is likely
that controversy will be unavoidable and bitter."31
The Harris County sites were surveyed in the Spring of 1978 and no
Houston toad calls were heard, It is unlikely that they will be consider-
ed further. One of the staff biologists felt this to be "biologically
invalid:" "Houston toads breed according to weather conditions. If the
study only goes through August (as it did), it might miss signs of Houston
Toad occupation. Political pressures will then dictate that the areas be
dropped," It is hard to tell if the Harris County sites were deleted
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because of political pressures or because they were beyond the definition
of critical habitat. It is clear, however, that the official FWS actions
differed from staff experts' recommendations and that the controversial
nature of the designations was well recognized and considered throughout
the incident.
Beyond delay and boundary modification, the Service can respond to
political controversy by simply not designating critical habitat. Not all
species are benefited by designation: Some are threatened for reasons
such as overutilization and are able to thrive over a large area. But by
not designating critical habitat, the interagency consultation require-
ments become much fuzzier: If there is no essential habitat, agencies
do not really have to worry about the impact of their actions (nor do
they know where to look). In the Furbish lousewort case, FWS concluded
that it was not necessary to determine critical habitat because the plant
could be transplanted to other areas. By not designating critical habitat,
the FWS allowed the Dickey-Lincoln project to move ahead without the
threat of lawsuit, even though it would destroy forty percent of the known
population of louseworts.
Working Towards Compromise Through Interagency Consultation
Negotiation in response to competing resource demands is most clearly
visible in the implementation of the Section 7 interagency consultation
requirements. Once species are listed and their critical habitats desig-
nated, agencies must review their actions to avoid harming the species or
modifying their critical habitats, Section 7 becomes a club to force
development agencies and the FWS to work out conflicts between endangered
species and projects. In theory, negotiation only occurs when both sides
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have something to gain from the resultant compromise. In the case of the
ESA consultation requirement, clearly the development agencies have an
incentive to bargain: They don't want to get taken to court by a third-
party intervenor. FWS also has an incentive: They don't want to inspire
a congressional backlash against the program.
According to the FWS, the interagency consultation requirement has
worked quite effectively. In preparation for oversight hearings, the FWS
estimated that 4,500 consultations had taken place in fiscal year 1977.32
Only three of these went into judicial proceedings. (Appendix G contains
a flow diagram of the consultation process.) In theory, each federal
agency must review its actions and determine whether they may affect a
listed species or its critical habitat. If so, the agency is required to
initiate formal consultation with FWS or NMFS. The Regional Offices are gen-
erally the recipients of consultation requests. In addition, if the Ser-
vice hears of a federal action that they view as potentially adverse to a
species, they can request that the appropriate federal agency initiate
consultation. In either case, the FWS must conduct a threshold examination
within two months after the start of consultation. They can conclude that
the action will not affect a species, that it will adversely affect it,
or that there is insufficient information on which to base a Biological
Opinion. Given the Biological Opinion, it is up to the project-initiating
agency to decide whether it should proceed or not. The idea that the FWS'
conclusion is based only on biology -- a Biological Opinion -- is fostered
repeatedly by the Service. However, as illustrated above, there is a
tremendous amount of pressure on both sides of the consultation to come to
some compromise conclusion.
In practice, a hierarchical administrative process seeks resolution of
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controversial consultations. (Appendix H contains a map of this insti-
tutional network.) Most consultations are handled by the Regional
Offices. But if the issue cannot be resolved, it is bounced to the next
level -- the Washington Office. At OES, the Management Operations Branch
tries to resolve project-species conflicts. The taxonomists who list
species (and who probably know the most about their needs) are often ex-
cluded from participating in the consultations. It is possible that they
are perceived within the agency as extremists unlikely to modify their
original definition of critical habitat. In any case, if OES cannot re-
solve the conflict, it is bounced higher into the FWS and the Department
of Interior. The highest level is -- de facto -- the Congress, which can
resolve a conflict by exempting a project from the Act's requirements (as
it did, for example, when it exempted the Alaskan oil pipeline from the
requirements of NEPA).
The higher in the hierarchy that the dispute goes, the greater the
likelihood that compromise will be achieved. At higher administrative
levels, the preservation of endangered species is less important as an
operational goal because fewer scientists participate in the decision and
other goals take precedent. Values and professional norms vary at dif-
ferent levels of agencies. Higher levels have broader agendas. In add-
ition, the higher the controversy rises in the bureaucracy, the greater
the political cost incurred by the administrators and their appointed and
elected bosses if resolution is not achieved. Hence, the hierarchical
structure results in significant pressures to resolve controversies in-
ternally as issues rise in the system.
In practice, this vertical resolution network has an extremely good
record of resolving conflicts through negotiation. The FWS finds it
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difficult to document the 4,500 figure (their early estimate of the number
of interagency consultation in fiscal year 1977), The figure includes
brief telephone calls as well as formal consultations. No record was
kept of informal consultations prior to January 1978 when final Section
7 regulations were issued. Researchers from Wayne State University Law
School were able to document 215 interagency communications up through
the end of fiscal year 1977. 33 Of these, two-thirds had been resolved by
determining that the project would not adversely affect the species. In
many of these cases, resolution was achieved through "research, consulta-
tion and considerate weighing of modifications and alternatives:"
"Amongst the range of projects in which reconciliation of species
conflict occurred through project modification were pipelines, ar-
port:s, channel dredging, nuclear plant thermal discharges, forest
management plans, pest control projects, sewage treatment plants,
highway construction, coal mines, bombing ranges, and dams.
"The modifications ranged from original design modification,
alternate site location, to changes in the specific nature of the
project such as lengthening a discharge pipe to avoid a species
population, or seasonally modifying flight patterns. Agreed to
modifications also include protective measures such as fences, or
barriers around populations, increase in safety techniques, and
enhancement of species habitat.
"Six additional projects in which there was a potential conflict
were abandoned by the construction agency, only one of these being
a case which was abandoned because of the presence of an endangered
species. This was a project to expand the hours and bag limits
for the Bosque Snow Goose in New Mexico. ... All of the other
abandonment cases occurred for a variety of financial and adminis-
trative reasons. None of which was based strictly on the endangered
species conflict." 3 4
The remainder of the documented cases (one-third of the 216) were still
on-going, The Wayne State group reviewed them and concluded that none was
irresolvable: "For nearly all of the projects there is a past example
which presents a readily available alternative." The group finished its
study by concluding that all of the on-going conflicts could be resolved
if there was good-faith interagency communication early on in the process.
There is the possibility that the Wayne State data was biased since
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one of the law professors was the counsel for the plaintiffs in the
Tellico case. Other good overall data is hard to come by. The Army Corps
of Engineers put together a list of 26 projects/permits that had been
successfully modified so as to allow the projects to go ahead without
harming an endangered species, 5 The modifications were in many cases
minor - disposing of dredge material in a different location, completing
construction prior to nesting season, development of strict boating regu-
lations, etc. Others were more costly such as screening intake structures
and disposing of dredge materials at more distant locations. In a separ-
ate list of 83 on-going cases where project-species conflicts were likely,
almost all were expected to be resolved without having to terminate the
projects or permits -- four of the permits were expected to be denied. In
testimony before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
representatives of both the Defense Department and the Forest Service
stated that they could work out conflicts with endangered species, and
that no amendments were needed to provide for exemptions to the Act.3 6
While these executive agencies have to follow the administration line
(which at that time was in support of the ESA), case material indicates
that negotiated compromises are the normal course of interagency action.
Consider, for example, the case of the Bachman's warbler which lives in
South Carolina's I'on Swamp, 4500 acres of the Francis Marion National
Forest. The Forest Service (FS) was planning to clear the swamp and sell
the timber. Several individuals in the Charleston area learned of the
plan and asked the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) to intervene. NWF
brokered a meeting and set-up a three-member arbitration panel, consisting
of experts from the FS, FWS, and the Wildlife Society. The panel held
hearings, made on-site inspections, and ultimately issued a report recom-
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mending areas where timber harvesting should and should not be allowed.
According to the NWF's counsel, all parties were satisfied; Timber was
to be harvested and the warbler's habitat was protected.3 7
Cases of negotiated reconciliation are numerous; The case of the
whooping cranes versus the' Grayrocks dam, reservoir, and associated power
38
project was nationally-publicized. In one corner: the whooping crane --
a national symbol of an endangered bird. In the other corner: the $1.6
billion Grayrocks dam, supplying cooling water to a massive coal-fired
power plant that would service 2 million electricity consumers in eight
states. The plant would reduce the flow in the Platte River and thereby
affect an area used by the cranes for mating and resting some 275 miles
downstream from the project. The National Wildlife Federation and the
State of Nebraska filed suit to stop the project and won a temporary in-
junction in October 1978. The headlines bemoaned another Tellico situa-
tion -- except here the culprit was not an obscure fish, but was a grace-
ful bird that had for years captured the spirit and imagination of the
American public.
The conflict at first appeared unresolvable, but was worked out in an
out-of-court settlement between NWF, the Missouri Basin Power Project,
the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Rural Electrification Administration.
The settlement guaranteed a minimum water flow and established a trust
fund to buy water rights and additional habitat for the cranes. The con-
sultation procedure had risen to the'top of the administrative hierarchy.
The Secretary of the Interior released the FWS' Biological Opinion in
December 1978; If the project followed the terms of the agreement, there
would be'no jeopardy to the crane population. In Secretary Herbst's
words, "(t)ogether the opinion and the agreement provide a flexible frame-
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work for the three Federal agencies to reach accord instead of facing the
irresolvable conflict that many anticipated."3 9
The Dickey-Lincoln Dam case illustrates the fact that not only are
individual cases negotiated politically, but political considerations also
set precedent and change general policy. After a delay of several months,
resolution was achieved allowing the Dickey-Lincoln project to move for-
ward even though the project would innundate 40 percent of the known
specimens of the Furbish lousewort and jeopardize another 18 percent
through construction activities. The key recommendation in the FWS'
Biological Opinion was that new colonies of the plant had to be established
through transplantation or other means. Other provisions in the agreement
were important -- acquisition of the other surviving colonies, acquisition
of habitat that could be used by the lousewort, research, etc. -- but the
transplant provisions were the most important.
By allowing the Army Corps of Engineers to transplant organisms to
new habitat, FWS officials contradicted an earlier policy that mitigation
as traditionally conceived was not allowed under the ESA. In mid-1977,
Keith Schreiner, Manager of the Endangered Species Program, asked the
Interior Department's Solicitor for a legal opinion as to whether mitiga-
tion -- acquisition of replacement habitat, transplantation, etc. -- was
allowed under the Act. The Solicitor responded that the Act prohibited
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all adverse modifications of critical habitat. For a while, OES clung
to this definition. But the lousewort case changed this. By allowing an
agency to protect a species by propagating it away from a project in which
original critical habitat would be destroyed, FWS contradicted its posi-
tion on the Tellico Project. If we can replant louseworts, why not trans-
plant snail darters to another river (like the Hiwassee)? For that matter,
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is it "preserving" species to put their genetic information in a "gene
bank" for future propagation? The case points to a basic uncertainty
that exists about the Act's purpose:' Does it protect endangered species
or critical ecosystems?
Even in the most extreme (and presumably irreconcilable) cases --
those that went to court -- achieving both project objectives and endan-
gered species preservation has been possible. In the Mississippi sandhill
crane case, for example, the U.S. Department of Transportation can satisfy
the Act's requirements and finish Interstate 10 in southeast Mississippi
by purchasing land around the controversial interchange to preclude its
development: DOT will purchase 1840 acres at a total cost of $4 million
(although some of this is in highway right-of-way that would have been
purchased anyway). In the snail darter case, it now appears that the
original goals of economic development can be better served by maintaining
the Little Tennessee River as a river, foregoing reservoir development.4 1
The snail darter will be preserved along with the river. In all these
cases, negotiated settlements are possible if the parties want to and
are able to negotiate.
In summary: Delay has been used repeatedly in the implementation of
the ESA as a strategic response to political controversy. Implementation
has not been aggressive and has certainly softened the prohibitive nature
of the statute. Scarce staff and information, and huge amounts of tech-
nical uncertainty foster enormous opportunities for the exercise of admin-
istrative discretion. Finally, because implementation takes place in a
politically-charged environment, the opportunities for discretionary
judgment and the'need to cope with'scarce resources lead to negotiation
even though the statutory prescription seems to rule it out.
156
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1. 108 Science News (6):95, August 9, 1975.
2. See diagram in Appendix F.
3. 8 Ecology USA (7);49, April 9, 1979; also see U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works, 1978, p85.
4. The number of outstanding listings were compiled according to the year
that they were proposed. The data includes all proposals that were not
resolved by September 30, 1978:
Year Proposal
Initiated
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Total
Numbers of Species Proposed for Listing,
But Never Finalized (Listed or Rejected)
Animals & Plants
0
53
1789
58
62
1962
Animals
0
8
28
58
62
156
The average number of days that these proposals were outstanding was
computed by calculating the number of days between the date that the
proposed listing was published in the Federal Register and September 30,
1978. These values were summed for all species and divided by the total
number of species. The results are as follows:
Number of Species
156
1806
1962
Average Number of Days*
458
843
812
*calculated from date of proposed listing to September 30, 1978
The reader should note an inherent bias in these averages since they in-
clude proposals that on average would not be expected to be finalized by
September 30, 1978. Thus many of the 1978 proposals bias the averages
downward. This does not detract from the point made in the text that
there are a large number of proposals that have been outstanding for a
long time.
5. See Chapter 4, note 19.
6. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1976, p21.
7. MacBryde, B., "Endangered Plant Listings, Handout", unpublished, November
2, 1977, p8.
Type
Animals
Plants
Total
_ _ _ _ _ _ _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
- I
157
8. Memo from Lynn Greenwalt, Director, FWS, to Keith Schreiner, Associate
Director for Federal Assistance, FWS, April 12, 1978.
9. Handwritten on top of memo listed in note 8, above.
10. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 1976, plO.
11. 43 Federal Register (146):32811, July 28, 1978.
12. 42 Federal Register (105):78052-7, June 1, 1977.
13. 40 Federal Register 31736, July 28, 1975.
14. New York Times, February 6, 1975.
15. 39 Federal Register (251):44990-2, December 30, 1974.
16. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1976, p1 12 .
17. Section 4(d), 16 U.S.C. 1532.
18. "Grizzly Bear Proposed as 'Threatened Species'", Department of the
Interior News Release, Fish and Wildlife Service, January 7, 1975.
19. The Senate Committee on Appropriations held a special hearing on the
"proposed critical habitat area for grizzly bears" on November 4, 1976
in Cody, Wyoming. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
1976.
20. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1976, p107.
21. Memo from Acting Associate Director, FWS, to Regional Director,
Region 2, "Houston Toad Critical Habitat", December 7, 1976.
22. Letter from Robert A. Thomas, Texas A&M University, to James Johnson,
FWS Regional Office, Region 2, December 16, 1976.
23. Memo from Acting Regional Director, Region 2, to Director, FWS,
"Reply to Comments on Proposed Critical Habitat for the Houston Toad",
December 20, 1976.
24. 42 Federal Register 27009, May 26, 1977.
25. See, e.g., Houston Post, June 17, 1977; Houston Chronicle, June 22, 1977.
26. NBC "Weekend" show, broadcast on January 7, 1978; transcript reprinted
at 124 Congressional Record E478-9, February 8, 1978.
27. Memo from James E. Johnson, Endangered Species Biologist, to Regional
Director, Region 2, "Field Review of Proposed Houston Toad Critical
Habitat", November 25, 1977, p2.
28. Ibid., p5.
158
29. Memo from Acting Regional Director, Region 2, to Director, FWS,
"Recommendations for Houston Toad Final Critical Habitat Determination",
November'25, 1977.
30. 43'Federal Register (21):4022, January 31, 1978.
31. Memo from Director, FWS, to Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife
and Parks, Department of the Interior, "Briefing on Final Rulemaking
to Determine Critical Habitat of the Houston Toad", January 20, 1978, p2.
32. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, 1978a,
p18.
33. Labelle, 1977, p3.
34. Ibid.
35. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 1978b,
p1125-48.
36. See, e.g., U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 1978a, p429,482.
37. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, 1978a,
p 83-4; National Wildlife Federation, Conservation'News, August 1, 1977,
p10-12.
38. For a more complete discussion, see Wondolleck, 1979.
39. "Whooping Cranes and the Grayrocks Dam Can Coexist, Interior Agency
Says", Department of the Interior News Release, Fish and Wildlife
Service, December 8, 1978.
40. Memo from Associate Solicitor, Conservation and Wildlife, Department
of the Interior, to Keith Schreiner, Associate Director for Federal
Assistance, "The Applicability of the Concept of Mitigation to
Critical Habitat", July 19, 1977.
41. See, e.g., Washington Post, January 24, 1979.
159
CHAPTER 7 -- NONSTATUTORY FORCES THAT SHAPE IMPLEMENTATION
If a prohibitive statute doesn't in fact control implementation, what
does? If the Endangered Species Act is not implemented prohibitively, what
accounts for the way it is implemented? Why do some species make it to
the list, and others do not? Policies are implemented by a network of
organizations and individuals that have histories that predate enactment,
and characteristics that are not determined by one piece of legislation.
The character of a new program is shaped by which and how many administra-
tive agencies participate in implementation, by how much staff and funds
each has, by their past and present goals and operating theories, and by
how the agencies interacted formally and informally in the past. In
addition, the environment in which these agencies operate influences their
behavior significantly: Which groups have supported and opposed them in
the past, to whom the agencies report, what ties of allegiance exist be-
tween agency personnel and other organizations, what the opinion of the
general public is and what issues are currently on the social agenda --
all influence the outcome and character of implementation.
In the implementation of the ESA, several forces stand out as most
significant in shaping the behavior of the administrative agencies: Resource
constraints, conflicting organizational goals, and bureaucratic and scien-
tific conservatism are internal factors that tended to resist change and
slow down implementation. External pressures provided by advocates, con-
stituent groups, and judicial and legislative sources in large measure
controlled what products finally came out of the administrative system.
Both sets of these factors mold the outcome of statutory prescriptions;
they help to explain why policy outcomes often differ dramatically from
statutory goals and why prohibitive policy is not implemented prohibitively.
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This chapter will first examine the'nature of the institutions that have
a formal role in implementation. Then it will look at pressures arising
from outside the formal system.
INTERNAL FORCES
Resource Constraints
One conclusion of almost all program evaluations is that there were
inadequate staff and funds to do the job. Rarely are appropriations up to
authorized levels. Rarely is there staff to do everything that should be
done. Most program administrators point to the basic lack of resources as
their central implementation problem. Both FWS and NMFS bemoaned their
lack of staff and money repeatedly. In 1976, FWS estimated that it needed
$30 million annually (compared with $7.5 million in appropriations) and a
staff three to four times larger than it had to implement the Act at an
optimum level. NMFS claimed that it needed funding at least at a doubled
3
rate.
In fact, while they are a good starting point to understand what kind
of problems occur in implementation, resource limitations are often over-
sold as an explanation of implementation failure. By arguing that resources
are inadequate to do the mandated job, agencies deflect real criticism:
"Personnel ceilings are just too tight." "The agency has higher priorities
than this program." "It's OMB's fault What can we do?" The resource
scarcity argument is effective since it requires only a demonstration of
inadequacy to continue at an increased level; incompetence gets rewarded;
aggressive, effective action is penalized.
Funding was a minor problem in the endangered species program, The
average FWS request for funds to the Department of Interior over the five
year (fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year 1978) period was about $9.5 million.
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This corresponded quite closely to the statutory authorization under the
ESA. The Department of the Interior's request to the President, the Pres-
ident's request to Congress, and the'Congressional appropriation averaged
about $7-3/4 million -- 20 percent less than the FWS request. While this
was a problem, staffing was a-more significant one.
It is not necessarily clear, however, that-more staff implement better.
The administrative record of the endangered species program did not improve
in direct relation to the number of staff added after passage of the 1973
Act. Indeed, often a large staff is counterproductive. With large staffs,
more attention must be spent on organizing. There are increasing problems
with accountability and with controlling what goes on within the agency.
Even with a scientific staff of eight in an agency with a history of organ-
izational loyalty, Keith Schreiner had significant problems maintaining
control of the flow of information from the office. At least one of his
biologists regularly leaked material to environmental groups and to the
media -- information and anecdotes that turned up later in newspaper columns
and accusatory letters from Capitol Hill.
In studying the implemention of an Economic Development Administration
program in Oakland, California, Pressman and Wildavsky were amazed at the
sheer number of "decision points" in the system -- places where delay and
potential program failure could occur. In many ways, the staff size
argument mirrors their observation, The:more staff, the more organizational
levels, the greater the number of components involved in implementation --
the greater the opportunity for delay and inadequate implementation. This
statement is somewhat counterintuitive and not absolutely true. In the ESA
case, however, generally the speed of implementation declined as the number
of actors involved in the process increased. This is not to argue that a
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lack of resources is not a problem; of course it is. Some staff and funds
are necessary but are certainly not sufficient to guarantee effective
implementation. Other factors appear more important in explaining the
character of implementation.
The Match Between Organizational Goals
The influence of the multiplicity of components comes less from their
sheer number than from their disparate goals and histories. When new pro-
grams are started, existing sets of individuals or groups are usually tapped
and given the responsibility to implement the program. Either a new activity
is absorbed into the existing agenda of an established group, or established
individuals are reformed into a new group whose agenda includes the new
program.5 Construction of totally new organizations out of totally new
individuals is extremely rare.6 Recruitment of new individuals into
established organizations occurs to meet the staffing demands of new pro-
gram activities but usually the recruits enter at a low level in the struc-
ture. In general, new programs are made of old parts.
'"You can't teach an old dog new tricks," says the adage. While you
probably can teach an old organization new tricks, chances are that it will
perform them much the way it has always done things. Individuals and organ-
izations have goals and traditions that hinder new programs. Individuals
in bureaucracies strive to achieve rewards that are defined by the disci-
plines or professions they belong to, or by the organization itself.
Organizations develop traditions about how things are done and what is
important; these become norms to guide individual behavior. Networks of
groups of individuals and organizations form through time and serve to
structure inter-group and inter-agency behavior.
When a new program (a'non-incremental policy prescription) is born, it
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enters an extremely hostile environment. From the first legislative slap
on the policy's bottom to its burial some years later, the new program is
brought -up by guardians who'-may care very little about the infant program.
Or, they may care about it, but don't quite understand it. An organization
already has an agenda. Non-incremental programs may simply get placed well
down on it. More commonly, they are administratively redefined to fit the
priorities and perspectives of the existing institutional network. Further-
more, because new programs may require the interaction of a number of organ-
izations -- many of whom have conflicting goals -- the new program may
encounter antagonism based on a history it had nothing to do with. Hence,
not only is there a clash of new and old, but there is also a continued
clash between old and old.
If there is one conclusion that shines out from the list of institutions
involved in implementing the ESA it is the limited number of groups who
really care about the preservation of endangered species. Table 7-1
identifies the central goals and traditions of the key organizations that
participate in the implementation of the ESA. Of a large set of actors,
only two have preservation as a significant organizational goal -- the
OES-Biological Support Branch and the preservation-oriented environmental
interest groups.
OES -''Biologists
The eight members of the Biological Support Branch are scientists first,
and bureaucrats second. Seven out of eight have Ph.D.'s. Five out of eight
came directly from the academic world to the OES. They include two mammal-
ogist and one of most other specialities a herpetologist (reptiles and
amphibians), an ornithologist Cbirds), an ichthyologist (fish), an entomol-
ogist (insects), a botanist (plants), and a-malacologist (molluscs). In
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Table 7-1: The'Goals and Operating Theories 'of the Major Actors
Involved in 'the 'Implementation 'of 'the'ESA
Organization Goals or Operating Theories
OES- Biological Support Branch
OES-Management Services, Chief
Fish and Wildlife Service
Department of the Interior
NMFS - Department of Commerce
Federal Development Agencies:
TVA, ACOE, FS, HUD, DOT
Scientific Community
State Fish and Game Agencies
Interest Groups (continuum
typified by:)
Funds for Animals, Environ-
mental Defense Fund
National Wildlife Federation
National Audubon Society
Wildlife Management Institute,
International Association of
Game and Fish Commissioners
Safari Club International,
Pet Stores
Chamber of Commerce, Labor
preservation, (scientific research)
bureaucratic, (preservation)
bureaucratic, conservation-game
management, (preservation)
bureaucratic, resource development,
conservation
bureaucratic, commercial and sport
fisheries, economic development
bureaucratic, resource development,
economic development
research, financial support, system-
atics collection, (preservation)
game animal management/production
preservation, anti-development projects,
anti-hunting
conservation, preservation
conservation, game management
hunting, commercial exploitation
economic development
- ---
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contrast to almost everyone else in the formal set of implementing organ-
izations, the biologists are by in large not career bureaucrats. Their
allegiance is to scientific research and to the preservation of species
within their taxonomic specialities. They interact more often with indi-
viduals in the scientific community than they do with bureaucrats within
the Federal government. Many also have fairly close ties to environmental
interest groups. Disciplinary norms are more important than organizational
norms. These experts perceive themselves as species' advocates -- as the
guys with the white hats. They do-more to publicize the plight of endan-
gered species than any other segment of the formal institutional network.
They are generally young and resent the bureaucratization of their scientific
decisions.
Nor are their motives entirely pure. Most perceive themselves as
environmentalists and are opposed to development projects that, for example,
impound rivers. They talk of the snail darter - Tellico Dam conflict:
"The snail darter is irreplaceable. I can't set a value on a species. But
that's a bad project anyway. It would dam the last free-flowing river in
East Tennessee." Sierra Club posters and environmental advocacy literature
abound in their offices. On one door, a cartoon is posted depicting a fat
TVA bureaucrat resting on an inner tube on a lake with a ferocious open-
jawed snail darter rising from the depths to attack in a voluminous but
sensitive area.
Biological judgments are weighted by these private values. For example,
many of the staff will contend that the malacologist was overzealous in
listing species because he was opposed to dam projects. A similar contro-
versy raged around the proposed listing and critical habitat designation
for the Cahaba shiner and goldline darter which survive in Alabama's
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Cahaba River. The proposals were based largely on the recommendation of
the staff ichthyologist, Jim Williams, a former Chairman of the Alabama
Conservancy, an environmental interest group. Development interests alleged
that Williams was privately opposed to development along the Cahaba River,
and let his personal values influence his professional judgment. The
Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce funded two other ichthyologists to
survey the range of the species; their data contradict some of the informa-
tion in the proposal.8
OES - Managers
The biologists' interest in advocacy sometimes brings them into conflict
with other segments of the OES whose staff are bureaucrats first and environ-
mental advocates second. They are lawyers and wildlife resource managers,
lacking the unifying professional norms that the scientists hold. They
perceive organizational goals much more clearly than do the biologists.
The managers interact primarily with other bureaucrats -- in the FWS
hierarchy, in the Regional Offices, and in other federal and state agencies.
As a result of the difference in traditions, norms and goals, there is
a noticeable schism between the biologists and the managers. In their down-
town Washington office, the biologists sit in a bank of offices on one
side of a receptionist, the managers sit on the other. Their territories
meet at the xerox machine. The scientists resent the resource management
and bureaucratic orientation of the managers, They slow things up. We
make decisions on biological grounds, Politics enter into the decision
after the listing packages leave our hands," The managers resent the
scientists' lack of allegiance to the'organization and distrust their
motives. The scientists contend, for example, that they are routinely kept
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out of interagency consultation negotiations. For example, Bruce MacBryde,
the staff botanist, was not included in most of the discussions held with
the ACOE over the Furbish lousewort issue.
The management-scientist schism is seen most clearly in a reorganization
plan proposed by Keith Schreiner, the Program Manager, in 1976. He proposed
to transfer the biologists into a research section, and to have them give
their data to the managers who would take it from there. It is not clear
what Schreiner's motives were -- to make the process work more effectively,
or to establish more control over the program. Regardless, critics argued
that this would insulate the scientists even further from the decision-
making process and would work to the detriment of the endangered species.
The FWS Hierarchy
The basic dichotomy between science and management is sharper in the
relationship between OES and the rest of FWS. At least everyone in the OES
has a common mission in that they comprise an office that only implements
the endangered species program. Everyone was ready to pass out champagne
to celebrate the Supreme Court decision in favor of the snail darter. Other
groups at FWS were not as exuberant, however. The FWS is a fairly old
organization. It has been around in some form or another since 1940. It
has very good vertical integration, controlling line operations extremely
well.
The goals of the FWS are game management and bureaucratic. Its tradi-
tion is one of conservation -- utilization of resources "for the greatest
good of the greatest number', 1 2 The Service's historic constituency are
hunters. Through the use of duck stamps and similar programs, hunters have
13
paid for most of the land acquisition programs for refuges; thus, on
equity grounds, they are seen as being an appropriate constituency for the
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FWS. FWS used to be called the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife --
an indication of its game-management orientation. Hunting and other uses
are allowed on National Wildlife Refuges. Data gathered by' a task force
of ten environmental groups, for example, indicated that in one year,
t'787,000 animals were killed'on wildlife refuges, 800,000 pounds of pesti-
cides were dumped on the land, 19-million board feet of timber were removed,
and 1,437,097 acres were devoted to commercial agriculture."1 4
The notion of preserving things for their own sake is quite different
from the traditions of conservation. Use is not central or even necessarily
possible. The conservation-preservation split is-matched by the split
between the scientific and management perspectives. The FWS draws its
staff from wildlife management departments in state universities, depart-
ments established in large part to provide staff to grow game animals to
be hunted by state residents.
The combination of differing perspectives, goals, and traditions --
preservation versus conservation, science versus management, and academic
identification versus organizational allegiance - significantly isolates
the endangered species program from the FWS mainstream. The location of
the OES six blocks from the huge Interior Department complex is a metaphor
for its satellite status within the organization. "We're viewed as not
having come up through the ranks, as being starry-eyed idealists," said one
OES staffer. "The land management types probably think that the mission
of the office is childish, We have to watch our image, For example a
botanist in Denver was told not to use her Ph.D. on correspondence. I
worry about my image - wearing rimless glasses is perhaps too academic an
image."
The'-mainline YWS doesnt quite understand the endangered species staff.
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Further, they may resent the program because it has been politically-con-
troversial and has occasionally cast the agency in an absurd light. In
addition, other program areas in the FWS work towards opposite goals. For
example, the Animal Damage Control (ADC) group ("gopher-chokers" according
to an OES biologist) poisoned prairie dogs (and killed black-footed ferrets
in the process) while at the same time the endangered species program was
trying to breed ferrets. Indeed, it appears that occasionally the FWS
goes overboard in controlling depredation. For example, a recent court
decision enjoined the FWS from trapping the threatened eastern timber wolf
except on lands adjacent to and within a quarter mile of privately-owned
16
lands on which significant depredation has occurred. The Fund for
Animals had taken FWS to court, claiming that the agency was overdoing its
damage control program. Since 1975, the killing of a domestic animal by
wolves was confirmed in 17 cases; in the same period, FWS had killed 151
wolves. The court reasoned that, "(o)bviously it did not take 151 wolves
to kill 17 cows, so one must conclude that some of these wolves ... were
not actively engaged in livestock depredation."1 7
The Regional Offices reflect the traditional orientation of the FWS.
Their primary activities focus on wildlife and fisheries management.
Endangered species is an extremely small item on their agenda. For example,
the New England Regional Office's (Region V) fiscal year 1977 budget was
almost $28 million. Less than 2 percent of this budget went to support
endangered species work, The regional staffs are by in large career people
with strong ties to the state game management agencies, Endangered species
expertise is fairly limted, One OES staff member described the relationship
between the endangered species staffs in the Washington and Regional Offices
as having "built-in tensions." They are directed by different individuals.
170
OES has Schreiner; the regions have their Regional Directors. The goals
set by these leaders may be very different. Hence the staffs may step to
different drummers. Indeed, the staff members interviewed in the Region V
headquarters were weaker in their defense of the ESA's absolute mandates
than were the biologists in the Washington Office: "There is no doubt that
if it comes down to a big project versus a little species, the project will
win ... We have to try to be reasonable about what information we request
... The Fish and Wildlife Service is a little agency. You have to realize
that the endangered species budget in the Regional Office is only $500,000
... One Corps project is bigger than the entire budget ... Fish and wildlife
is not a priority item."
The disparities between organizational goals, norms and traditions
becomes important because the FWS hierarchy plays a critical role in imple-
menting the ESA. It is the Director of the FWS, not the Chief of the OES,
that has administrative authority to act on behalf of endangered species.
Listings, critical habitat designations, and regulations flow from the OES
through the FWS. Beyond this formal role, the FWS hierarchy plays an impor-
tant function in building program constituency through public relations
efforts and in dealing with Congress. Several of the OES staffers felt
that the agency had let them down in responding to the media attacks pitting
the "insignificant" snail darter against the "valuable" Tellico dam. In
another example, even though the FWS was publicly against an amendment to
the Act in 1978, top management privately agreed to the review committee-
approach eventually adopted by Congress. It is of course natural for the
commitment to endangered species to weaken as you move up the administrative
hierarchy since the actors on the top suffer far-more from the effects of
political controversy than do lower level staff.
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Department of the Interior
Further away from the Office of Endangered Species, the missions and
priorities of agencies that play a formal role in the implementation of
the ESA are even more distant from the preservation goal. The FWS is a
component of the Department of the Interior. The buck stops on the Secre-
tary of the Interior's desk: In especially controversial cases, the
Secretary reviews and okays program activities. In the Tellico case, for
example, Secretary Andrus was actively involved in seeking resolution of
the controversy. The Department of the Interior's mission, however, is
natural resource development and exploitation. Its traditional constituencies
are mineral developers and livestock grazers, recreationists and farmers of
irrigated land. Vast land areas are managed and leased for commercial use.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), for example, controls over 450 million
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acres in the public domain -- 62 percent of the total federal land area.
The notion of preserving -- of setting aside chunks of the public
domain -- angers the Department of Interior's constituents and is alien to
the agency staffers. Environmentalists have claimed for years that agencies
like the BLM and the Bureau of Reclamation have worked against environmental
goals and are captured by development interests. Indeed, the CEQ complained
to the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conserva-
tion and the Environment that "some federal land management agencies,
particularly the Bureau of Land Management, have not made a sufficient effort
to regulate activities such as off-road vehicles that are detrimental to
critical habitat. ,,19
Department of Commerce -- National Marine Fisheries Service
Other conflicts between organizational goals appear as additional
federal agencies are brought into the picture. NMFS has the largest formal
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role in implementation outside of the Interior Department. As co-lead
agency with FWS, NMFS presumably would have at least the same commitment
to endangered species preservation; but the evidence indicates otherwise.
NMFS, located within the Commerce Department, is largely concerned with
the development of commercial fisheries. At one time, NMFS was called the
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries when it was located in the Interior Depart-
ment. The Commerce Department is obviously concerned primarily with
economic development.
In 1973, there was much controversy over the proposal to designate
both Commerce and Interior as lead departments for the ESA. Environmen-
talists were outraged:
"Many conservationists do not always trust Commerce, since one
of the department's chores is to promote fishing interests. It is
widely known, for example, that the department fought the placing
of several species of whales on the government protection list.
"Conservationists and Interior officials also say that giving
Commerce joint jurisdiction puts it in the conflicting position
of promoting the tuna fishing industry which, government sources
claim, is killing between 250,000 and 400,000 porpoises a year.
Porpoises are not on the endangered species list."2 0
The Fund for Animals claimed that NMFS had prepared reports showing that
one species of dolphin (porpoise) might be reduced 30 to 80 percent by the
tuna industry and that another species would probably not survive the
additional pressure. FFA claimed that NMFS would not list the species
because of pressures from the tuna industry.22
While some argued that Commerce should get a role in administering the
Act because NMFS had extant scientific expertise in marine fisheries, the
Draft Environmental Statement prepared for one of the pre-Act bills indi-
cates a different motive:
"Joint jurisdiction over enforcement of the proposed legislation
will provide a mitigating-measure in that the interest of commercial
fisheries and other areas within the jurisdiction of the Department
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of Commerce will be represented and protected. Regulation and
management of certain species by both Departments will result in
consideration for those commercial interests centered around the
taking of them."2 3
The director of the office in which the NMFS endangered species pro-
gram is carried out does not argue about the agency's orientation towards
commercial interests: "NMFS is primarily involved with commercial fish-
eries. The Endangered Species Act and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act of 1976 are very difficult for us to implement." In response, NMFS
has taken a research orientation to its endangered species program. It
tries to work around potential conflicts by finding a technical solution
prior to listing species. For example, it contracted to develop an excluder
net for shrimp trawlers so that sea turtles were not caught during commer-
cial fishing operations. NMFS believes even more strongly than FWS that
species should be managed, not preserved. '"We prefer to list species as
threatened rather than endangered because it allows for more management of
the species."
The conflict between the organizational goals of NMFS and FWS have
led to significant delays in implementation. OES staffers are more explicit:
"NMFS just sits on its ass and bitches." In NMFS' eyes, however, FWS is
overzealous. Indeed, NMFS staff claim that FWS' efforts to oversee all
endangered species activities is "empire building" at high levels. "We
should have full authority over marine species; they spend 99 percent of
their life in the sea. Besides, we have the marine research laboratories
and vessels."
The conflict between NMFS and FWS is most clearly seen in the sea
turtle case. Two species of-marine turtles were proposed for listing by
the Department of the Interior on December 26, 1973. In the news
release that accompanied the proposal, Interior stated that green turtle
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"stocks in the Caribbean, once believed to have numbered at least 50 mil-
lion, now are estimated at less than 10,000. Reproductive potential may
be destroyed in the near future if present harvest levels are maintained."2 5
But the enactment of the 1973 ESA rendered the proposal obsolete. The
turtles were not listed until July 1978,-- four and a half years later.2 6
The delay came primarily from a jurisdictional conflict between NMFS
and FWS which was an outgrowth of the conflict between their organizational
goals. NMFS favored exemptions from the taking prohibitions for commercial
mariculture and for incidental catch by commercial fishermen; FWS did not.
The Interior Department was petitioned in April 1974 to list the green
sea turtle as endangered and the loggerhead and the Pacific Ridley sea
27
turtles as threatened. NMFS and FWS signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) outlining their jurisdictional responsibilities under the Act in
August 1974, but left the allocation of responsibilities over marine tur-
tles unresolved.28 A joint FWS and NMFS proposal to list all three species
was published in May 1975. 9 The turtles then became mired in turf claimed
by both Commerce and Interior.
After the proposal was published in the'Federal Register, NMFS decided
to grant the petition of Sea Life Park of Hawaii to hold a public hearing
on the proposal, and decided that a draft environmental impact statement
(DEIS) should be prepared. Its decisionswere unilateral, violating the
1974 MOU that stated that all listing actions would be collaborative. Its
motives were unclear, but appear to be a conscious effort to delay the
final listing. NMFS had never before prepared a DEIS on a proposed listing.
Lynn Greenwalt, Director of the FWS, responded loudly:
"This letter is written to express-my strong opposition to your
proposed delay in listing three species of sea turtles as Threatened
in order to hold a public hearing requested by Sea Life Park ... and
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because you consider it necessary to prepare an environmental impact
statement on the listing.
"We cannot agree with delaying this listing action for the possible
benefit of a commercially-oriented organization which already has had
ample opportunity to submit its comments in writing ...
"We also oppose any delay for purposes of preparing an environmental
impact statement. The existing impact assessment is biologically
sound and covers the situation in adequate detail. It was jointly
prepared by professionals in both of our organizations and I feel
their product clearly supports a negative declaration."3 0
NMFS scheduled the hearing for December 3, 1975. Meanwhile, OES re-
quested the opinion of the Solicitor's Office as to what could be done in
case of violation of anMOU. The Assistant Solicitor replied that "(s)ince
the Memorandum of Understanding does not provide a procedure to be followed
in the case of violations, it must be assumed that any disagreements will
be escalated to a higher level within the Executive for resolution." 3 1
In November, NMFS postponed the hearing until February 25, 1976. In
December, it sent a draft of the DEIS to FWS. FWS commented that ninety
percent of the draft was copied from materials that had been prepared by
them earlier.32 NMFS' DEIS was made available to the public in February
1976. It stated two things clearly: economic impacts of the proposal were
very small ($35,000 direct impact; $85,402 indirect and induced impacts;
8.5 employees displaced); and the species were indeed threatened: "The
biological data for these three sea turtles indicate that they should be
listed under the provisions of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Any
failure to do so would be contrary to the intent of Congress. Also, lack
of action undoubtedly would lead to a continuing decline in numbers of
these sea turtles and their eventual extinction.
At the public hearing held in February 1976, the presiding officer
34
stated that final action would come around June 1, 1976.3 4 But two more
years of delay and interorganizational conflict remained. In the fall of
1976, draft regulations were approved by the FWS that would have given
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primary authority for the turtles to NMFS. But the Interior Department
vetoed the agreement.3 5 At the end of 1976, all three species were added
to the CITES Appendix I list.
After much debate and high-level involvement, an MOU was finally
agreed upon in July 1977.36 Jurisdiction over the sea turtles was given
to NMFS when they were in the water, and to FWS when they were on land.3 7
Even though the jurisdictional question was seemingly settled, important
issues over what degree'of protection the species should receive remained
to be resolved. The central issues were (i) should the species be listed
as threatened or endangered, and (ii) should exemptions be provided for
mariculture and incidental catch by trawlers. The Environmental Defense
Fund petitioned FWS and NMFS in February 1978 to list the species as
endangered.38 Endangered status would preclude any commercial exemptions.
Finally, agreement was reached to list the species as threatened with two
populations as endangered. Exemptions for commercial mariculture were not
allowed; but incidental catch by commercial fishermen was exempted. Thus,
four and a half years after the original proposed listing, and over a year
and a half after everyone agreed the species were in jeopardy, protection
was finally given.
'Federal Development Agencies
Delay and negotiation resulting from the juxtaposition of conflicting
organizational goals is seen throughout the interaction between FWS and
other federal agencies. The federal development agencies have one of the
largest roles to play in the implementation of the ESA. Since habitat
loss is a prime contributor to endangerment and since these agencies con-
tribute significantly to habitat -modification, their actions determine
(often in large measure) the fate of many species. Water resource projects
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are some of the most extreme sources of habitat change, changing whole
ecosystems. Yet these development agencies have very little incentive to
worry about endangered species. Their constituencies and Congressional
supporters favor the economic development and jobs that come with large-
scale federal projects. Congressmen can often stay elected by delivering
enough pork barrel dollars to their districts to satisfy their constituents.
By evolving measures of success that focus on getting project dollars,
the multi-objective mandates that have often been given to agencies get
overlooked and agencies pursue single purposes with a vengeance: TVA
becomes a dam-builder and an electric utility; the Army Corps of Engineers
becomes a dam-builder; the Forest Service, a lumber company; and the Depart-
ment of Transportation, a road-builder. Multiple-goals have been established
by federal law for these agencies. The Act that established the TVA,3 9
the Water Resources Planning Act, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act,41 and the Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act42 all lay out potentially
non-development objectives. But frankly, items like "enhancement of the
quality of the total environment" are hard to measure. Items like wildlife
preservation just don't seem to buy very much for the agencies, especially
considering their historic elements of constituent support.
The Tellico Dam controversy is a good example of wildlife preservation
taking a low priority in the face of conflicting agency mandates. The
snail darter was discovered in the Little Tennessee River in mid-1973,
several miles upstream from the partially-completed Tellico Project. TVA
officials responded by first denying that it was a species, then denying
that it only existed in the Little Tennessee. In mid-1975, TVA staff
began a transplant program to establish the species in the Hiwassee River.
Numerous consultation-meetings were held between the staffs of FWS and TVA,
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but their content was limited to discussions about the transplantation
program. The TVA leadership would not agree to consider alternatives other
than transplantation until May 1978 -- after its Board of Directors had
changed significantly. In TVA's mind, it was doing "everything humanly
possible to conserve the snail darter" by implementing the transplantation
44
program. In case the transplant program did not work, the TVA had financed
a study of the darter's life history "so that a record could be left of its
existence after the closing of the Tellico Dam ...
The evidence shows that TVA did pursue the transplantation program
with vigor; cooperation with the FWS was sincere. The agency would not
consider changing the project, however, because of its traditions as a
reservoir-builder and because of a conflict with other legislated mandates:
The leaders sincerely felt that the project was responsible and effective
in boosting economic development. This objective was supported by the fact
that the President continued to request and Congress continued to appropriate
money for Tellico construction after passage of the ESA and even after dis-
covery of the snail darter conflict. Over $20 million was appropriated in
fiscal year 1976, for example.4 6 In light of this overriding goal, the
snail darter did not seem very important. Nor did the Act's legal mandate
seem entirely clear since the Federal District Court said that TVA had ful-
filled the requirements of the law. The point is that evil intentions are
not necessarily at the heart of these controversies; rather they result from
conflicting organizational goals and notions of what is valuable, what is
rational, and what is appropriate.
Even those federal agencies that would he expected to have traditions
and goals that stress the preservation of endangered species sometimes turn
up with ther priorities. The Smithsonian Institution is probably the best
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example. Intuitively one would think that this scientific organization
would be an undying advocate of endangered species. Yet at the 1978 over-
sight hearings, Smithsonian officials complained about the implementation
of the ESA and wondered if FWS hadn't gone too far in the protection
business. The Smithsonian officials -- like most of the scientific com-
munity -- were upset about permit requirements for transporting and
possessing endangered species or portions thereof: "The question of permits
to take, transport, possess and even to engage in acceptable husbandry
practices involving endangered species require inordinate amounts of time
and effort to procure ... one wonders what the controls on already dead
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museum specimens actually accomplish." The Smithsonian's concerns were
greater than just the procedural issue, however:
"... many scientists question how far down the phylogenetic scale
the concept of endangered species should be taken. Few people
question the premise that the protection of many endangered or
threatened mammals, birds, reptiles, frogs, fishes, and plants
is a justifiable aim. There is, perhaps, justification for the
inclusion of some invertebrates. But there appears to be no
working philosophy that considers where Federal protection should
stop, where one reaches a point of diminishing ecological returns."
On the other hand, there have been a few cases where agencies that have
historically worked at ends opposed to the preservation of endangered species
sought to protect them in their planning process. The Army Corps of Engi-
neers' work to resolve the Dickey-Lincoln/Furbish lousewort conflict is a
good example. The Corps was ahead of the FWS in trying to get guidelines
set and work out ways around the conflict. It is certainly true that
interagency negotiation is helped immeasurably by the willingness of agencies
to cooperate at an early stage in their planning process. Avoiding early
49
polarization also seems helpful. It is not clear whether the Corps'
commitment was to endangered species or to simply try to get rid of a
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problem as fast as it could. It does not make that much difference to the
species, but it does point to the significance of the court's stringent
interpretation of Section 7 as an incentive to work out conflicts admin-
istratively.
Conflict between organizational goals is heightened by the fact that
organizations do not necessarily have just one dominant goal or even a
clear set of ranked priorities. The TVA in the past year is a good example.
For years, the TVA has been primarily a reservoir and waterways developer
and an electric utility. Aubrey "Red" Wagner, Chairman of the Board of
Directors, had opposed any modifications to the Tellico Project since con-
troversy broke out in the early 1970s. He adamantly refused to consider
any alternative conservation programs for the snail darter other than the
transplant program to the Hiwassee River. Yet, all of a sudden, when
David Freeman was appointed to the Board, the agency's position began to
change. For a while Wagner was saying that Tellico should be finished as
a reservoir project while Freeman was suggesting that the area might be
more valuable as a river and farmland.50 Congressman Dingell compared this
change in agency attitudes to the conversion of Saint Paul. Yet, while
this organizational schizophrenia persisted, it was hard for the FWS to
take any action to resolve the snail darter issue.
Non-Federal Groups
A range of organizations outside the federal bureaucracy also have a
role in implementation. The State wildlife agencies provide information,
petition for changes in species' status and enforce the provisions of the
Act. Over two-thirds of the states have some sort of endangered species
law or administrative regulation, although most of these simply reiterate
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the federal statute. Twenty-two states had signed cooperative agreements
with FWS by the end of 1978.52
The stateagencies, whose historic constituency is hunters and fisher-
men, are by and large game animal agencies. Their professional traditions
are those of conservation and -management of wildlife to produce a huntable
surplus. Most of their programs are financed principally from hunting and
fishing license fees. The' orientation towards game animals is pervasive.
The states were not given a larger role in the implementation of the
ESA because of the fear of their game animal-bias.53 Indeed, at the time
of the Act's passage, the Congressional Research Service compiled data
showing that 34 states still had bounty laws -- laws which either enabled
lower jurisdictions to pay hunters for killing specific animals or that
established state programs to do the same. Nineteen of the state agencies
were themselves empowered to pay bounties ranging from $100 per mountain
lion in Arizona to 3 per starling in Michigan.54 Some of these bounty
programs ran directly counter to the interest of endangered species. Wolf
bounties are the best example: Sixteen states offered or authorized bounties
on wolves. Other protected species were affected as well, however. For
example, Oklahoma offered bounties for prairie dogs (which affected the
black-footed ferrett, as described above).
The attitudes of state agencies towards preservation ranges from mild
support to outright hostility. Generally, if species are small, non-game,
and not in conflict with other interests, the states support them. The'
protection of game or predatory animals,, or those in conflict with other
interests usually finds few proponents at the state level.5 5 An extreme
view of the statest attitudes'is held by many environmental groups. For
example, in the 1973 hearings, Tom Garrett of the Friends of the Earth,
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stated that in Wyoming, "there is a bitter joke going around in the last
few years, that the state game and fish commission would continue to sell
hunting licenses to out-of-Staters after the last mule deer were gone from
the State."5 6
Nor is the scientific .cmmunity overwhelmingly preservationist. Their
goals of scientific research'-- experimentation and collection -- do not
necessarily coincide with protection efforts. Overutilization of species
for laboratory animals is a significant contributor to many species' decline.
For example, 26 primate species' were added to the list in 1976 in part due
to the threat from biomedical research.5 7 An additional species, the
squirrel monkey, had been proposed'earlier along with the 26, but opposition
and data from the biomedical establishment caused the Service to postpone
a final determination on the' species. No further action was ever taken.
The scientists hate the'permitting procedures. As the' Smithsonian
representative indicated above, it takes time and energy to comply with
the government regulations. Further, since the scientists are usually the
experts that are called on to make'.recommendations about the status of
species, their "technical judgments" can be affected by other motives. This
can work in several ways: Some scientists see the species they study as
very special and hence are over-protective. Indeed, addition to the list
makes some extra government funds available for research -- a significant
incentive since one of most university researchers' central goals is to
capture funds to carry on their research. On the other hand, the endangered
classification makes it difficult to obtain new research specimens. This
limitation can lead to misleading and potentially-harmful effects. For
example,' the' OES-malacologist noted that the contractor who'was determining
the status of the'Nashville crayfish felt that it was endangered, but
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recommended threatened status so that he would not have to get a permit to
collect it. At the extreme, scientific motives can be no better than those
of trophy hunters. Horror stories abound at the OES: There is one about
a species with only a few surviving individuals; a researcher went to cap-
ture and stuff them so as to have them in his collection.
Even environmental groups that advertise themselves as preservationists
sometimes have mixed motives. These groups sometimes sponsor trips in
search of the great whales or the mountain gorilla who would be much better
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off without any human contact. In addition, the species may suffer from a
backlash effect. The use of the ESA as a lever to stop the Tellico Project
is a good example. The groups that brought suit were interested in stopping
the project, not really in protecting the snail darter. Their single-minded
pursuit of their goal brought changes to the ESA that weakened it somewhat.
In the context of all of these conflicting organizational goals and
traditions, it is really quite amazing that preservation stands a chance.
There are no traditional incentives that encourage anyone to advocate species
preservation, since endangered plants and animals do not vote or buy things.
Leadership certainly affects organizational goal-setting. The change in
TVA's attitudes is proof. Yet inertia is difficult to overcome. Even in
well-integrated and controlled'organizations like the Forest Service and
FWS, it is very difficult to modify attitudes, norms and traditions that
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have been instilled for years.5
Scientific'and 'Breaucratic Conservatism
Beyond the conflict between goals, another force significantly colors
and molds the character of implementation: Most social institutions are
conservative. Conservatism is a philosophy'whose central goal is maintenance
of the status quo: Change is resisted. In the case of the ESA, conservatism
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comes in two forms -- scientific and bureaucratic. It has worked against
agressive implementation of the provisions of the Act. This is ironic
because preservationists are inherently conservative as well: In preserving
endangered species, the apparent status quo is maintained.
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Scientists seem to be professionally conservative. Part of this is
from a fear of being wrong in the face of professional rewards and norms
that punish erroneous judgments. Beyond this, the awareness of options and
uncertainty that comes with knowledge leads one to avoid making decisions
or firm statements simply because decisions that appear to the layman to be
black and white, are really quite gray. The experimental method extends
this: In pursuing hypotheses, there are always other experiments or
possibilities that "should" be examined. The "hypothesis trees" rarely end
in certainty.
Scientists also believe that they have a responsibility to avoid making
decisions that appear to be arbitrary, or based on personal values or other
non-scientific considerations. To guard against this perception, scientists
opt to try to reduce the uncertainty in their decisions. In practice this
means more information -- more data, more experiments, more research. In
House hearings, for example, Lynn Greewalt, Director of the FWS, commented
that, "(b)iologists never know enough to be utterly comfortable with things
they are asked to do."6 2 The result is that they wait -- for more results
and information. "Biologists always want more and more information," com-
mented one NWF biologist.
Scientific conservatism results in delay. In the ESA case, it has
resulted in increased jeopardy to a species. Take the Mississippi sandhill
crane case. The population of forty birds could easily have been destroyed
while the taxonomists worried about scientific procedures. In the 1960s,
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there was some question as to the appropriate taxonomic status of the crane.
A 1964 BSFW memo described the bird's status as follows:
"The resident sandhill cranes formerly occupying south Louisiana,
Mississippi and Alabama have not fared so well. Whether or not
these birds are the same race as those in Florida, they are certainly
endangered -- to the point of almost complete extirpation except
for the small colony in Mississippi presently estimated at between
10 and 25 pairs. If the Bureau has any desire at all to preserve
and restore the remnant colony of resident cranes in Jackson County,
Mississippi, consideration should be given to acquisition of land
in that area. Without acquisition of sufficient habitat, this
Mississippi colony cannot survive."63
In spite of this dire estimate, action to protect the population did
not come for almost a decade. After enactment of the 1969 Act which broadened
federal protection to include subspecies, the Atlanta Regional Office tried
to get the Washington Office to buy refuge land to protect the cranes. The
problem was that in order to use Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF)
monies to acquire habitat, the crane had to be on the endangered list. But
even though everyone agreed the population was a distinct subspecies, it
had not yet been appropriately classified according to taxonomic rules.
In response to pressures from the Regional Office, John Aldrich, the staff
specialist who was the expert on the cranes, wrote:
"I would like nothing better than to describe the Mississippi popu-
lation of sandhill cranes as a distinct subspecies which could then
be put on the Secretary's list since there is not doubt that it is
endangered. Unfortunately, however, adequate specimen material to
make this determination apparently does not exist ... Of course
there is a temptation to base a description on only the present
living captive birds. This would not be a safe procedure since
there is no assurance that these birds will be preserved later in
a condition which will demonstrate the diagnostic characteristics,
and it is quite doubtful that a diagnosis based on such material
would be acceptable by taxonomists."64
An "adequate specimen" did not appear for over a year. In November
1971, an adult crane died due to a leg injury. At about the same time, the
BSFW's Land Acquisition Advisory Committee corroborated the earlier decision
about use of the LWCF: It would hold off acquisition activities until the
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crane was placed on the list.
Another seven months went by. The Director of the Regional Office
wrote to Washington to express his frustration with the process:
"We are discouraged about the seemingly endless roadblocks that
continue to prevent positive action for saving these birds. While
we are going through the artificial mechanics of surmounting each
required hurdle, the remaining habitat which is essential to the
bird's survival is rapidly disappearing." 6 5
Indeed, the Regional Director's memo indicated that the Nature Conservancy,
a preservation-oriented environmental group, had indicated an interest in
helping to acquire land to preserve the crane's habitat. Since the Con-
servancy only acquires land as an interim measure, the Regional Director
had to pass up the offer since the BSFW could not make a commitment to buy
it in the future.
In a note to the files, Gene Ruhr of the Washington Office clung to
the need to follow established taxonomic procedure:
"Dr. Aldrich has long suspected that the Mississippi sandhill and
Florida sandhill are actually separate and distinct subspecies.
It remained for him to confirm and publish a description of the
Mississippi subspecies to make the classification an accomplished
fact. This winter he acquired an acceptable specimen of the Miss-
issippi bird from Patuxent's flock, and he has written that description.
It has not, however, yet appeared in print. As frustrating as it
may be to wait for publication of such taxonomic changes, we find
it an essential shield against excessive splitting based upon
the opinion of many a "fly-by-night" taxonomist. We accept any
description that has withstood the technical and editorial scrutiny
received during the scientific publication review process, but we
believe the evidence should also withstand the judgment of others
after it appears in print." 66
Aldrich finally published a formal description in August 1972.67
While this ended the taxonomic question, it still took nine months before
the subspecies was added to the endangered list.68
The effects of scientific conservatism are aggravated significantly
by bureaucratic conservatism. Many analysts have commented that bureaucracies
are inherently conservative -- that they act cautiously and attempt to
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preserve the status quo. Large organizations try to conserve energy by
defining narrow yet consistent rules and relationships. All organisms --
biological and bureaucratic -- seek stability as a goal. To attain it,
one wants to increase predictability and decrease the uncertainty associated
with everyday activities. Narrow niches and well-ordered relationships and
operating procedures do this. Large institutional networks become dependent
upon these procedures. It-makes sense: Without a "way of doing things,"
each decision becomes chaotic involving inordinate amounts of energy and
time.
Bureaucracies thus attempt to classify actions into what Simon calls
programmed decisions.69 These are routine, repetitive decisions with a high
degree of predictability of outcome. Non-programmed decisions constitute
the other end of the spectrum, being unique, heuristic, and low certainty
situations. Because non-programmed decisions threaten the established order,
agencies often shirk the responsibility of dealing with these types of pro-
blems and will attempt their resolution by allowing them to filter through
traditional mechanisms to handle programmed decisions. From the agency's
standpoint, this makes sense as well. It uses proven techniques that have
a history of working and that are understood: If you've always bought
Lincoln Continentals and have had "good luck with them," it's natural to
buy another one even though gas prices and insurance rates have doubled
since your last purchase. If you've always built dam projects, you continue
to build them even if contrary legislative mandates have been produced.
Keith Schxeiner tried very hard to huild a network of programmed
decision-rules to implement the ESA. In defending the amount of time this
took, Schreiner explains, "Cs)ure we've been going slow, but I'm trying to
avoid the hard confrontation until we've got some firm foundations built
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in law and precedent ... I'd rather avoid confrontation until I'm firmly
entrenched and it's harder to blow me out of the water."7 0 Schreiner's
comments show his fear of non-programmed decision-making. "You know, I
wouldn't like to lose a species, but I'd hate like hell to lose the whole
Engangered Species Act. And I'm worried sick about that right now."7 1
Non-programmed decisions are costly. Administrators lose control.
Worse, they require more attention from officials at higher levels of the
organization. Bureaucrats are rewarded for running programs quietly and
effectively. So we see Schreiner acting slowly and cautiously, making sure
listings are well-documented, trying to reduce uncertainty, trying to avoid
an attack on the program in which programmed decisions revert to non-
programmed status. "... every listing is favored by some people and dis-
favored by others. Those who do not like what you are doing are highly
likely to take you to court. Therefore it is absolutely essential that when
you list, delist, reclassify a species or habitat, that you do it according
to the letter of the law.7 What the letter of the law means, however,
is open to interpretation. In practice this means that you take the minimum
common denominator route, that is, whatever behavior will "satisfice" (in
Simon's terms). The critical habitat determination for the Mississippi
sandhill crane and the Houston toad, for example, were the minimum areas
that could be designated in spite of contrary scientific opinion. The
Solicitor's opinion on hybrids - not protected under the ESA -- is another
example.73
The fear of uncontrolled, non-programmed situations turns into a fear
of controversy. Jack Anderson described a telling incident in a 1975
Washington Post article:
"At a recent staff -meeting, Schreiner asked a biologist to name the
two categories of endangered species. The'man dutifully wrote down
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'threatened and endangered' -- the common listings. Schreiner
quickly corrected him. The two types, he said were 'controversial
and non-controversial.' The meaning was clear to those who attended
the meeting. Any listing of a specie 4 that might cause controversy
should be handled very, very slowly."
The desire to avoid controversy has had other effects beyond delay.
It has affected listing priorities. For example, one of the OES biologists
stated in an interview that, "we say that we will pick the species to be
considered first on the basis of highest degree of threat. In fact, we
have picked some because they were safe." The desire to avoid controversy
has also resulted in a tendency to separate the listing and critical habitat
designations of potentially-controversial species. This is quite effective
because it insulates the decisions from those who are potentially-aggrieved
by them. If you list a species without designating what area is critical
to it, no one knows whether he will be affected by the listing. Once a
species is on the list, it's hard to argue against a habitat designation
because it casts the critic in a bad light. After all, who can be against
protecting helpless creatures that must be in need of help since they are
on the endangered list.
The basic bureaucratic desire to avoid controversy was exhibited by
other actors in the ESA case. For example, in order to get an answer about
whether the Tellico Project was economically-justified or not, Congress kept
funding studies: The General Accounting Office (GAO) came back and said,
yes, it's possible that the project is uneconomical, and should be studied
further. The University of Tennessee Architecture Department came back and
said yes, there are alternatives to the project, but we don't know which is
best. Nobody wanted to state that the reservoir project was good or bad.
Both studies avoided cost-benefit analysis. Congressman Leggett was clearly
frustrated by this result. In the 1978 oversight hearings, he stated that,
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"(The GAO) did a study, but they did not do the number study, either,
because apparently the guidance we gave them again was not very clear. So
both-the university and General Accounting Office spent a lot of money,
but we don't have any information at all that would lead people to draw
reasonable conclusions as to the pluses and minuses of the various alter-
natives."7 5
The bureaucratic interest in avoiding controversial situations provides
a significant incentive to resolve problems and issues at a low level in
the administrative hierarchy. The higher an individual is in the hierarchy,
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the more time he spends on resolving non-programmed situations. Interest-
ingly, the desire to resolve decisions at low levels -- an outgrowth of
bureaucratic conservatism -- is the basic driving force that fosters reso-
lution of project-species conflicts. · Since conflicts that are forced into
non-programmed decision-making are increasingly uncontrolled and destabil-
izing, there is a tremendous incentive to work the conflicts out ahead of
time.
The conservative desire to avoid controversy also brings with it a
desire to avoid accountability. If an agency is not accountable for its
actions, it cannot be criticized. The desire to avoid accountability is
important because almost all actions anger someone. Hence, almost any
decision that an agency makes can become controversial. There are several
ways to avoid accountability; Don't make decisions. This is an effective
strategy that can be cloaked in excuses about inadequate information,
staff, funds, etc. Or, claim no discretion. 'We're just doing what the
law says." Sabatier and Mazmanian have pointed out what a potent tool clear
statutory obj ectives-are to both the proponents and opponents of implemen-
tation. 77 The "No discretion" argument is-very effective because it
JoC
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deflects criticism to the other actors.
When scientists are bureaucrats, they can use a third strategy to
avoid accountability and challenge: Make the decision on seemingly-technical
grounds. The FWS used this strategy repeatedly. Listings, critical habi-
tat designations, and Biological Opinions on agency projects were always
identified as solely technical decisions: "Non-biological factors are not
considered." 7 8 By claiming that decisions are entirely technically-based,
review becomes very difficult. The courts almost always defer to the
"experts' judgment."
The No Discretion and. Technical Decision strategies allow agencies to
play a special form of Bardach's game of "Not Our Problem," 79 FWS, for
example, designates critical habitat and adds something like the following
disclaimer:
"The designation of Critical Habitat does not have any direct impact
upon the environment. The designation of Critical Habitat, in and
of itself, prevents nothing, stops nothing, discourages nothing,
and controls nothing. It simply designates an area that is necessary
to the continued existence and possibly to the recovery of an endan-
gered or threatened species. It is a biological designation. Economic
and other factors cannot be considered because there is no way of
knowing what Federal actions may be contemplated in the area. These
activities are only curtailed, modified, or delayed when the activity
will materially reduce the value of the Critical Habitat to the
endangered or threatened species concerned."80
Thus, FWS is not responsible for what might happen as a result of the desig-
nation: It's not the agency's problem. In playing this game, the onus of
decision-making is placed on another agency. For example, after designating
critical habitat for the California condor in an area where phosphate is
mined, the FWS stated, "Under' Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of
1973, decisions about possible disruption of the Critical Habitat by mining
activities will be the responsibility of the Bureau of Land Management,
which issues mining permits.'81
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The influence of bureaucratic conservatism is quite pervasive and was
seen throughout the implementation of the ESA. In general, these forces
resist change; they cling to the status quo. The effects of conservatism
and of conflicts between organizational goals are extremely hard to over-
come. In the case of the ESA, an external pressure was usually necessary.
Bardach has identified the notion of a "fixer" as a necessary element to
achieve effective implementation.8 2 While Bardach applied the term to a
benevolent high official, other groups can take the responsibility for
"fixing" implementation, that is, influencing the bureaucracy to act in
accordance with the statutory goals. In this case, the "fixers" were
generally either advocates within the system or constituent support groups
from outside the formal process.
The Advocates Within
In general, for a species to get put on the protected list, it has to
have an advocate either inside the FWS or in an environmental or scientific
group. The staff biologists often play this role within the OES. There
is little doubt, for example, that the reason that so many southeastern
fish species are on the list is because the staff ichthyologist is an
expert on the area. The same is true with molluscs: The staff malacologist,
Marc Imlay, was extremely vocal and effective in getting numerous species
of snails and clams added to the list.
Advocacy inside is dangerous, however, because it favors change. It
runs counter to the stabilization goal of organizations. Thus, in many
ways, to advocate for a species from the inside forces staffers to examine
what they're willing to pay to pursue their interests. One of the staff
talked about the OES herpetologist: "Ken Dodd is only temporary, even
though he's done an excellent job. He thinks that maybe he has listed too
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many herps for his own survival at the agency." It is clear that main-
stream staffers are opposed to the advocacy role taken by some of the
scientists. An official at the Region V Office commented, for example,
that, "some people view themselves as advocates. This polarizes the
other agencies and is counterproductive."
The malacologist Imlay is the best example of an internal advocate
who seems to have paid a high price. From the enactment of the ESA to
April 1978, Marc Imlay was responsible for listing or preparing for listing
more species than any of the other seven biologists in OES, including one
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turtle, 24 mussels, 19 snails, and 12 shrimp and crayfish. He had also
proposed 35 more species out of the 400 mollusc species he had estimated
were endangered.
Imlay was extremely effective at converting internal advocacy into
external pressure. He had close ties to outside environmental groups. He
"leaked" information to newswriters. He undertook lobbying activities.
For example, without getting FWS clearance, he had a letter sent to
Congressman Wilmer Mizell (N.C.) which opposed a water resource project
on the New River in North Carolina and Virginia on the grounds that it
might endanger several fish and mollusc species. 4 His activities obviously
did not earn him much support in an agency like the FWS.
In October 1976, Imlay was told he was to be transferred to a research
laboratory in Columbia, Missouri to study the effects of pesticides on
fish. Hal O'Connor, a FWS official, claimed that a specialist like Imlay
was not needed to list the remaining species, and that his expertise was
needed in research. "Imlay said he was being transferred because the
Interior Department wants to list species very slowly, so as not to aggra-
vate Congress ' 8 5 The malacologist declined the transfer, beginning a
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year and a half of administrative proceedings to try to stay in Washington.
Environmental groups protested to the Interior Department: "This is not
the time to disrupt an orderly procedure by reassigning or dismissing the
key person intimately familiar with the listing process and with the species
being proposed." 6 Lew Regenstein of the Fund for Animals was more explicit:
"They are persecuting a conscientious biologist ... It's because of
politics -- he wants to list more species and now it probably won't get
done."8 7
Whatever the truth is about the FWS' motives, it is at least true that
Imlay as advocate clashed with Schreiner as program manager. It is also
true that Imlay as advocate was very effective at getting species protected
under the ESA. And it is true that he was finally transferred in April
1978.
EXTERNAL PRESSURES
Considering that there are such powerful centripetal forces inside the
black box of implementation and that the internal advocacy game is a dan-
gerous one, something must account for the fact that species did get listed.
In many cases, the reason is that there was an external pressure. Some-
body was able to shake the system and get an outcome to fall out. The
most consistently effective pressure was that brought by an outside support
group. In addition, pressures from the activities of other branches of
the federal government also significantly molded implementation of the ESA.
The Uneven Popularity of the Issue
In spite of the bureaucracy's attitude, endangered species preservation
is an extremely popular public issue. Indeed, how can anyone be against
protecting helpless plants and animals? Just like no one is in favor of
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pollution, no one is against protecting endangered species. Endangered
species is the quintessinal environmental issue. Everyone supports it.
It appeals to young and old, rich and poor. Pictures of endangered species
are marvelously popular symbols. We see them on beer cans, throwaway cups
from "7-11" convenience stores, television advertisements for automobiles,
and on company calendars and the like. (For example, the Norton Company --
a Worcester, Massachusetts abrasives manufacturer -- produced a 1978 calen-
dar with lovely pictures of endangered species printed above calendar months
headlined by its divisions, Grinding Wheel Division, Coated Abrasive
Division, Plastics and Synthetics Division, etc. The Company's 1979
calendar contains pictures of race cars.)
"Pardon me sir, should we move a stretch of the Interstate to
protect the sandhill cranes?"
"Certainly."
"How about an oil refinery, to protect the bald eagle?"
"Our national symbol. Of course"
"How about protecting the leopard?"
"Probably."
"The grizzly bear?"
"Hmmm... Maybe."
"The snail darter?"
"Well ... "
"The Cumberland monkeyface pearly mussel and the white warty-
back pearly mussel?"
"Now hold on a minute ..."
It is not entirely clear why animals are so popular. No doubt it
relates to primordal ties and attitudes, to our lack of understanding of
them, to our awe at the parallels between ourselves and them, and to
religious notions of stewardship and equally of domination and guilt. What
is clear is that these notions are quite deep and that they affect how we
react to specific animals. Throughout culture, there are strong metaphors
that influence our views on what are good and bad animals and therefore on
the values we assign to the: Wolves are evil. There's Peter and the Wolf,
and the story of Little Red Riding Hood. In slang terms, a wolf is a man
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who crudely chases after women, or -- according to Webster -- it is a
"crafty person" or a "fierce, rapacious, or destructive person." 8 8 To
wolf one's food is to devour it with greed and haste.
Bears, on the other hand, are generally good-natured and clumsy like
Yogi, Smokey, Winnie the Pooh, and Teddy. Clammy hands are cold and wet
and not very desirable. A snake is a "worthless or treacherous fellow" --
not someone you would want as your friend or business partner. A weasel
is a sneaky individual. A bird-brain is not a very bright person. Mustangs,
pintos, and impalas are symbols of speed and grace, and they are automobiles
as well. While a rabbit is now on the market, the toad has not come out
yet.
Generally we assign anthropomorphic characteristics to animals in
direct relation to their height in the evolutionary order. In cartoons,
for example, mammals usually receive talking-parts, birds occasionally.
Fish never talk -- perhaps because they're usually under water. We've
been told that frogs turn into princes if you kiss them. (Make sure it's
not a toad or you'll get warts.) But this is a metaphor for the triumph
of human beauty over animal ugliness. Snakes are almost never given parts.
An exception is in the Garden of Eden story, but that wasn't a good role.
Value is implicitly assigned to species based on these social meta-
phors, their evolutionary closeness, their utility as products, their
aesthetic appeal, and the degree of threat they present to humans. Grizzly
bears are not as well-liked as black bears, for example. Wolves are feared
universally. These attitudes and values can even be seen in the scientific
names of species. The grizzly is Ursus arctos horribilis. The gray wolf
is Canis lupus monstrabilis. These implicit notions of value are important
because they contribute to the formation of support and opposition groups.
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Constituent support is one of the most effective initiators of external
pressure to force the bureaucracy into action.
Constituency
According to the National Wildlife Federation's 1977 Conservation
Directory, there were 103 non-governmental environmental organizations with
wildlife and fisheries as a central focus.8 9 This count does not include
groups like the Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund that are
regularly involved in wildlife controversies, nor does it include botanical
groups or garden clubs. The actual number of plant and wildlife interest
groups is probably at least several times the 103 figure. These include
groups such as the American Cetacean Society, the American Society of Ich-
thyologists and Herpetologists, the Elsa Wild Animal Appeal, the Inter-
national Atlantic Salmon Foundation, the Ruffled Grouse Society of North
America, the Trumpeter Swan Society, and Wild Horse Organized Assistance,
Inc. (WHOA, of course).
There is really an enormous network of environmental groups in the
U.S. Their interests range from animal rights to endangered species pre-
servation to management for hunting. There are groups that worry about
individual species (for example, the Society of Tympanuchus Cupido Pinnatus
Ltd. -- the prairie chicken) and organizations that have broader viewpoints
(the Wildlife Society). There are large groups (National Wildlife Feder-
ation -- 3,500,000 members) and small groups (the Trumpeter Swan Society --
102 members).
These groups play a similar role as Bardach's fixer: They petition;
they provide data; they educate; they lobby; they threaten legal action.
Their actions account for many of the listings that were finally made.
Marc Imlay, for example, estimates that at least 50 percent of all post-1973
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listings resulted from the presence of a visible constituency. Thomas
Allen, author of a National Geographic book, Vanishing Wildlife of North
America, pointed to the critical role that constituent support groups play.
In describing preservation activities for the manatee, a large southeastern
sea mammal (also called the sea cow), Allen writes, "(t)he manatees, mean-
while are going off the earth for the same reason that television shows go
off the air: no sponsor. Unsponsored species can, of course, hope for
the next season. There cannot be a hope for a rerun, though, if a species
is canceled for lack of interest ... (L)ike many other imperiled species,
the manatee lacks an organized band of supporters to sound the cry -- and
plead for the money. Save the Whale! can summon a crusade. Save the
manatee! summons a question: What's a manatee?" In Allen's eyes, "Who
decides an animal's fate? Letter writers and lobbyists, hunters, tourists,
lawmakers, voters.'90
Environmental groups played the fixer role repeatedly throughout the
implementation of the ESA. In the sea turtles case, for example, the Envir-
onmental Defense Fund (EDF) lobbied, amassed scientific depositions, and
eventually threatened a lawsuit in order to pressure the FWS and NMFS to
add the species to the list. Similarly, the National Wildlife Federation
(NWF) proposed draft regulations for the implementation of Section 7 and
threatened to sue if regulations were not issued. NWF also went to court
to stop Interstate 10 construction to protect the Mississippi sandhill
crane, and played a similar role in the Grayrocks Dam-whooping cranes
controversy. In another case, the Fund for Animals (FFA) and the World
Wildlife Fund successfully pushed for the listing of over twenty primate
species in 1976.
The FFA's activities on behalf of species listed in Appendix I of the
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International Convention are illustrative. The organization petitioned
91
the FWS to list the 175 animals contained in the Appendix. In May 1975,
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it threatened legal action if the species were not listed within two months.
Interior responded in September 1975 by proposing to list as endangered all
of the species contained in the Appendix that had not been previously
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listed. After several months went by without final action by FWS, the
FFA again threatened a lawsuit. Most of the species were finally listed
in mid-June 1976.
The mere existence of a constituency group does not mean that a species
will receive protection. The group has to be able to mobilize resources
to place pressure on the system in some way. Many organizations petition
the FWS to take action. However, many petitions do not go anywhere.9 6
The most effective groups are the largest, the most established, and the
wealthiest in terms of scientific and legal resources. Hence we see NWF,
EDF and FFA involved in a lot of these controversies. The citizens' suit
provision of the Act provides a significant pressure point on the system.
Any group with legal resources has the opportunity to effectively threaten
the FWS. The implementation experience shows this to be a significant
force.
When groups lack the resources to effect political pressure, they some-
times band together into coalitions that in aggregate play the fixer role.
For example, a collection of environmental groups banded together to oppose
the Tellico Project. Monitor, Inc. is a consortium of wildlife interest
groups. Over thirty groups belong to the consortium. The groups meet
weekly to plot strategy and to combine ideas. The fairly-successful "Save
the Whales" campaign was organized by Monitor. They pick large, symbolic
animals to champion. Their 1977/1978 target was the African elephant. The
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Interior Department listed the elephant in May 1978.
Coalitions of support groups can be extremely effective as pressures
on the system. Indeed, the strength of the 1973 Act was probably due to
the strong coalition of environmental groups that had lobbied for its
passage. It has been suggested that one of the reasons that the ESA was
finally amended in 1978 is that the coalition broke apart. Up through the
Spring of 1978, environmentalists were unified and adamant in their oppo-
sition to amendments. But in the summer, the unified front fell apart,
with major groups like the NWF reluctantly supporting an amendment. For
example, in May 1978, the NWF commented that "Sen. Culver introduced his
amendment in the belief that it was necessary to forestall attempts by
others in Congress to pass legislation of disastrous consequences to the
Act. The National Wildlife Federation hopes that Sen. Culver is wrong
about the mood of Congress and that the members will reaffirm their com-
mitment to the Endangered Species Act which they passed with overwhelming
support in 1973."97 But two and a half months later, the organization
changed its position: "It is only with great reluctance that the National
Wildlife Federation is recommending that the subcommittee support an amend-
ment to the Act. Yet, we have concluded that the time has come to offer
constructive suggestions to the Congress on how we believe this difficult
and perplexing issues can best be solved."9 8 Other groups such as the FFA
continued to oppose any amendments. Obviously there was a difference of
opinion over the probabilities of passage of some kind of amendments and
over tactics. Regardless, the example points to the significance of massing
resources via coalition in trying to "fix" the outcome of implementation.
Generally when an effective constituent group exists to lobby for a
species, designations are speeded up. Several of the OES experts conceded
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for example that the package containing the Appendix I species was speeded-
up by the threat of lawsuit. It is, of course, impossible to determine
whether championed species would ever be listed without the pressure.
Beyond speeding-up the process, the influence of the groups may also result
in a higher degree of protection for a species than otherwise would have
been provided. Or, it may legitimize the role of internal advocates.
Basically, if no one knows what's right, you do what the loudest group
wants. In many cases in the implementation of the ESA, the environmental
groups either out-shouted other interests or were unopposed in their cam-
paigns.
Conflicting Interests
But what happens when there are a significant number of groups shouting
back from the other side of the fence? Interests that argue against formal
action function as "negative constituency." These groups usually have
economic interests at stake, and will be constrained by the listing action.
Hunting, livestock interests, furriers, whale oil merchants and others who
deal in commercial products made from plants and animals often stand a good
deal to lose or at least perceive that they do. These conflicting interests
use the bureaucracy's fear of acting in a controversial situation to delay
or stop the process.
The pressures of conflicting interests certainly delayed the designation
of critical habitat for the eastern timber wolf. Habitat has never been
designated for the grizzly in large part because of the existence of groups
interested in sport hunting and in-controlling alleged depredation of live-
stock. It was shown above that the sea turtle listing was delayed for a
number of years because of mariculture and commercial trawling interests.
Environmental groups allege that the action to protect the African elephant
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was delayed because of commercial interests in ivory and trophies.
Pressures can be subtle. For example, David Wolff, a Houston developer,
was concerned about the critical habitat designation for the Houston toad.
He wrote the White House repeatedly. The White House staff responded by
pressuring the Interior Department. Ken Dodd, the OES staffer in charge
of the toad, received phone calls from Senator Proxmire's office inquiring
as to the status of the designation. In Dodd's telephone record, he wrote,
"I smell a Wolff here."9 9
The threat of lawsuit is still the strongest weapon. For example,
Safari Club International -- a trophy hunting interest group -- filed suit
in April 1978 alleging that the FWS had illegally listed several large game
animals including the lechwe (an African antelope) and the leopard.1 0 0 The
FWS responded by publishing a Notice to review the status of the two species
in May 1978.
"Anti-preservation" interests can occasionally use the media to advance
their cause, but are usually less effective than are proponents of preser-
vation. This relates back to the popularity of the issue, and the difficulty
in casting a petition for delisting, for example, in a positive light. The
exception is when a conflict can be portrayed as absurd: Tellico versus the
snail darter, Dickey-Lincoln versus the Furbish lousewort. These cases
use the juxtaposition of an insignificant and less-popular species versus
large development projects. The media applauded when an oil refinery was
turned away from the northeast coast of Maine to protect bald eagle nests,
but turned to accounts of toad condominiums1 0 2 and the "Tellico Outdoor
Movie Theater' 0 3 when faced with less popular species.
Intermediaries
A third kind of external pressure group has occasionally acted to
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influence implementation. These are the intermediaries -- the mediators
between support and opposition groups. Intermediaries try to find common
ground between positions and help the parties negotiate an acceptable
solution. This role is most effective in attempting to break deadlocks in
interagency consultation conflicts and is being used in greater frequency.
The National Wildlife Federation has played this third-party role in sev-
eral cases, notably the Forest Service-Bachman's warbler case cited above.
NWF can play this role because it has a broad membership that includes
both preservationists and hunters. Most of the other environmental groups
have too limited a constituency to play the intermediary role, so they have
to stick to adversary politics. The type of conflict and the prior polar-
ization of the interests -- among other factors - influences the effective-
ness of the third-party contribution. A budding literature on environmental
mediation deals with these issues at length.10 4
Other Governmental Influences
There has also been direct and indirect pressures placed on the admin-
istrative bureaucracy due to the activities of the judiciary and Congress.
Judicial interpretation of the ESA in the Tellico Dam and Interstate 10
cases had a significant impact on implementation. For example, stringent
interpretation by the courts resulted in three major changes in the final
regulations for interagency consultation:1 0 5 Whereas consultation was dis-
cretionary on the part of the development agency in the guidelines and
proposed regulations, the final regulations were changed to make consulta-
tion mandatory. In addition, the regulations were changed to include
projects that had been under construction prior to December 1973. This
was in part due to the endangered species cases, and also to precedent set
in NEPA-related cases. Finally, the changed regulations mandated a show of
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good-faith consultation by not allowing project agencies to make irretriev-
able commitments of resources while negotiations were on-going.
Considering the time line of implementation (Appendix I), there is
possibly a small perceivable influence on overall actions due to the Inter-
state 10 appellate decision (which produced the first injunction issued
under the Act). In the three months preceding the decision, only six
actions were taken. In the three months after the decision, 2,026 actions
were taken. It is of course difficult to make firm conclusions about what
was going on. But it is true that for the five months preceding the court's
decision, no listing actions were taken -- the biggest gap in the program's
history since the early days of implementation (1974). A possible hypothesis
to explain the gap is that the agency was waiting to see how the case would
come out.
The concept of critical habitat probably would not have been defined
when it was if there had not been the pressure of upcoming judicial proceed-
ings. The Mississippi sandhill crane case was on-going at the time. The
FWS had to commit itself to a definition of critical habitat so that it
could publish a designation for the crane. It did so in September 1975 in
106
the first proposed critical habitat to be published. The first critical
habitat that was finalized was that for the snail darter, made under pressure
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from the Tellico Dam litigation.
Legislative pressures also influenced the implementation history.
There were numerous allegations, for example, that the rate of listings
was dependent on when oversight hearings were to be held:
"This reminds me of a G.I. inspection," drawled Sen. Wendell
Ford (D-Ky.) as he conducted a recent hearing to review progress
by the Department of Interior's sluggish endangered species
program. "It seems whenever an oversight hearing occurs, regu-
lations start popping out of the departments right and left."
205
"Such has been the case once more, this time prior to Ford's
latest Senate Commerce subcommittee hearing: The endangered
species office, during the last two weeks in April, proposed
63 species for listing on the official endangered and threatened
species list after, for some of the animals, three-year-long
delays...
"Bursts of activity immediately before endangered species over-
sight hearings are starting to form a recognizable pattern. Before
hearings were announced by Rep. Robert L. Leggett (D-Calif.) last
fall, only 11 species had been placed on the endangered or threatened
lists in more than two years. Between the announcement and the
hearing itself, the endangered species office proposed almost
400 species for listing.
"This time, a week before the Senate subcommittee hearing,
which was held May 6, that office proposed 32 U.S. snails for
inclusion on the endangered or threatened lists, and officially
listed two swallowtail butterflies, the gray bat and the Mexican
wolf. A week before that, the office proposed inclusion of 27
primate species (under study for more than two years) including.
the chimpanzee, the squirrel monkey and the stumptail macaque,"10 8
It is difficult to isolate the effect of legislative pressures on the
program. The implementation time line does show a general correlation
between the existence of oversight hearings and the publication of listing
actions, especially in 1975 and 1976. One OES staff member corroborated
this, conceding that "maybe we pushed up some of the listings because
hearings were going to be held."
It is probably true that the amendment-oriented activity had a retard-
ing effect on the program. Part of this was simply from the diversion of
staff from implementation activities to deal with Congressional inquiries.
It is also true that the change in rules that resulted from the 1978
Amendments had a delaying effect. For example, FWS was considering deleting
all pending proposed critical habitats (over sixty of them) and reproposing
them to be sure that they comply with the new rules.10 9
In summary: This chapter has examined the internal characteristics
of bureaucracies and the external pressures that influence implementation.
Not only is prohibitive policy implemented non-prohibitively, but a host of
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variables other than the statute significantly mold and influence the
character of implementation. Internal forces such as conflicting organi-
zational goals and bureaucratic and scientific conservatism generally resist
change and slow implementation. Pressures are placed on the administrative
network to modify the products and rate of implementation. These pressures
commonly come from internal advocates, interest groups, and judicial and
legislative sources. The dynamic interaction between these external pres-
sures and internal characteristics in large measure determines the outcome
of implementation regardless of the fact that it was presumably clearly
specified by a prohibitive statute.
207
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
1. See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1976, p18-19,
29, 38; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Environment and Public
Works, 1978a, p35.
2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1976, p18-19.
3. Ibid., p38.
4. Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973, p102-110.
5. For example, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was split into the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development
Administration to separate development of atomic energy from its regu-
lation. The staffs of the two agencies were drawn almost entirely
from the parent agency.
6. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration might have been an
example of this. Its effectiveness at completing its early missions
may have been due in part to the "newness" of the organization.
7. For a lengthier discussion of this point, see Lipsky, 1978.
8. See accounts at U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Environment and
Public Works, 1978, p328; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 1978b, p882,1183.
9. See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1976, p13, 60.
10. Actually its component parts were established in the late 1800s:
The Bureau of Fisheries was created in 1871; the Bureau of Biological
Survey was established in 1885.
11. In this sense, there are strong parallels with Kaufman's classic study
of the U.S. Forest Service. See Kaufman, 1960.
12. See Pinchot's discussion of the conservation concept at "Gifford Pinchot
on Naming the Movement, 1907", in Smith, 1971, p19-23.
13. See, e.g., Congressman Dingell's comments at U.S. Congress, House,
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 1973, p348.
14. 7 'Ecology USA (11):86, May 22, 1978.
15. The poisoning was banned by Executive Order 11643, 37 Federal Register
2875, February 9, 1972.
16. 9 Environment Reporter 922, September 15, 1978.
17. Ibid.
208
18. U.S. Public Land Law Review Commission, 1970, p156-175.
19. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
1978b, p1152.
20. Washington Star, 'February 24, 1972.
21. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1976, p98.
22. It is not absolutely clear why Commerce received the joint role in the
implementation of the ESA. One reporter claimed that Commerce Secre-
tary Maurice Stans had the White House pressure Interior Secretary
Rogers Morton into accepting the Commerce role after learning that
Interior had drafted a strong bill. This account claimed that a White
House aide told Morton that he could either accept Commerce as a partner
in the program or he would lose the White House's support for other
pending environmental proposals. (Washington Star, February 24, 1972)
23. U.S. Department of the Interior, 1972, p15.
24. 38 Federal Register (248):35485, December 28, 1973.
25. "Green and Loggerhead Turtles Proposed for Foreign Endangered Species
List", Department of the Interior News Release, January 4, 1974.
26. 43 Federal Register (146):32800, July 28, 1978.
27. Letter from F. Wayne King, New York Zoological Society, to Rogers
Morton, Secretary of the Interior, April 23, 1974.
28. "Regarding Jurisdictional Responsibilities and Listing Procedures Under
the Endangered Species Act of 1973", signed by Lynn Greenwalt, FWS, and
Robert Schoning, NMFS, August 24, 1974.
29. 40 Federal Register 21974, May 20, 1975.
30. Letter from Lynn Greenwalt, Director, FWS, to Robert Schoning, Director,
NMFS, August 18, 1975.
31. Memo from Ronald E. Lambertson, Assistant Solicitor, to Associate Direc-
tor for Federal Assistance, FWS, "The Unilateral Actions of the NMFS
Concerning the Proposed Listing of Certain Sea Turtles", October 24, 1975.
32. Memo from Chief, Office of Endangered Species, to Associate Director for
Federal Assistance, FWS, "NMFS Draft Environmental Impact Statement on
Sea Turtle Listing", December 30, 1975.
33. U.S. Department of Commerce, 1976, p82.
34. The statement was made by Paul Kiefer, an attorney for the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington office, as trans-
cribed in "Sea Turtle Hearing Minutes", unpublished, February 25, 1976.
209
35. Lipskep M., 1977, p228..
36. "Memorandum of Understanding Defining the Roles' of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the'National Marine Fisheries Service in Joint
Administration of the Endangered Species'Act of 1973 as to Marine
Turtles'!, signed by Lynn Greenwalt, FWS, and Robert Schoning, NMFS,
July 18, 1977.
37. In the 1977 oversight hearings, Senator Culver asked NMFS Deputy Director
Gehringer what happens if theyfound a turtle that flew. Culver pro-
posed that jurisdiction for NASA._ (U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Environment and Public Works, 1977b, p66)
38. Letter from Michael Bean, EDF, to Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce,
and Cecil Andrus, -Secretary of the Interior, February 28, 1978;
Also see EDF' Letter, May/June 1978, p3.
39. Tennessee Valley 'Authrity Act, 16 U.S.C. 831,' 48 Stat. 58, May 18, 1933.
40. 42 U.S.C. 1962-1962a-3, 79 Stat. 244, July 22, 1965.
41. 16 U.S.C. 661-667e, 48 Stat. 401, March 10, 1934, as amended.
42. 16 U.S.C. 528-531, 74 Stat. 215, June 12, 1960.
43. Letter from Lynn Seeber, General Manager, TVA to Director, FWS, August 15,
1975.
44. Letter from Lynn Seeber, General Manager, TVA, to Phillip Morgan, Acting
Regional Director, FWS, May 13, 1976.
45. Letter from Lynn Seeber, General Manager, TVA, to Nathaniel Reed, Assis-
tant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Department of the Interior,
March 12, 1975.
46. Letter from Lynn Seeber, General Manager, TVA, to Director, FWS,
August 15, 1975, p9.
47. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, 1978a, p38.
48. Ibid.
49. This was one of the major differences between the Dickey-Lincoln and
Tellico cases; The ACOE's willingness to discuss the Furbish lousewort
issue prior to committing itself to a formal position aided the develop-
ment of a compromise; TVA, on the other hand, started out in a polarized
position against any compromise other than transplanting the snail darter
to a different river.
50. See, e.g., Washington Post, April 7, 1978.
51. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 1978b,
p865.
210
52. 4 Endangered Species'Technical Bulletin (1);12, January 1979.
53. See, e.g., Assistant Secretary of the Interior Nathaniel Reed's
comments at U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1972, p72.
54. Ibid., p275-283.
55. States have little incentive to protect endangered species because of
the "public goods" nature of the problem: Protective action is costly.
Yet if other states do not act in a similar manner, the protection is
not effective. Besides, there is little incentive for individual action
because the other states cannot be excluded from benefitting from
the protective action.
56. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
1973, p303.
57. 41 Federal Register (203):45990, October 19, 1976.
58. "Environmentalists are also concerned that the whales may be loved to
death. The Mexican Government, citing noise and interference in whale
behavior, is threatening to close all lagoons, including San Ignacio,
to sightseers. And the human influence on whales has prompted the
U.S. Marine Mammal Commission to study whether some of the giant
mammals are ignoring their own reproductive activity -- in favor of
watching the people who are there watching them." (93 Newsweek (19):41,
May 7, 1979)
59. See, e.g., the Forest Service's memo to staff stating that they have to
do better at considering wildlife management in their line activities.
(Reprinted at U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 1978a, p433)
60. Preservationists favor protecting the existing set of species regardless
of whether some would become extinct on their own. Since the status
quo includes current trends, preservationists actually exhibit
"reactionary" behavior, not just conservatism.
61. Note that their tendency to be conservative is in terms of making absolute
conclusions that might be challenged later on. If they were truly con-
servative or risk-averse in regarding the substance of their decisions,
they would be overprotective towards endangered species.
62. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
1978b, p872.
63. Memo from J. Findlay, Acting Regional Director, to Director, BSFW,
"Florida Sandhill Crane Population Estimate", December 1, 1964.
64. Memo from Dr. John Aldrich, National Museum, Washington, to Regional
Director, Atlanta, "Mississippi Sandhill Crane", July 8, 1970.
211
65. Memo from Acting Regional Director, Atlanta, to Director, BSFW, "Endan-
gered Species - Mississippi Sandhill Crane", June 2, 1970.
66. Ruhr, C.E., "Getting a subspecies on the endangered species list",
June 13, 1972, unpublished file note.
67. Aldrich, J., "A New Subspecies of Sandhill- Crane for Mississippi,"
85 Proceedings, Biological Society of Washington (5):63-70,
August 30, 1972.
68. 38 Federal Register 14678, June 4, 1973.
69. Simon, 1960.
70. 108 Science News (6):94, August 9, 1975.
71. Ibid.
72. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 1976, p2 2.
73. 3 Endangered Species Technical Bulletin (8):5, August 1978.
74. Washington Post, March 15, 1975.
75. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
1978a, p543.
76. In her study of political executives, Weinberg found, for example,
that Massachusetts Governor Francis Sargent spent much of his time in
crisis-resolution. (Weinberg, 1977)
77. Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1977, p10.
78. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
1978b, p1061.
79. Bardach, 1977, p159.
80. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
1978b, p1155.
81. 1 Endangered Species Technical Bulletin (4):3, October 1976.
82. Bardach, 1977, p2 6 8.
83. Washington Post, April 8, 1978.
84. Indeed, he had a legislative assistant in Mizell's office request the
letter to start with! (Letter from John Paradiso, Chief, Branch of
Biological Support, OES, to Congressman Wilmer Mizell, July 30, 1974)
85. Washington Post, April 8, 1978.
212
86. Reprinted at 52 Defenders (4):268, August 1977.
87. Washington Post, April 8, 1978.
88. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1967 edition, p1027.
89. The NWF Director lists 342 nongovernmental environmental organizations
that emphasize various elements of the environment. (NWF, 1977, p v-viii)
90. Allen, 1974, p151, 154.
91. 40 Federal'Register (188):44329, September 26, 1975.
92. Washington Post, May 28, 1975.
93. 40 Federal Register (188):44329, September 26, 1975.
94. Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 1976.
95. 41 Federal Register (115):24062, June 14, 1976.
96. See Chapter 4, text accompanying note 2.
97. NWF Conservation Report (15):253, May 19, 1978.
98. NWF Conservation Report (24):348, August 11, 1978.
99. Note to the files from Ken Dodd, March 1, 1978.
100. Complaint, SCI v. Andrus, U.S. District Court, Southern District of
Mississippi, Civil Action #J78-0146(c), April 14, 1978.
101. 43 Federal Register (84):18583, May 1, 1978.
102. Houston Chronicle, June 22, 1977.
103. 18 Environment (8):i, October 1976.
104. See, e.g., Cormick and Patton, 1977; Rivkin, 1977.
105. 43 Federal Register (2):871, January 4, 1978.
106. 40 Federal Register (171):40521, September 3, 1975.
107. 40 Federal Register (197):47505, October 9, 1975.
108. 109 Science News (20):308, May 15, 1976.
109. 3 Endangered Species Technical Bulletin (2):7, November 1978.
213
CHAPTER 8 -- THE IMPACT AND USES OF PROHIBITIVE POLICY
This thesis has examined one case of the use of prohibitive policy
-- a kind of government regulation that has been used increasingly in
recent years. Prohibitive policies regulate behavior by specifying
absolute restrictions. They do not allow regulatees to make choices
legally: Thou shalt not commit murder; critical habitat cannot be
adversely modified. A second form of prohibitive policy restricts
behavior by allowing only one kind of action: Automobiles must have
seat belts; federally-funded transit programs must have access for handi-
capped persons. A third kind of prohibitive policy prohibits action by
specifying a boundary such as a standard: Ozone emissions cannot exceed
0.12 parts per million; all municipal sewage treatment plants must provide
at least secondary-level treatment.
Both proponents and critics of prohibitive policy make a number of
implicit assumptions about the impact of prohibitive mandates on imple-
mentation: (1) prohibitive policy defines a decision-making process based
solely on technical criteria; (2) these technical criteria serve as a
basis for making binary yes-no decisions (a species is or is not endangered;
a driver is or is not driving recklessly); (3) since technical criteria
exist, agency discretion is limited; (4) the balancing of costs and
benefits of individual actions is not permitted; and (5) outside interests
are excluded from participating in implementation. Proponents translate
these assumptions into an expectation that implementation will proceed
rapidly, Critics conclude that prohibitive policy is bad because it is
inflexible.
But the experience of implementation indicates that these assumptions
are not correct. The ability to make technical decisions is limited by
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significant resource constraints and an enormous amount of scientific un-
certainty. Since technical decisions cannot be made technically, adminis-
trative discretion is evident throughout implementation, providing an
opportunity for administrators to include nontechnical considerations in
their decisions. The political and bureaucratic context of implementation
encourages administrators to include outside interests in decision-making;
balancing takes place. Indeed, the nonstatutory forces of conflicting
organizational goals and traditions, bureaucratic and scientific conser-
vatism, resource scarcity, and pressures from advocates, interest groups,
the judiciary, and the Congress appear to mold the character of implemen-
tation more than the statute. It is likely that the outcome will be
significantly modified by implementation regardless of how much statute-
building takes place initially.1
While this analysis has focused on the case of the Endangered Species
Act, the findings are corroborated by other cases. For example, the
Food and Drug Act's Delaney Clause bans any food additive that is proven
to be carcinogenic. Cyclamates (artificial sweeteners), however, were
not banned for almost twenty years after evidence of their carcinogenic
properties was developed. In a similar case, several recent scientific
studies indicated that saccharin may cause cancer in rats at high dosages.
Yet the artificial sweetener is still used in food products. The
saccharin case exhibits the technical uncertainty problems seen in the
implementation of the ESA, and illustrates how balancing of other
interests takes place regardless of the prohibitive mandate: The Food
and Drug Administration allows companies to use saccharin in their
food products as long as they print a warning on the package.
In other areas of prohibitive policy, it can be seen that their
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prohibitive mandates were not achieved. Auto emissions standards were
relaxed repeatedly. Water quality deadlines were not met. Only 33.1
percent of all publicly-owned'treatment plants met the 1977 deadline
prescribed in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Police rarely
stop motorists driving five miles over the' speed limit. Not all individ-
uals who break the law are prosecuted. Indeed, some criminal activity
is overlooked or encouraged so that police can use the "lawbreakers" as
informers. Non-absolute enforcement of prohibitive policy appears to be
the norm, not the exception.
If prohibitive policy is not implemented prohibitively, why use it?
Should it be used in the future? The answer to these questions depends
on who you are and what objective you have in mind. Even though imple-
mentation is not absolute, a prohibitive mandate can be valuable as a
means of influencing bureaucratic behavior, as a political statement, and
as a way to alter the balance of power in the political arena. Indeed,
prohibitive policy works in many cases not for the reason assumed by
many critics and supporters (that it is absolute and inflexible) but
rather due to its strategic impact in influencing the bargaining and
negotiation that characterizes implementation.
Prohibitive Policy'and'Bureanicratic Behavior
Agency officials like or dislike prohibitive mandates depending on
their desire to comply, If the policy does not conflict with other agency
goals or alienate traditional supporters, agency staff generally welcome
prohibitive policy because of its apparent precision. Prohibitive laws
prescribe clear objectives and well-defined measures of success and failure:
"Critical habitat cannot be' adverselytmodified" is a clearly defined
standard for implementation. While previous chapters have shown that the
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determination of what is critical habitat is discretionary, once
boundaries are drawn, it appears easy to determine whether the habitat
will be modified by a project.
The precision of prohibitively-prescribed policy makes it easy for
agency staff to implement: It prescribes clear objectives, gives unam-
biguous direction, and reduces the uncertainty associated with nonprohib-
itive prescriptions. It is quite possible that agencies will prefer a
difficult yet certain directive to an uncertain one. For example, the
Army Corps of Engineers wanted final guidelines to use in planning for the
Dickey-Lincoln Project, and would probably have preferred tough final
guidelines rather than the uncertainty associated with no guidelines.
Other studies have indicated the likely supremacy of fear of uncertainty
over fear of stringency.5
Prohibitive policy is also easy to implement because it limits the
range of expertise necessary to take action. Statutes that mandate
balancing various interests require a range of talent that often is not
present in single-(or dominant-) purpose agencies; or the staff may be
present, but balancing requires large expenditures of staff time to deal
with the multidisciplinary nature of the analysis. Agency officials do not
want to have to deal with this problem. For example, the 1978 Amendments
to the ESA require that an economic impact study be prepared for each
proposed action. OES staffers bemoaned their new responsibility: "Most
of us are not happy to do this...We're not economists, we're biologists."6
In addition, prohibitive policy places the agency in a powerful
position where there appears to be no discretion. Agency staffers can play
the "We're just doing what the statute makes us do" game. The prohibitive
statute makes implementation appear to be entirely a technical matter.
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Hence, agency officials can cloak discretionary judgments in the guise of
technical decision-making. The courts have tended to ratify this stance:
For example, in both of the ESA court cases, the FWS was clearly "the
expert". The appelate courts would not go beyond the FWS' opinion in
examining the merits of TVA's or DOT's case, since the ESA had clearly
defined consultation as mandatory and had absolutely restricted adverse
modifications of critical habitat.
While prohibitive policy enhances the agency's power by casting deci-
sions as technical, it tends to hide the discretionary decisions that are
made throughout implementation. Since the problem appears to have a
technical solution, there is really little reason to incorporate huge
amounts of public input into the decision. Indeed, formal
public participation in the implementation of the ESA focuses primarily
on the amassing of data to support or oppose a designation or a listing.
Very little is done to ascertain the impact of the designations since
balancing of different kinds of impacts is not prescribed. The NEPA-review
process -- one way public comment has been incorporated into many federal
actions -- has been effectively sidestepped in the implementation of the
ESA.8 Discretionary redefinition, trade-offs, value judgments -- all are
made almost exclusively by the Act's administrators without outside
consultation or review. With prohibitive policy, it is hard for external
parties to identify where discretion occurs; it is even harder to argue
that other public inputs should be included in the seemingly-technical
decision.
For most other kinds of policy, analysts often define a "good" policy
as one that includes'all affected interests in decisions-made in imple-
mentation. Yet it is commonly assumed that outside input should be
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excluded from the implementation of prohibitive policy. Indeed, public
participation seems inimical to the'notion of a prohibitive policy: In-
terest groups should not influence the'FWS' decision whether a species is
or is not endangered. But regardless of what "ought" to be, external
considerations are in fact included; political negotiation takes place.
Hence, if you accept the criterion that a good policy should provide for
the participation of all affected interests, then devices such as public
hearings, comment periods, formal notifications, and review by external
committees should be structured into implementation.
If agency staff do not want to comply with the prohibitive statute,
a prohibitive mandate can result in significant organizational costs.9
For example, the prohibitive mandate may isolate-the group implementing
the policy (as it did in the case of the OES). Since the statute may call
on an office of an agency to act in a way that is counter to traditional
modes of agency operation, the office may bear the brunt of other offices'
animosity and disdain. Hence there can be real morale costs incurred
by the implementing office. With nonprohibitive mandates, the implementing
office could translate the offending item into traditionally-acceptable
terms, or could just limit its activities. But the absolute nature of
prohibitive policy and the concurrent threat of lawsuit opens the agency
to public and legislative scrutiny, and controversy. Large amounts of
agency resources must be expended to deal with these nonprogrammed
situations,. The agency can also pay a cost for doing a good job. The
media, for example, played the snail darter-Tellico Project conflict as
absurd, portraying the FWS as inflexible and eccentric. The OES-biologists
probably took this as proof of their good work, boosting their confidence
in the "quest". But most of the rest of Interior shuddered about its
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public image.
Prohibitive Policy as Political'Strategy
By supporting prohibitive policy, legislators and interest groups
can affect their own power positions in the political arena. Prohibitive
policy, for example, can be very effective as a symbolic statement of
support for a goal. Elected officials can use such statements to please
voters and constituent groups. Precise statements are more easily under-
stood than lengthy, imprecise formulas for trade-offs and balancing. For
example, it is a more powerful statement to say that "no species will
consciously be allowed to go extinct" than to say that "we'll do our best
to conserve endangered species but other priorities may come up and force
us to consider trade-offs and possibly allow or cause some species to go
extinct because we need economic development and some species are not
important anyway."
The symbolic nature of prohibitive policy is quite valuable to
elected officials. Since the media and the public can understand prohib-
itive mandates easily, politicians can use such statements as a way of
attracting news coverage and as a way of demonstrating commitment. For
example, one analyst has suggested that the reason that the 1970 Clean Air
Act was such a strong statement was a result of Senator Edmund Muskie's
desire to appear more committed to improving the quality of the environment
than was President Richard Nixon in light of the upcoming 1972 elections.1 0
When'dealing with a popular or emotional issue, nonprohibitive state-
ments can sometimes he used to imply weakness or even corruption. For
example, one alternative to banning the discharge of pollutants (or defining
acceptable effluent standards) is to auction "pollution rights," giving
companies the right to pollute up to a certain level. While this scheme
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may have the same net effect as a standards approach, it appears morally
corrupt: The public does not generally feel that industries should have
the right to discharge pollutants. Similarly, the idea that the benefits
of a development project can be weighed against the value of a species
seems corrupt to many individuals. Thus many groups expressed a sense
of moral outrage at the 1978 Amendments to the ESA which included a
"God committee" -- a review board that could exempt projects from the obli-
gation to preserve an endangered species provided by the ESA. In contrast
to policies that provide an explicit balancing of social objectives, pro-
hibitive policies promote an image of moral commitment and political
strength regardless of how they are finally implemented.
Prohibitive policy is also valuable as a political statement because
it appears to limit the discretion of "faceless bureaucrats". Often it
is politically dangerous to go on record in favor of an agency having the
power to pick and choose between social objectives. More commonly, elected
officials condemn the caprices of bureaucratic agencies. Senator Hodge's
(Ark) comments at the 1978 ESA hearings are representative: "I will tell
you as an individual citizen and a Senator, I am not willing to trust any
single agency of this government with my final environment."1 1 Even
though the limitation may be more apparent than real, the image of limiting
bureaucratic discretion is a popular one and is generally well-received in
a Congressman's home district.
While elected officials can use prohibitive policy to boost their
popularity and strength, interest groups can use it to increase their
effectiveness in influencing the direction of implementation. Both
supporters and opponents can use the precision of a prohibitive mandate
to their advantage. Sabatier and Mazmanian have pointed this out in a
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recent paper: "Clear objectives also serve as a resource to actors within
and external to the implementing institutions who'perceive deviations
between statutory objectives and policy outcomes." It is easy to see where
the actions of the implementing agencies deviate from the prescribed path.
In policy that prescribes emission standards, for example, groups can
measure the actual emissions and compare them with the statutory pre-
scription. In the case of the ESA, opponents could claim, for example,
that certain species that were currently listed were not endangered under
the terms of the Act and should be de-listed. Proponents could argue that
species that were not listed, should have been. They could also claim
that development projects like the Tellico Project would adversely affect
critical habitat and/or an endangered species and should be stopped.
In all these cases where an interest group plays a watchdog role,
the resources provided by the prohibitiveness of the policy is buttressed
by the presence of a legal remedy. In the ESA, the citizens' suit provision
clearly made outside comment louder. Both of these elements -- prohibitive
prescription and citizens' suit - allow external groups to place pressure
on the administrative agency. It is not sufficent just to have the citizens'
suit provision because -- as in the case with NEPA -- it is not clear when
a substantive duty is required, nor is it easy for the courts to determine
that any agency has fulfilled its duty if it is not clearly laid out by
the statute.
Besides providing an enhanced ability to measure agency compliance,
prohibitive policy can be used by interest groups to boost their power in
implementation negotiations. Most laws regulate the behavior of a number
of interacting groups and individuals, Who is included in the negotiations
and their relative power positions are of critical importance to the outcome.
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Statutes define who is in the game and the rules by which they should
play. Prohibitive policy has a heavy influence on the inital distribution
of power in the arena. In the case of the ESA, it gave the proponents of
preservation an extremely strong position from which to start. In Federal
project planning, for example, wildlife preservation has always taken a
back seat, but the ESA changed that by requiring federal developers to
take this interest seriously. In so doing, it started the advocates of
preservation in an extremely strong position in the ensuing discussions.
While this did not necessarily change the overall result of the discussions,
it did affect who was compensated in the process. Commercial interests
were protected; species were added to the endangered list. Development
was achieved; endangered species were protected.1 3
Groups that advocate prohibitive policy should recognize several of
it liabilities, however. Prohibitive statutes can be used irresponsibly
by individuals who claim the fixer role, but are really pursuing other
goals. Thus, prohibitive policy can be used unduly as a leverage point
for external pressures to gain control over implementation. For example,
groups could use the ESA to stop the Tellico Project regardless of whether
they cared about the goal of endangered species preservation that the ESA
was intended to promote. It should be noted that there is a basic
asymmetry between the ability of groups to slow down implementation versus
their ability to speed it up: Delay is always easier to accomplish. It
is possible that prohibitive policies can be structured so as to avoid
irresponsible usage. One method is to build penalties for losing (such as
loss of a bond) into the citizens' suit provision, but this may act as a
barrier to the involvement of legitimate interests. Besides, hurdling a
financial barrier may simply demonstrate wealth, not commitment.
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Proponents of prohibitive laws should also be cautious of policies
that take too large a jump away from status quo producing significant
levels of impacts on powerful regulatees. The' auto emissions reductions
mandated by the Clean Air Act are a good example. The auto industry
could claim that it was technically impossible and economically-suicidal
to pursue the ninety percent reduction goal and could simply not comply. 1 4
The administrative recourse -- to sue and fine the companies -- was not
politically or economically feasible. Hence the goals were postponed
repeatedly. If the threat is not taken seriously because it cannot be
carried out, enactment of prohibitive policy incurs an opportunity cost
in that other kinds of policy might have been more net effective. Thus,
the "believability" of the threat is critical to the effective imple-
mentation of prohibitive policy.
The real danger that proponents of prohibitive policy should consider
is the potential for backlash that accompanies enactment of a prohibitive
mandate. It is very possible that the perception of irresponsible
activities, unrealistic goals, and apparent inflexibility may combine
to yield pressures for recision of the prohibitive mandate. This, of
course, happened to the Eighteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
which prohibited the manufacture, sale or tansportation of intoxicating
liquors. 5 Similarly, amendments to the ESA were passed which emasculated
portions of the law. If a backlash builds, the resultant change in
policy may backstep past the place where society might have been had a
non-absolute policy been passed in the first place.
The hidden discretion provided by a prohibitive statute alters the
strategic position of different groups in different ways. It obviously
enhances the power of the technical experts significantly. As a result,
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organizations and individuals that are tied into the day-to-day adminis-
trative information network are in a good position relative to other
interests. Hence traditional agency supporters and groups with a common
disciplinary base can use prohibitive mandates to their benefit. Regulated
groups whose goals are unpopular can also benefit, because their comments
do not appear in public forums. However, hidden discretion can be a
significant problem for interests that would "normally" not be included
in agency discussions and negotiations. If a group is outside the network,
they find it especially difficult to participate in the implementation
of prohibitive policy. Such groups should argue strongly for provisions
for public participation and/or technical review when the policy is being
formed.
Prohibitive Policy as a Means of Regulating Agency Behavior
By changing the power relationships of the actors involved in imple-
mentation, prohibitive policy can have a significant impact on federal
agency behavior. Indeed the strategic impact of prohibitive policy may be
an effective method of regulating agency behavior in extreme cases where
traditional forms of regulation will not work. Bardach has identified
four major ways to control administrative behavior: 6 prescription,
enabling, incentives, and deterrence. To control federal development
agencies, the ESA prescribes appropriate behavior, enables agencies to
act appropriately by funding FWS' consultations (expert input), and
sets up a significant deterrence system by providing the precision of a
prohibitive mandate backed by the opportunity for citizens' suit. Without
the prohibitive mandate, it is doubtful that agencies would comply with
the preservation goal since their support comes from interests that are
opposed to preservation.
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Theory suggests that in a bargaining situation like implementation,
negotiation will take place only if both parties can be made better off.17
(Economists would say we have to start at a Pareto inferior point.) Prior
to the inclusion of the prohibitive mandate in the ESA, development agencies
had no incentive to protect endangered species since they could only be
made worse off (that is, they had to expend resources to protect something
that did not buy them anything with their supporters). By adding the
potential costs of extended controversy, the ESA put the development
agencies in a position where negotiating (seeking ways to include the pre-
servation objective in their planning) would result in their being better
off: It would reduce the possibility for embarrassing controversy, the
potential for costly litigation, and the uncertainty about continuing.
Other federal wildlife conservation programs have tried to regulate
agency behavior without the prohibitive mandate and have failed. The Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA)1 8 is the best example. The FWCA
was first enacted in 1934 to provide a mandate to water resource develop-
ment agencies to include fish and wildlife conservation in project planning.
It outlined a control system by prescription and enabling. Twice the Act
was legislatively reexamined and amended because it had not significantly
19
influenced agency behavior. The 1958 Amendments even boosted consider-
ation of wildlife conservation to equal status with other goals such as
regional economic development. But there is considerable evidence that
the FWCA has done little to influence the behavior of development agencies.
The U.S. General Accounting Office, for example, undertook a study of 11
major development projects and 17 permit requests in 1972-1974. It
concluded that,
"...the policies of the Coordination Act 'had not been effectively
carried out,' because the construction and permitting agencies
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had not always consulted with the wildlife agencies when
required to do so, because the wildlife agencies had often
failed either to evaluate adequately the wildlife effects of
proposed developments or to make their evaluations available
in sufficient time to influence development decisions, and
because the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service had been unable to resolve jurisdictiona½0
disputes stemming from the 1970 executive reorganization."
This conclusion has led to pressures for a third set of amendments
to the FWCA. In hearings held in July 1978, for example, Senator John
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Chaffee (R.I.) complained about the "permissiveness" of the Act. Since
the FWCA has probably done as much as it can in the way of prescription
and enabling, its supporters might push for prohibitive policy backed
by legal recourse as a way to get the agencies to include the conservation
mandate in their planning programs. The problem is not predominantly
financial because federal money is available for mitigation purposes.
Nor is it limited to the federal construction agencies: Interior and
Commerce have yet to finalize regulations on the Act's implementation.
Control by traditional incentives will not work in this case either.
The conventional wisdom holds that agencies compete for additional programs
and funds. Hence, to encourage them to do something, the policy-designer
should include incentives that play to their "imperialistic" tendencies.
But this is a program that development agencies do not want or understand.
It makes life difficult and pays very little compared to the huge sums
in capital-intensive development projects. It is difficult to conceive
of financial incentives large enough to induce development agencies to
pursue an endangered species program at the cost of major modifications
to some of their projects.
Traditional forms of deterrence do not work very well for regulating
agency behavior either. If you fire someone for doing a bad job, he cannot
improve. If you take away a program's funding for bad work, it's not going
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to get better. Deterrence works primarily by threat, not by carrying out
the threat. As in most deterrence systems, the threat of external action
and controversy is probably best left as a threat perhaps ratified by
a test case or two. Over time, organizations learn what they can do to
satisfy a prohibitive mandate and what they can get away with. For
example, after several years of initialreluctance, most agencies now
routinely prepare environmental impact statements as mandated by NEPA.
Prohibitive policy thus incurs systemic start-up costs paid by the agency
and the judiciary. These costs may be a requisite part of the deal, and
are likely to diminish over time as institutional learning takes place.
Prohibitive policy has worked as a significant incentive to get
agencies to comply. The Mississippi sandhill crane and the snail darter
cases prove this. If the ESA had not been interpreted as mandatory and
binding on DOT, the Interstate-10 project would have been constructed with-
out the habitat-protection modifications. The same thing was true with the
snail darter. Without the prohibitive mandate, the snail darter would
have by now become extinct in the Little Tennessee River. A similar
pattern of compliance can be seen in the early years of NEPA: Agencies
were reluctant to comply until the courts made it clear that the procedural
requirement of preparing an impact statement was mandatory.
It is clear that the FWS views the Section 7 mandate as a club to
force development agencies into compliance. For example, FWS Director
Lynn Greenwalt testified in the 1978 hearings that "a legislative exemption
from Section 7 compliance would, at this point in implementation of the act,
set an extremely undesirable precedent. It would undermine present and
future good-faith consultation efforts. We would anticipate great reluc-
tance by development agencies to enter into meaningful consultation if there
228
is any possibility of an exemption, Sponsors of projects which have
suitable alternatives which would minimize or eliminate adverse impacts
might be reluctant to implement even-minor modifications if there was a
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possibility of achieving an exemption."
Prohibitive Policy and the Substance of the Issue
Beyond its use as a means of altering the relative political power
of interest groups and agencies, and as a way of regulating agency behavior,
prohibitive policy is a useful (and probably necessary) legislative re-
sponse under two substantive conditions: when there is a social ethic
involved, and when the risks of allowing certain activity is too great.
Prohibitive policy is inherently inefficient since it does not explicitly
allow for balancing the benefits provided by reaching the policy's goal
against the cost of complying with it. Even though negotiation takes
place in spite of the prohibition, a prohibitive mandate can incur signifi-
cant costs of compliance in financial terms, in start-up and organiza-
tional costs, and in the potential for backlash and irresponsible use.
Beyond these, a prohibitive mandate can force an agency into nonprogrammed
decision-making, consuming scarce resources. Hence, the substantive basis
for using this kind of policy must justify significant resource expenditures.
Laws that define and protect social ethics are an appropriate use of
prohibitive policy. Indeed, if you believe that society is making a moral
statement, prohibitive statements may be necessary. Ethics are by defi-
nition prescriptions of right and wrong behavior. It would not be appro-
priate, therefore, to set out policy that encourages negotiation between
these positions. Some ethical relationships are well-defined and
generally accepted in a culture: Enacting prohibitive laws to protect
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these relationships is not controversial. Murder, for example, is pro-
hibited by most human societies. Other relationships are not as generally
accepted: the right of a woman to an abortion, for example, or the
right of a nonhuman species to exist. To advocate the use of prohibitive
policy to protect these rights is a question of personal or group values
about what is right and wrong. Hence, it is entirely appropriate to push
for prohibitive laws to protect endangered species if you feel they have
a right to survive.
In pushing for adoption of a prohibitive mandate, however, proponents
have to weigh the possibilities of a backlash: It is possible that
implicit recognition of a right (especially one 'held by a minority) may
at times be more beneficial to the holder of the right than explicit
codification. This is especially true if the institutional network would
protect the right on its own. Proponents should also recognize the
hidden discretion problem that accompanies prohibitive mandates, and
should push for the inclusion of review mechanisms in the statute.
None of this implies that ethics (and hence policy definitions) are
static. Okun (1975), for example, has discussed the evolution of ethical
relationships as a dynamic process. 5 Ethics are continually reassessed
and modified through time. Prohibitive policy that defines and protects
ethical relationships can change accordingly. But by arguing that pro-
hibitive mandates are necessary to protect fundamental rights, it is
assumed that the rights are too important to be redefined by the adminis-
trative bureaucracy: Major shifts from the law require the attention of
a broader set of social representatives.
The second circumstance in which prohibitive policy is useful is
when the risks of allowing the prohibited activity are too high. If you
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are extremely risk averse, and feel that by allowing an activity to take
place, there is a possibility of incurring disastrously-high costs, pro-
hibitive policy is an appropriate way to protect yourself. For example,
interest groups that advocated a prohibitive law to protect endangered
species based their arguments in part on an estimate of risk and
uncertainty: "We do not know what might happen in the future if we lose
a species (high uncertainty), but there might be high costs." The
endangered species issue is tricky, because not many humans will argue
that the potential costs of losing one species are terribly high; but
the aggregate loss of many species -may indeed be costly. If global
society could forecast the location and impact of all present and future
development, could evaluate its needs in terms of medicinal and other
uses of species, and could objectively evaluate the possibility of finding
new value in a type of species, then perhaps some preservationists would
agree to the conscious extinction of several plant or animal species.
But this is of course unlikely: Preservationists apply their aggregate
risk estimate to the individual species level because decisions are
made at that level.
There are several dimensions to the risk-avoidance argument:
(1) how likely is it that the feared event (disaster) will take place
(a probability)? (2) how accurate is the estimate of risk (degree of
uncertainty)? (3) if the disaster occurs, what is its cost? (4) how
reversible is the consequences of the disaster? (5) how certain are the
estimates of cost and reversibility? The decision to argue for prohibi-
tive policy due to risk is based on a combination of these factors. For
example, an event might have an extremely small probability of occurrence,
yet be devastating in its consequences.
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Groups have advocated prohibitive policy to avoid risk in a number
of recent cases; Moratoria on constructing new nuclear power plants
(and arguments to shut down existing facilities); bans on the transship-
ment of nuclear wastes and liquified natural gas (LNG) through cities
and states;-moratoria on recombinant-DNA research; bans on ocean dumping
of toxic wastes. All of these reflect a certain attitude towards the
probability of a certain event occurring, and the acceptability of the
resulting situation.
It is possible to build "escape valves" into prohibitive laws that
avoid risk. Some of the nuclear moratoria do this: They are worded so
that when additional information becomes available (or another event
happens), the ban is released. In the nuclear moratorium in California,
for example, the ban will be lifted when a solution to the waste storage
issue is resolved. The central issue in including an escape valve is
who determines when the ban should be lifted. In many cases, advocates
of absolute prohibitions argue that the risks and consequences of an
event are so great that the broadest sample of society should vote on any
recission of a ban. In the case of the ESA, for example, opponents of
the 1978 amendments argued that in the event of a truly irreconcilable
conflict between a project and a species, Congress should be forced to
make a decision; this would provide a significant incentive to resolve
conflicts prior to that stage, and would subject the project to the most
intense scrutiny. (Also, in a strategic sense, the preservationists feel
that Congress would have a hard time voting against endangered species
because of their public appear.)
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In summary; This thesis has looked at one case of the use of prohi-
bitive policy. It has discovered that prohibitive policy is not imple-
mented prohibitively; rather, it is subject to the influence of a wide
range of nonstatutory forces that provide for the balancing of other
social interests. Hence, those who criticize prohibitive mandates on the
basis of inflexibility should relax somewhat. Yet there are some reasons
to advocate prohibitive mandates as opposed to other kinds of policy
depending on one's objective. From an agency's standpoint, a prohibitive
mandate can be valuable in limiting the range of required expertise, in
defining clear objectives, and in reducing external perceptions of the
discretionary nature of the process. If the agency does not want to comply
with the mandate, framing a law as prohibitive can limit the ability of
an agency to redefine the program in terms of its standard operating
procedure. Hence, it can cause real morale and organizational costs.
From a politician's standpoint, a prohibitive law can be an extremely
effective means of making a political statement: It is clear and
easily-understood by constituent supporters. It tends to counter
perceptions of weakness or immorality provided in statutes that allow
explicit balancing to occur.
From an interest group's standpoint, a prohibitive policy can be
useful because it appears to define clear measures of administrative
effectiveness: An agency either did or did not stop an activity; it did
or did not comply. Prohibitive statutes change the relative bargaining
positions of the various actors that participate in implementation nego-
tiations. Hence, the power of some interests is increased relative to
others. Since many of the discretionary decisions that are made through-
out implementation are hidden by its technical appearance, the interests
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that already have "the ear" of the implementing agency are benefitted by
the prohibitive statute. Other groups should therefore advocate inclusion
of review procedures in the law even though it is framed as prohibitive.
Prohibitive policies also have the ability to regulate agency beha-
vior when other forms of regulation do not work. When there is a mechanism
for outside interests to sue for agency noncompliance, a prohibitive man-
date acts as a tremendous incentive to comply. It is more effective than
policy that provides for explicit balancing because the judiciary can
perceive noncompliance more easily. (This is true even though much
discretion is hidden by the process: It may be hard to know what is
going on day-by-day, but it is easy to enforce once noncompliance is
recognized.) Since agencies fear protracted controversy, they will work
harder at resolving conflicts between other goals and the prohibitive
mandate.
Finally, the analysis suggests two substantive circumstances under
which prohibitive policy is especially appropriate: when there is a
fundamental right or moral issue involved, and when the proponents of the
policy are so fearful of a possible event that they want to avoid the
chance of its occurring entirely. Both of these circumstances, of course,
involve questions of human values -- in determining what is right and
wrong behavior, and what is valuable to protect at what cost. These are
in fact the central questions of the endangered species case. To answer
them (and hence to decide whether to advocate the use of prohibitive
policies) requires an individual assessment of what is moral, and what is
valued. Economics and biology only help us slightly in making these choices.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
1. This tends to weaken Theodore Lowi's argument that laws should not
be passed without clear standards of implementation. Even with the
clarity provided by a prohibitive statute, there are many oppor-
tunities for administrative redefinition of the statute. (See
Lowi, 1969, p297+)
2. Turner, 1970, p6.
3. The 1975 standards were relaxed at least three times. In 1973, EPA
Administrator William Ruckelshaus granted a one-year extension.
In 1974, Congress passed the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordi-
nation Act which postponed the deadline another year. In 1975,
EPA Administrator Russell Train granted an additional year's delay.
(Reisner, 1977b, p3-4)
4. U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, 1977, p36.
5. See, e.g., Yaffee, 1973, in which local wastewater treatment agencies
would have preferred stringent standards that would not change for a
long period of time over weaker standards that incrementally changed.
6. Washington Post, March 7, 1979.
7. Schelling points to the importance of "commitment" in a negotiation in
that other parties have to respond to the committed party. The com-
mitted party essentially sets the agenda or the starting point for
bargaining. In the case of the ESA, the prohibitiveness of the statute
allowed the FWS to play "committed". Other groups and agencies had
to respond to the FWS' position since in almost all cases both sides
could be made better off if some bargain was struck. This is fairly
obvious with commercial interests like shrimp trawling when they are
faced with potential restrictions on their activities. (Schelling,
1960, p37)
8. Indeed, the Pacific Legal Foundation has filed suit against the FWS in
an attempt to make the agency prepare environmental impact statements
so that outside review is possible. See U.S. Congress, House, Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 1978b, p849-851.
9. Note that the key element here is the desire not to comply. Tradi-
tional organizational behavior literature (such as Simon, 1957) suggests
that organizations like clear objectives. As pointed out above in the
text, clear objectives (such as a prohibitive mandate) are desirable
only if the organization wants to comply with the mandate. If it does
not, prohibitive mandates can force them to accept programs they would
otherwise redefine to a more "acceptable" form.
10. Jones, 1975, p1 9 1-2 10.
11. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, 1978a,
p228.
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12. Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979, plO.
13. In many ways this agrees with the Coase theorem that suggests that in
a bargaining situation where both parties can be made better off by
negotiating and where there are no transaction costs, the results of
the bargain will be the same regardless of who holds the rights in
question; but the resulting asset position differs. The ESA assigned
control of the bargaining situation to the preservation interests.
In bargaining, they were compensated (projects were modified; miti-
gation took place) while projects continued to be built. (Coase, 1960)
14. The ability to effect mass non-compliance is of course influenced by
the degree of organization present in the regulated group. A monopo-
listic or oligopolistic industry may be able to unite in non-compliance
more easily than firms operating under pure competition. On the other
hand, the oligopolistic industry may be able to absorb the costs due
to the regulations more easily while firms operating at a slim profit
margin may scream bankrupcy and get exemptions from the mandate.
15. Ratified January 16, 1919; repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment
on December 5, 1933.
16. Bardach, 1977, p1 1 0-1 2 4 .
17. Schelling has examined the process of bargaining and has concluded that
to induce negotiation, there has be to "some range of alternative out-
comes in which any point is better for both sides than no agreement
at all." (Schelling, 1960, p22)
18. 16 U.S.C. 661-667e (1970)
19. P.L. 85-624, August 12, 1958, 72 Stat. 563.
20. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Improved Federal Efforts Needed to
Equally Consider Wildlife Conservation with Other Features of Water
Resource Development" (1974), cited in Bean, 1977, p207.
21. NWF Conservation Report (23):343, August 4, 1978.
22. For example, the Sikes Act Extension (16 U.S.C. 670(g)-670(o)(Supp IV
1974) authorizes a mitigation program on public lands under control of
the Departments of Interior and Agriculture.
23. The President recently directed the Secretaries of Interior and
Commerce to draw up regulations by March 1, 1979. (NWF Conservation
Report (23):343, August 4, 1978)
24. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works,
1978a, p19.
25. Okun, 1975.
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APPENDIX A -- FLOW DIAGRAM OF LISTING AND CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION
PROCEDURES
STEPS:
(1) NOMINATION
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LISTIG 1 |
(2) NOTICE OF REVIEW
(3) PROPOSED LISTING
(4) FINAL LISTING
(Source: MacBryde, B., "Plant Conservation in the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service", Extinction is Forever: The
Status of Threatened and Endangered Plants of the Americas,
The New York Botanical Garden, undated, p64.)
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APPENDIX B -- NUMBERS OF SPECIES IN ACTIONS TAKEN PURSUANT TO THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973
Proposed Listing.
Gross
3
244
1859
77
63
2246
Net**
3
24
75
76
61
239
Final Listing
Gross
3
14
198
33
40
288
Net***
3
10
39
21
37
110
* Does not include reclassifications or the species listed in
the Smithsonian Report (which was taken as a notice of review
for 3187 species of plants)
** Does not include reclassifications, Appendix I species, or
plants proposed in the Smithsonian Report
*** Does not include reclassifications, Appendix I species, or
captive species listings
Notice of
Gross
67
3271
1
57
67
3463
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Total
Review
Net*
65
83
1
56
2
207
Proposed
Critical
Habitat
0
7
9
50
33
99
Final
Critical
Habitat
0
0
6
16
11
33
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APPENDIX E -- CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THE INTERAGENCY
CONSULTATION PROCESS
Date Action
Dec 28, 1973
May/June 1974
Oct 16, 1974
Dec 3, 1974
April 22, 1975
May 29, 1975
April 1, 1976
April 22, 1976
May 20, 1976
Nov 11, 1976
Jan 26, 1977
May 15, 1977
Jan 4, 1978
Endangered Species Act signed into law
Regional meetings held to explain the Act to Federal
and State agencies
Internal memorandum from Secretary of the Interior to
Interior offices and bureaus emphasized the importance of
Section 7, defined Interior responsibilities, and gave lead
implementation role to FWS
Joint letter from Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to
all Federal agencies, defining respective roles of the
two lead agencies and highlighting agency responsibilities
under Section 7
Federal Register notice explained concept of Critical Habitat
Interagency meeting held in Washington, D.C., chaired by
FWS and attended by 42 agencies, further explained Section 7
responsibilities. Federal agencies request that guide-
lines be developed. Ad hoc interagency committee formed
to prepare interim guidelines.
First critical habitat designation made (snail darter)
Guidelines finished and circulated to all agencies
At the request of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
the guidelines were submitted to federal agencies for a
"quality of life" review.
At OMB's request, the draft proposed regulations -- the
revised guidelines -- were submitted for a second
"quality of life" review
Proposed regulations published in the Federal Register
At the request of the OMB, FWS convened an interagency
meeting to discuss the proposed regulations
Final Section 7 regulations published in the Federal
Register
__ ___
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APPENDIX G -- FLOW DIAGRAM OF THE INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION PROCESS
Federal agency
reviews its action
No effect
No consultation
I
unless request by FWS*
Threshold examination conducted
by FWS within 60 days after
receipt of letter.* FWS determines:
1. Action will promote
conservation of listed species.
Biological Opinion is so written.
2. Action is not likely to have an
impact on listed species or habitat.
Biological Opinion is so written.
3. Action is likely to have an adverse
impact on listed species or habitat.
Biological Opinion is so written.
4. Insufficient information to conclude
action is not likely to have adverse
impact on listed species or habitat.
FWS will so notify the Federal agency
and the agency will have to provide the
FWS with additional information.
Federal agency will
determine final course of
action in light of its
Section 7 obligations.
* Points at which there is written communication between the Federal
agency and the FWS
(Source: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 1978b, p1167)
\1/
May affect
1
Initiate consultation by
letter to Regional Director
with available information*
L.
FWS will respond within 60 days
of receipt of adequate
information and documentation.
Response will be in accordance
with items 1, 2, or 3.*
I |
-
I
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APPENDIX H -- HIERARCHICAL PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS
IN INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION (SECTION 7)
Congress
_ L
Fish and Wildlife
Administrative H
. 1~~~I
Fish and Wildlife
Office of EndangE
Interior
e Service:
ierarchy
e Service:
---A An ; c Federal Constiruction Agencies
Tennessee Valley Authority
Army Corps of Engineers
Bureau of Reclamation
etc.
Secretary of the
Fish and Wildlife Service:
Regional Offices
_ 
.
__ _ ._ __ _- ^
, 
. |
. A _~~~
11\
-
\
___
\
I
i
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
II
iI
=Lc t Ylu I T1
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APPENDIX I - IMPLEMENTATION TIME LINE
January
February
March
April
1 May
9 June
7 July
4 August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
1 May
9 June
7 July
5 August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
1 May
9 June
7 July
6 August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
1 May
9 June
7 July
7 August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
1 April
9 May
7 June
8 July
August
September
Judicial
·Action,
1-10 STOPPED
TELLICO STOP
Legislative
Action
HR HEARINGS
S HEARINGS
ED
S HEARINGS
HR HEARINGS
S HEARINGS
HR HEARINGS
HR HEARINGS
Total Numbers of Actions (* = 3 actionsf
3 15 30 45 60 75 90
'C
IC*
k*k*** * ** * ******k*********
IC**
k~*** * **  ~fk******,k
Total
Actions
3
3
1
16
3
5
* 255
8
6
65
*1961
4
3
4
26
4
64
9
2
12
9
17
2
17
13
14
17
5
5
5
43
9
5
34
34
7
+ Total Actions = Number of Proposed Listings + Final Listings + Proposed
Critical Habitats + Final Critical Habitats
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